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How Belgian Colonizers Impregnated Thousands of African Women—Then took away their children

Between 1920 and 1960, thousands of Belgian citizens relocated to the Congo. This population consisted largely of civil servants, engineers, and single men who left their families in Europe to manage colonial operations. Upon arrival, many of these men formed relationships with local African women.

From these unacknowledged unions, thousands of mixed-race children were born. These children often possessed lighter skin and European features, serving as visible markers of relationships that ran counter to the official colonial narrative. Despite their biological connection, the vast majority of the European fathers chose not to legally recognize or register these children, leaving them entirely within the custody and care of their African mothers in local villages.

By 1948, the growing population of mixed-race children—known historically as métis—began to present an administrative dilemma for the colonial government. Their presence directly challenged the strict policies of social and racial segregation that the administration sought to maintain. To address this situation, the state implemented a systematic policy to remove these children from their maternal families and place them into specialized institutions.

The Institutional Framework of Separation

The Congo operated under a system of strict separation. European residents lived in modern, well-developed urban sectors featuring paved roads, electricity, and running water. The local African population resided in separate, underdeveloped quarters lacking basic public infrastructure. Legally and socially, cross-cultural unions were prohibited by the administration to maintain distinct social boundaries.

In practice, however, these boundaries were frequently crossed. Because European women rarely accompanied the initial waves of male settlers, many men formed domestic arrangements with local women. By the 1940s, thousands of mixed-race children lived in rural villages across the region.

To manage this demographic, the colonial administration established a specialized agency in 1948 called the Oeuvre de Protection des Métis (The Society for the Protection of Mixed-Race Children). While its stated public objective was to provide education and social integration, the agency’s primary function was the systematic registration and documentation of these children. Officials compiled detailed ledgers recording names, ages, physical descriptions, locations, and the identities of the European fathers.

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Individual Accounts of the Policy

The structural impact of this policy is best understood through the individual experiences of those who lived through it. Henri, a young European engineer who arrived in the region in 1943 to supervise mining operations, lived in an isolated residence provided by his employer. Like many single expatriates of the era, he hired local staff to manage the household.

Among his employees was Ensala, a young woman from a neighboring village. In 1945, Ensala gave birth to a daughter named Monique. The child inherited her father’s distinct features but received no legal acknowledgment, financial support, or surname from him. Monique was registered solely under her mother’s name, growing up within the rural community where her appearance made her a subject of curiosity and isolation.

In May 1948, following the completion of the government’s centralized registries, administrative trucks began arriving in rural villages to execute separation orders. The administration targeted young children between the ages of two and five, calculating that younger children would adjust more quickly to institutionalization and have fewer memories of their biological families.

When the state vehicles arrived at Monique’s village, officials accompanied by local interpreters presented formal relocation orders to the families. Despite maternal resistance, the children were systematically collected and placed into transport vehicles destined for distant institutional centers.

Life Within the Care Centers

Monique was transported to a large brick institution managed by religious orders in the Katanga region, roughly 600 kilometers away from her home village. Upon arrival, the children underwent a strict process of assimilation designed to sever connections to their origins:

  • Language Substitution: Children were forbidden from speaking local languages such as Kikongo, Lingala, or Swahili. All communication was mandated to occur strictly in French.
  • Identity Standardization: Personal items were replaced with identical uniforms, and hair was uniformly cut to reduce individuality.
  • Rigid Routines: Daily schedules were strictly controlled, revolving around early morning devotionals, academic lessons, agricultural or domestic labor, and structural maintenance of the facility.

Simon, another child placed in the same institution at five years of age, recalled the severe environmental and social conditions of the facility. The dormitories, constructed with corrugated iron roofs, reached extreme temperatures during the dry seasons. Inquiries regarding family or requests to speak native languages were met with immediate disciplinary measures by the staff.

The institutional philosophy was predicated on the idea that these children needed to be thoroughly integrated into European cultural frameworks, yet they remained isolated from both European and African societies. They existed in a legal and social limbo—insufficiently European to be granted citizenship, yet estranged from the traditional communities of their mothers.

The 1960 Evacuation and Abandonment

By the late 1950s, political movements across Central Africa successfully demanded national sovereignty. On June 30, 1960, the Congo officially declared its independence from colonial rule, prompting a rapid and widespread evacuation of European administrative and civilian personnel.

During the chaotic transition period, the future of the estimated 20,000 institutionalized mixed-race children became a subject of brief administrative debate. Some officials proposed evacuating the children to Europe and granting them formal citizenship. However, political factions opposed the measure, arguing that European society was unready to absorb a large population of mixed-race individuals.

Ultimately, the departing administration withdrew without establishing a formal plan for the children. Administrative files, identity registries, and personnel records were either destroyed or shipped back to Brussels during the evacuation, leaving the children without legal documentation or proof of lineage.

Lea, who was 14 years old in 1960 and had spent eight years in an institution, witnessed the sudden departure of the staff. Two days prior to independence, the directress informed the residents that the facility was closing permanently and that the incoming local government would assume responsibility for them. When Lea requested information regarding her mother or her European father, she was informed that the relevant registry files had been lost.

Following the departure of the administrative staff, the children were left entirely unsupervised in empty facilities without financial resources, food reserves, or legal status. As the region entered a period of civil unrest and military mutinies, many of the older children fled into urban areas or attempted to navigate their way back to rural provinces, though few possessed the necessary information to locate their maternal relatives.

Post-Independence Realities and Statelessness

In the decades following 1960, the survivors of the separation policy faced profound systemic challenges. Lacking birth certificates, parental surnames, or regional documentation, many found themselves legally non-existent.

“Without verifiable parental data or a documented place of birth, thousands of individuals became functionally stateless, unable to obtain passports, secure formal employment, or contract legal marriages.”

Lea eventually managed to relocate to Europe in the 1970s, where she trained and worked as a professional nurse. Despite residing in Brussels for decades, her legal status remained unresolved for a generation because she lacked a valid birth certificate or formal recognition from her biological father.

Monique remained in the region, working for decades in domestic service within the capital city of Kinshasa. She spent her adult life attempting to locate records of her mother, but the wholesale destruction of regional archives during the 1960 evacuation rendered her search unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, the majority of the European fathers had returned to their home countries during independence, transitioning back into conventional domestic lives, careers, and families without ever acknowledging their African descendants or the institutional framework that had separated them.

The Long Path to Recognition and Legal Redress

For over fifty years, the history of the métis remained largely absent from institutional curricula, historical textbooks, and public discourse in Europe. The systemic relocation of these 20,000 children was treated as a closed chapter of colonial administration.

The advent of the internet in the early 2000s altered this dynamic. Online forums and digital databases enabled aging survivors across Europe and Africa to connect, compare accounts, and recognize that their individual experiences were part of a coordinated state policy. In 2015, survivors established the formal association Métis de Belgique to campaign for historical accountability, the opening of state archives, and official state apologies.

The organization utilized media outreach and archival research to bring the issue before the public. This sustained advocacy resulted in a series of institutional responses:

  1. The Ecclesiastical Apology (2016): The religious authorities that had managed the colonial care centers issued a formal apology acknowledging their participation in the forced separation of children from their mothers and the difficult conditions within the institutions.
  2. The Parliamentary Colloquium (2017): The Belgian Senate hosted a formal inquiry where survivors presented direct testimonies regarding their childhoods, institutional discipline, and the long-term impact of statelessness.
  3. The Executive Acknowledgment (2018): Prime Minister Charles Michel delivered an official address before the Chamber of Representatives, formally recognizing that the state had implemented a discriminatory segregation policy that caused deep, multi-generational suffering.

In March 2019, the federal government issued an official apology to the victims of the separation policy, marking the first time the state formally accepted responsibility for its role in the system.

The Precedent-Setting Judgment of 2024

Seeking formal legal accountability beyond symbolic statements, five survivors—Monique, Simon, Lea, Noëlle, and María José—initiated civil litigation against the state in 2021. They sought formal damages and a judicial declaration that the state-sponsored separation policy constituted a systemic violation of fundamental human rights.

The state’s initial legal defense argued that the events had occurred too far in the past, that the statutory limitation periods had expired, and that the actions, while flawed by modern ethical criteria, conformed to the administrative standards of the colonial era. The court of first instance initially ruled in favor of the state’s technical defense.

The plaintiffs appealed the decision. On December 2, 2024, Chamber 31 of the Brussels Court of Appeal issued a historic, definitive ruling before an assembly of journalists, activists, and descendants.

The appellate judge read the comprehensive verdict, stating that the court found definitive proof that the plaintiffs had been systematically removed from their mothers during early childhood without maternal consent, based solely on racial classification. The court ruled that these actions were part of a coordinated, state-engineered strategy to eliminate a demographic group from public view.

Crucially, the Court of Appeal categorized the state’s systematic policy as a serious breach of international law and a violation of fundamental human rights that is exempt from conventional statutory limitations. The landmark ruling ordered the state to provide formal legal redress and financial compensation to the survivors, establishing a major legal precedent for the evaluation of colonial-era administrative actions under modern international human rights frameworks.

Credits: AC. The Belgian colonizers who impregnated thousands of African women and then stole their chiIdren – News Lighttopix

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Trafficked, beaten and raped: raids reveal scale of abuse of women in Asia’s cyberscam centres

was 11pm, but at the cyberscam compound inside Laos’ Golden Triangle, workers were logging on for a long night shift, scamming Americans online.

Every night, workers sat at their computers until the early hours, building fake profiles of glamorous, jet-setting women on Facebook and Instagram. Sarah trawled the web to find older men to target with messages, where she fawned over their jobs, asked how their day had been and exchanged photos of luxury travel and beach trips. Each conversation she had was meticulously designed to follow a multi-day script, and monitored by bosses who walked up and down the long rows of desks.

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All In A Day’s Job: Face to face with an old Angolan Guerrilla!

By Emmanuel O. Fashakin MD, Esq.

When Fidel Castro died on November 25, 2016, I wrote him a memorial, thanking him for his intervention in Africa which made the “liberation” of many countries in the Southern part of the continent possible. I remember our many marches as students in the 1970s calling for independence for Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, end of apartheid in South Africa and release of Nelson Mandela. One morning, in my Brooklyn office, I came face to face with one of the liberating Cuban Guerrillas in Angola and Namibia. 

I am used to patients asking me, in view of my unAmerican last name and thick African accent “where are you from?” I usually ignore such questions, deeming them irrelevant, or tell them tales like “Brooklyn”, “Samsabusa”, or “Archipelago.” Many of them wisely drop the subject, but that morning, there was something unusual about this 66 year old Cuban emigrant, a new patient to the practice, who wanted to know where in Africa I came from.

“Nigeria!”, I finally told him. “Ah, Nigeria. I fought in Angola!” “What?”, I exclaimed! “You were one of the Cubans sent by Castro to fight in Angola!” Yes, he affirmed. They were well armed by the Soviet Union. He told me that they killed lots of Portuguese in Angola, until they fled, and Angola became independent. He remembered fondly Dr Augustino Neto, the warlord freedom fighter turned First President of Angola.

Ok, my patient is Cuban, spoke only Spanish, and the Angolans spoke Portuguese: “how did you communicate with the Angolans?” “We had our commanders”, he explained. “Our commanders spoke to the Africans, and tell us where to fight, and we fight.” “After Angola was liberated, we crossed over to Namibia and fought against the South Africans”.

I doff my heart! It’s tough fighting a war to liberate your own country, but to cross the ocean and fight another man’s war of independence is something else. Africa is forever grateful to Fidel Castro’s Cuba and the Soviet Union for helping the continent throw off the yoke of oppression in our own homelands

Thank you old soldier! I feel honored being in the same room with you. May God bless Cuba and may Fidel Castro Rest In Peace.

Emmanuel O. Fashakin MD, Esq.

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Working People United set to honour Pastor Enoch Adeboye with responsible citizen award

Working People United (WoPU), a broad coalition of patriots comprising organised labour unions, seasoned professionals, artisans, traders, and stakeholders across critical sectors of Nigeria’s economy, has announced its intention to confer its highly esteemed “Responsible Citizen Badge” on Pastor Enoch Adeboye, the revered General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG).

This recognition underscores WoPU’s commitment to celebrating individuals whose voices and actions embody patriotism, integrity, and a steadfast dedication to national unity. Pastor Adeboye’s influence, which transcends the pulpit, has consistently reflected moral clarity, responsible leadership, and a deep concern for Nigeria’s stability and progress.

“The Responsible Citizen Badge” is not merely symbolic; it represents WoPU’s civic mission to highlight exemplary citizens whose contributions strengthen institutional accountability, foster constructive dialogue, and inspire collective responsibility in addressing Nigeria’s challenges.

By honouring Pastor Adeboye, WoPU seeks to affirm the value of principled leadership and encourage Nigerians at home and abroad to engage in nation-building with dignity and respect.

The honour will be bestowed in recognition of the highly revered clergy’s courageous and statesmanlike defence of Nigeria’s leadership and institutions, particularly in relation to the country’s ongoing security challenges.

The declaration follows Pastor Adeboye’s remarks at the US–Nigeria Faith Heroes Award Gala in Washington, where he responded to criticism of the Nigerian President’s handling of national security.

In his comments, Pastor Adeboye firmly rejected claims that the President had failed in addressing insecurity, stressing that the Commander-in-Chief’s role is to provide strategic leadership and direction, while operational responsibilities rest with the nation’s security agencies.

He noted pointedly that the President is not expected to “put on khaki,” underscoring the constitutional clarity of executive responsibility.WoPU described Adeboye’s intervention as a patriotic act and a demonstration of high responsiveness.

According to the coalition, Adeboye’s remarks contribute to a more balanced national discourse at a time when Nigeria faces complex security challenges requiring unity of purpose, institutional accountability, and coordinated action.

Speaking on the honour, WoPU Convener and National Coordinator, Comrade (Prince) Williams Eniredonana Akporeha praised Pastor Adeboye’s courage and moral clarity:

“Pastor Adeboye has consistently demonstrated leadership that extends beyond the pulpit. His voice in moments of national tension reflects responsibility, wisdom, and a sincere commitment to the stability and progress of Nigeria. Unlike others who have gone abroad to disparage the country for personal gain, he has chosen to defend Nigeria with dignity and patriotism.”

The “Responsible Citizen Badge Award”, unveiled during WoPU’s Good Governance Summit on June 25, 2026, at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Centre in Abuja, is designed to honour individuals whose public engagement strengthens unity, promotes responsible leadership, and advances constructive national dialogue.

WoPU emphasised that the award is civic in nature, not political, and is intended to recognise voices that contribute meaningfully to peace, accountability, and national development.

By honouring Pastor Adeboye, WoPU seeks to highlight the importance of responsible citizenship and encourage Nigerians at home and abroad to engage in discourse that uplifts the nation rather than undermines it.

State Police vs Police State, By Olufunke Baruwa

Nigeria may finally be on the verge of one of the most consequential constitutional reforms since the return to democratic rule in 1999. Last week, the Senate passed the Constitution Alteration Bill establishing State Police, moving the country closer to abandoning one of the world’s most centralised policing systems. The proposal, which still requires approval by at least 24 State Houses of Assembly before it becomes law, seeks to create state police services operating alongside the federal police, with governors empowered to appoint Commissioners of Police, subject to legislative confirmation. It also contains safeguards intended to prevent political abuse.

The development has predictably reopened one of Nigeria’s oldest constitutional debates. Should policing remain exclusively under federal control, or should states be trusted with their own police services?

For every Nigerian who believes state police is long overdue, another fears it could become nothing more than an instrument of political intimidation. The question before us is therefore not simply whether Nigeria needs state police. It is whether Nigeria can build state police without becoming a police state.

The Case for State Police

Few would argue that Nigeria’s current policing architecture, as it is currently structured, is working.

A country of over 230 million people, spread across vastly different geographical, cultural and security environments, relies largely on a single centrally controlled police force headquartered in Abuja. The result is painfully obvious. Response times are slow. Intelligence gathering is weak. Officers are frequently deployed to communities they neither understand nor speak the local language. Governors are constitutionally designated as the chief security officers of their states, yet they possess little operational authority over the police officers expected to secure those states.

Meanwhile, insecurity has become frighteningly diverse. The North-East continues to battle insurgency. The North-West grapples with banditry and mass kidnappings. The North-Central experiences recurring farmer-herder conflicts. The South-East faces separatist violence. The South-South contends with oil theft, while urban centres across the country battle armed robbery, cultism and organised crime.

Expecting one central command to effectively manage these vastly different threats has become increasingly unrealistic. Analysts argue that decentralised policing could improve response times, strengthen intelligence gathering and allow officers with local knowledge to respond more effectively to emerging threats.

Indeed, Nigeria has already experimented with decentralisation, albeit informally. Regional security outfits such as Amotekun, Ebube Agu and Hisbah emerged largely because states were searching for solutions that the federal policing structure could not adequately provide. State police merely formalise what insecurity has already forced upon the federation.

Federalism, after all, is built upon the principle that power should be exercised as close to the people as possible. If states can manage education, healthcare, transportation and taxation, why should security remain almost entirely centralised?

The Fear of a Police State

Yet, the strongest argument against state police is not about security. It is about power. Nigeria’s democratic history offers little comfort to those who fear abuse.

Many governors already wield enormous influence over state institutions. State assemblies are frequently accused of acting as extensions of executive power rather than independent legislatures. Local governments often operate with limited autonomy. In several states, political opposition struggles to function freely, while journalists, activists and civil society organisations sometimes face intimidation.

Against that backdrop, giving governors operational influence over armed police formations understandably raises alarm. Critics worry that state police could become tools for election manipulation, harassment of opposition figures, suppression of peaceful protests and persecution of political critics. Rather than protecting citizens, state police could end up protecting incumbents.

These fears are not imaginary. Nigeria’s political history is filled with examples of security agencies being used for partisan purposes, even under federal control. Those who oppose state police therefore ask a simple question: if existing institutions have sometimes been politicised, why should citizens believe that state-controlled police will behave differently?

Perhaps recognising these concerns, the Senate included several safeguards in the proposed legislation. Among them is a provision prohibiting state police from arresting, detaining or deploying force against individuals merely for criticising government. The bill also envisages continued federal oversight and intervention where state police engage in serious abuses or where public order breaks down.

These provisions are encouraging. But laws alone do not prevent abuse. Nigeria already possesses numerous constitutional guarantees protecting freedom of expression, due process and fundamental rights. Their existence has not always prevented violations. Institutions matter far more than legislation.

Reforming Institutions, Not Just Structures

The debate, therefore, should not become a simplistic choice between federal police and state police. Both systems can fail. Federal police have often been criticised for delayed responses, poor intelligence coordination, inadequate manpower, corruption and limited community trust. State police, if poorly designed, could simply replace one set of problems with another.

The real challenge is institutional design. How should recruitment occur? Who investigates complaints against officers? Who disciplines misconduct? How are operational standards maintained? How are poorer states expected to finance professional police services without compromising salaries, equipment and training? What mechanisms prevent governors from arbitrarily dismissing commissioners or directing politically motivated operations? These questions matter far more than the constitutional label.

Successful federal countries such as the United States, Canada, Germany and Australia all operate decentralised policing systems. But they also possess strong independent courts, active legislatures, professional oversight bodies, transparent recruitment systems and vibrant civil societies capable of holding police accountable.

Nigeria cannot simply copy the structure while neglecting the institutions that make the structure work. State police should never mean fifty different policing philosophies operating without national standards. Training, forensic standards, human rights compliance, intelligence-sharing and disciplinary procedures must remain nationally coordinated even if operational control becomes decentralised. Otherwise, insecurity may simply become decentralised as well.

Beyond Politics

Perhaps the greatest mistake Nigerians could make is reducing this conversation to partisan politics. Supporters are not necessarily enemies of democracy and opponents are not necessarily enemies of security; both sides raise legitimate concerns. Nigerians wear the shoe and know where it pinches; from SARS to MOPOL, abuse of policing powers is the lived reality of many Nigerians, especially the youth.

Nigeria desperately needs a policing system that is faster, smarter and closer to communities. But Nigerians also deserve protection from political intimidation regardless of who occupies Government House. Security without liberty becomes oppression and liberty without security becomes an illusion.

The challenge before Nigeria is therefore not choosing one over the other but designing institutions capable of protecting both simultaneously. History will not judge this reform merely by whether state police was established; it will judge whether ordinary Nigerians became safer without becoming less free.

That is the true constitutional test. If state police becomes an instrument for protecting citizens, history will remember this reform as a bold step towards genuine federalism. If it becomes another weapon in the hands of powerful politicians, then Nigeria would have achieved something far more dangerous than decentralised policing – decentralised authoritarianism. And that is the difference between state police and a police state.

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

From one question at Johannesburg airport to South Africa’s xenophobia crisis

Nkiru-and-Ikeazor-Akaraiwe-at-the-Zambezi-River-Livingstone-Zambia

By Ikeazor Akaraiwe, SAN

The first sign that something was deeply wrong did not come from a mob attack or a viral video of foreign-owned shops being looted. It came from a routine immigration interview at Johannesburg’s O.R. Tambo International Airport.

For Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Ikeazor Akaraiwe, SAN, a single question posed by an immigration officer during a stopover in 2017 has, in hindsight, come to symbolise the prejudice and resentment that have since erupted into repeated waves of xenophobic violence against African migrants in South Africa. In this commentary, he argues that the crisis reflects not only mounting economic frustrations but also political choices that risk turning fellow Africans into convenient scapegoats.

  1. My wife and I, in 2017, went for the International Bar Association conference which held in Sydney, Australia, that year.
  2. Flying with South Africa Airlines, we were obliged to layover in Johannesburg for about nine hours.
  3. The first question we were asked by the immigration officer at O.R. Tambo airport, was, “why can’t you Nigerians stay in your country? !!!”
  4. It is in the light of this question that I am able to understand the black on black violence / killing of dark-skinned foreign nationals ongoing in South Africa, which, by the way, is worse than a scandal.
  5. And in President Cyril Ramaphosa announcing to his people that South Africa’s economic woes was caused by undocumented immigrants, he was deflecting his own administrative failings towards Africans of other nationalities.
  6. What has Cyril Ramaphosa done to stem the tide of undocumented migrants in South Africa?
  7. How many has he deported? And what has he done to block the routes they follow to come into South Africa?
  8. While it is the right of the government of South Africa to save its primary constituency from economic adversity, it must do so with utmost sensitivity to the role played by brother African nations to dismantle apartheid.
  9. In response to the ongoing xenophobia’s murders which has spared no nationality in South Africa, it is my view that an emergency meeting of the African Union should be called, and African nations agree to collectively break off diplomatic relations with South Africa.

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WHEN TERROR PAYS (Part IV A): The forgotten Nigerians

After the Negotiations… After the Reintegration… What Became of the Victims?

By Law & Society Magazine Investigations

The Man Who Refused to Die

When the bandits caught up with Aliyu Hassan, they did not shoot him. Death by bullet would have been too quick. Instead, they tied his hands and feet, dragged him into a nearby hut, poured petrol over his body, struck a lighter and walked away, convinced the flames would finish what they had started. His only crime was returning to his family’s farmland in Katsina State.

Like thousands of displaced farmers across Nigeria’s North-West, Hassan had hoped to salvage what remained of a livelihood destroyed by years of armed violence. His family had already abandoned their village after repeated attacks. Farming was the only means of survival they had left.

The attackers accused him of hiding money. He told them he had none. They demanded to be taken to his father’s house. He explained there was no home to return to because insecurity had already driven the family away. The explanation changed nothing.

As the fire engulfed him, Hassan rolled desperately across the sand, screaming for help until the flames eventually died. A passer-by later found him barely alive and rushed him through a succession of hospitals before he finally received treatment. He survived. But survival, he would later discover, was only the beginning.

Months after the attack, Hassan remained displaced. His village was still unsafe. His farm remained inaccessible. The men who tried to burn him alive were still somewhere in the forests stretching across Katsina and neighbouring states. His story is horrifying. It is also painfully ordinary.

Across northern Nigeria are thousands of men, women and children whose lives have been permanently altered by banditry, terrorism and mass violence. Some escaped kidnappings. Others watched relatives murdered before their eyes. Many fled burning homes carrying little more than the clothes they wore.

Yet while governments negotiate with armed groups, announce reintegration programmes and celebrate the surrender of so-called repentant fighters, another population continues waiting. Not for rehabilitation. For justice.

After the Headlines Fade

For nearly a decade, Nigeria’s response to banditry has swung between military offensives and negotiated settlements. Entire policy frameworks have been built around persuading armed groups to surrender, lay down their weapons and rejoin society. Supporters argue that dialogue saves lives where military campaigns alone have failed. Critics counter that negotiations reward violence and encourage future criminality.

That debate has dominated national discourse. Far less attention has been paid to the people left behind. The farmer who cannot return to his land. The widow raising children inside a displacement camp. The schoolgirl whose education ended the day armed men stormed her classroom. The trader whose shop was reduced to ashes. The community that no longer exists except in memory.

If Part I of this investigation examined how negotiations with bandits evolved, Part II traced the rise and collapse of reintegration efforts, while Part III questioned whether peace can endure without accountability.

This final chapter asks a different question.

What happens to a country when reconciliation focuses on those who carried the guns while those who lived under them remain forgotten?

The Village That Paid Twice

In Dekara, a quiet community in Niger State’s Borgu Local Government Area, residents believed they had done everything necessary to save themselves. Bandits had imposed a ₦10 million levy on villages across the district. The demand was explicit. Pay or prepare to bury your dead.

Families contributed what little they had. Farmers sold livestock. Traders pooled resources. Community leaders collected the money and handed it over, hoping the payment would purchase the one thing government had been unable to guarantee. Security.

The gunmen accepted the money. Then they returned. This time, they set the community’s primary school ablaze. The destruction of Central Primary School shattered whatever confidence remained that negotiations with armed groups could offer lasting protection.

Residents had paid.

They had complied.

They had trusted the promises of criminals because they believed they had no alternative.

Still, the violence came.

For many analysts, the attack exposed the fundamental weakness of negotiating from a position of fear. Extortion is not peace. It is merely violence paid in advance.

A Country Learning to Live With Fear

Banditry in Nigeria has changed.

What began as largely opportunistic cattle rustling has evolved into an organised criminal enterprise stretching across multiple states, sustained by kidnapping, illegal taxation, arms trafficking and increasingly sophisticated financial networks.

In many rural communities, armed groups no longer wait to kidnap wealthy individuals. Entire villages are taxed. Farmers pay before cultivating their fields. Transport operators pay before using rural roads. Herders pay before accessing grazing routes. Failure to comply often attracts devastating consequences.

The result is the emergence of what security experts increasingly describe as a parallel authority operating outside the Nigerian state. In these territories, bandits determine who farms, who trades, who travels and, in some cases, who lives. Communities caught between armed gangs and an overstretched security architecture often make impossible choices.

Pay the levy.

Raise ransom.

Abandon the village.

Or die.

The Business of Terror

Perhaps no public official has captured this transformation more candidly than Katsina State Governor Dikko Umaru Radda. Banditry, he observed, has become a business. His assessment goes beyond rhetoric.

Like every successful criminal enterprise, the violence now sustains an entire economy. Kidnapping generates ransom payments. Extortion finances arms purchases. Illegal mining provides additional revenue. Livestock theft supplies black markets stretching beyond Nigeria’s borders.

Intelligence leaks, according to the governor himself, sometimes emerge from within government institutions and security agencies, allowing criminal groups to evade military operations almost as quickly as they are planned.

If those observations are accurate, Nigeria is confronting more than isolated criminal gangs. It is confronting an underground economy built on insecurity. That reality raises difficult questions about the long-term effectiveness of policies centred primarily on persuading individual commanders to surrender. Removing one gang leader does little if the financial incentives driving the violence remain intact.

The Peace That Never Arrived

Official announcements often speak of restored calm. Military operations eliminate camps. Bandit commanders surrender. Governments declare progress. Yet beyond the press conferences lies another Nigeria. A Nigeria where farmers still avoid fertile land because they fear ambush. Where parents hesitate before sending children to school. Where villages emptied years ago remain overgrown and abandoned. Where internally displaced families continue living in temporary shelters long after the television cameras have disappeared.

For these communities, peace is measured differently. It is not the number of weapons surrendered. It is whether children can walk to school without armed escorts. It is whether farmers can harvest crops without paying protection money. It is whether families can sleep through the night without wondering whose turn will come before dawn.

Until those questions receive affirmative answers, many victims argue that peace exists only in official statements.

The Invisible Majority

Nigeria has spent years counting surrendered fighters. It has devoted considerably less effort to counting broken communities. The woman widowed by a midnight raid. The child who still wakes screaming after witnessing executions. The elderly man who has not visited his ancestral home in five years. The teenager whose education ended when her school closed indefinitely. These stories rarely feature in policy debates. Victims seldom sit at negotiation tables. Few are consulted before reintegration programmes are announced.

Yet they are the people expected to live with the consequences long after governments declare success. Their silence has become one of the greatest blind spots in Nigeria’s response to insecurity. And while the nation debates how to rehabilitate perpetrators, millions of survivors are still searching for a chance to rebuild their own lives. For many of them, that journey has barely begun.

The Republic of Displacement

For every village that makes the headlines after a deadly attack, dozens more disappear quietly. There are no breaking news alerts when families abandon ancestral homes under the cover of darkness. No television cameras follow the elderly as they leave behind generations of history. There are no official ceremonies marking the closure of schools that may never reopen or the farms that will no longer be cultivated.

Yet these silent departures have become one of the defining features of Nigeria’s insecurity crisis. Across the North-West and North-Central, displacement is no longer an emergency. It has become a way of life.

According to humanitarian agencies, Nigeria remains one of Africa’s largest displacement crises, with millions of people uprooted by conflict, banditry and communal violence. While the insurgency in the North-East accounts for a significant proportion of the displaced population, the rapid expansion of banditry across Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kaduna and Niger states has created a second humanitarian emergency that often receives far less international attention.

Entire communities have emptied.

Villages that once echoed with the sounds of children, livestock and market traders now stand deserted, their mud walls collapsing under years of neglect. Footpaths have disappeared beneath weeds. Roofs have caved in. Wells have dried up.

Some settlements no longer exist except on old electoral maps. For those forced to flee, displacement is not simply the loss of shelter. It is the loss of identity. Farmers become refugees in their own country. Community leaders lose the people they once governed. Children grow up without ever knowing the villages their parents still call home.

Many displaced families now live in overcrowded camps, unfinished buildings, schools converted into emergency shelters or with relatives whose own resources were already stretched before they arrived.

Temporary arrangements have quietly become permanent realities.

A Harvest of Fear

Long before food prices began dominating national conversations, insecurity had already begun reshaping Nigeria’s agricultural landscape. Across vast stretches of the North-West, farming has become one of the country’s most dangerous occupations.

Fields that once produced maize, millet, sorghum and beans now lie uncultivated because their owners fear they may never return alive. Others cultivate only small portions of their land, choosing fields closer to military checkpoints while abandoning larger, more fertile plots deep inside rural communities.

The consequences extend far beyond the affected states. Every abandoned farm represents food that will never reach Nigerian markets. Every farmer prevented from planting contributes to shrinking food supplies. Every harvest lost pushes prices higher for families hundreds of kilometres away. Banditry is no longer merely a security crisis.

It is an economic crisis.

It is a food security crisis.

It is an inflation crisis.

When economists discuss rising food prices, they often focus on exchange rates, transport costs and inflationary pressures. Those factors matter. But behind every expensive bag of maize is another story. Sometimes it is the story of a farmer who paid ransom instead of buying fertiliser. Sometimes it is the story of a community that abandoned hundreds of hectares after repeated attacks. Sometimes it is simply the story of land that has become too dangerous to cultivate. The cost of insecurity is now reflected on dinner tables across Nigeria.

The Taxation of Terror

Perhaps nowhere has the collapse of state authority become more visible than in the emergence of what residents increasingly describe as “bandit taxation.” Communities no longer fear only kidnappings. They fear invoices.

Across several affected states, armed groups routinely impose levies on villages before planting seasons. Farmers are ordered to pay before accessing their own land. Livestock owners must pay to graze cattle. Traders contribute levies before transporting goods through certain rural corridors.

These are not isolated acts of extortion. They increasingly resemble parallel systems of governance. Where government authority has weakened, armed groups have filled the vacuum, collecting revenue, enforcing rules and punishing defiance with extraordinary brutality.

The implications stretch beyond criminality. Taxation has always been one of the defining powers of government. When armed groups successfully impose taxes across large territories, they are doing more than stealing money. They are exercising authority. That reality should concern policymakers as much as the violence itself.

Children of the Crisis

The youngest victims rarely appear in official security briefings. Yet they may carry the longest scars. A child who spends formative years moving from one displacement camp to another loses more than classroom instruction. Friendships disappear. Routine disappears. Stability disappears.

Psychologists have long warned that prolonged exposure to violence fundamentally alters childhood development. Anxiety, depression, behavioural disorders and post-traumatic stress become increasingly common among children exposed to repeated attacks. In many communities, fear has become an inherited condition.

Children who never witnessed the first attacks still grow up hearing gunfire in family conversations, watching parents panic whenever motorcycles approach and learning evacuation routes before they learn multiplication tables. For many, insecurity becomes normal long before peace ever does.

The Schools That Never Reopened

Few images better symbolise Nigeria’s security crisis than empty classrooms.

The world remembers Chibok.

It remembers Dapchi.

It remembers Kankara.

But behind those internationally recognised names lies a quieter tragedy unfolding in hundreds of communities. Parents increasingly question whether education is worth risking a child’s life. Teachers seek transfers from vulnerable rural schools. Some refuse postings altogether.

Entire communities have watched education grind to a halt because armed groups transformed classrooms into targets. Every attack creates another generation of parents who hesitate before sending children back to school. Every closure widens educational inequality between urban and rural Nigeria. For girls, the consequences are often irreversible.

Interrupted education frequently leads to early marriage, economic dependence and reduced opportunities that can last a lifetime. The long-term damage extends beyond individual families. A country cannot build human capital while schools remain battlefields.

The Women Who Carry the Burden

Conflict rarely treats men and women equally. When communities collapse, women often become providers, caregivers and protectors simultaneously. Many lose husbands to violence while assuming responsibility for entire households inside displacement camps where opportunities for income are scarce.

Humanitarian organisations have repeatedly documented increased risks of sexual exploitation, trafficking, domestic violence and child marriage in communities affected by prolonged displacement. Economic hardship compounds every vulnerability. A mother who cannot feed her children becomes more susceptible to exploitation. A teenage girl who leaves school because her family fled violence becomes more vulnerable to forced marriage. A widow who loses farmland loses not only income but independence. The conflict continues long after the shooting stops.

It simply changes its victims.

The Cost Nobody Calculates

Governments routinely estimate the financial cost of military operations. Far less attention is given to the hidden economic losses accumulated year after year. How much productivity disappears when entire farming communities abandon their land? What is the lifetime economic cost of children denied education? How much investment avoids regions associated with insecurity? How much talent leaves rural Nigeria permanently because professionals refuse to return?

These losses rarely appear in budget documents. Yet they may ultimately exceed the direct costs of fighting banditry itself. The country’s insecurity crisis is not merely consuming lives.

It is consuming development.

It is consuming opportunity.

It is consuming the future.

The Measure of Peace

For government officials, peace is often measured through statistics. Fewer attacks. More arrests. Weapons recovered. Bandits neutralised. Those indicators matter. But for the people living inside conflict zones, peace is measured differently.

Can farmers cultivate without paying armed men? Can children attend school without fear? Can women walk to markets safely? Can displaced families return home?

Until those questions are answered positively, declarations of victory will continue sounding incomplete to the people who have sacrificed the most. This is because for millions of Nigerians, the greatest tragedy is not that violence came.

It is that years later, normal life has still not returned.

To be contibued.

Part I: When Terror Pays: Inside Nigeria’s controversial experiment with “repentant” bandits

Part II: When Terror Pays: How Nigeria’s search for peace left thousands waiting for justice

Part III A: When Terror Pays (PART III A): When peace comes without justice

Part III B: When Terror Pays (PART III B): The world has been here before

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US Supreme Court upholds bans on transgender athletes in female school and college sports

The US Supreme Court has ruled that states can ban transgender women from competing in female school and college sports.

The court considered cases from students in two different states who had challenged bans on participation. The two states, Idaho and West Virginia, enacted laws that required public school and college sports teams to compete in accordance with their sex recorded at birth.

One of the two challenges said the ban violates equal rights protections in the US Constitution. The other said it contradicts civil rights laws.

More than two dozen states have enacted bans since Idaho did so in 2020. President Donald Trump celebrated the decision in a social media post as a “BIG WIN”.

Under those state bans, a transgender woman – a biological male who identifies as a woman – is not permitted to compete in female sports at schools and colleges.

All nine justices on the court decided the state bans do not violate a civil rights law called Title IX that prohibits sex-based discrimination in schools.

But the judges were split along ideological lines on whether the bans contravene the Constitution’s 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law.

The six conservative justices said it did not violate the constitution, while the three liberal justices disagreed.

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Birthright citizenship ruling: US officials, lawmakers and advocates react

Reaction is rolling in after the United States Supreme Court ruled against the administration of US President Donald Trump, upholding the practice of automatically granting citizenship to nearly all individuals born in the US.

The 6-3 ruling on birthright citizenship represents a major rebuke to one of Trump’s most ambitious efforts to overhaul longstanding US immigration practices.

The majority argued that birthright citizenship is rooted in both the US Constitution and longstanding practice dating back to English common law, rejecting the Trump administration’s assertion that it should apply only to US citizens and permanent residents.

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Whether a court has the power to reverse its own judgment under Nigerian law

By M.O. Idam, Esq.

The Certified True Copy (CTC) of the judgment/ruling of the Federal High Court, Lokoja Judicial Division, now in circulation has generated varying interpretations across legal and political circles.

Having carefully reviewed the decision, I offer the following considered legal opinion, devoid of emotion and political sentiment.

My considered view is as follows.

As a general rule, once a court delivers a final judgment on the merits of a matter, the dispute becomes res judicata and the court becomes functus officio—that is, it has discharged its judicial duty in respect of that case.

The law presupposes that there must be an end to litigation. Consequently, a court that has finally determined a matter lacks jurisdiction to revisit it, either by rehearing the case or by sitting on appeal over its own decision. Any party dissatisfied with such judgment is expected to pursue the appellate process.

This principle explains the hierarchical structure of the Nigerian judicial system—from the Magistrate Courts, High Courts (including the Federal High Court), Tribunals and the National Industrial Court, to the Court of Appeal and ultimately the Supreme Court, which serves as the final court of the land.

Exceptions to the Rule

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the law recognizes limited circumstances in which a court may vacate, set aside, or vary its own judgment. These include where:

  1. The judgment is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
  2. The judgment was procured by fraud or deceit.
  3. There was a fundamental denial of fair hearing, rendering the proceedings a nullity.
  4. The judgment was entered in default of appearance, and the applicable rules permit the court to set it aside.
  5. There exists a clerical mistake or accidental slip capable of correction under the Slip Rule. This power is limited to correcting accidental errors and does not permit the court to alter the substance of its decision.
  6. A statute or the applicable Rules of Court expressly confer a power of review in the particular circumstances.

Outside these recognized exceptions, a court cannot ordinarily:

  • rehear a matter merely because it believes it reached the wrong conclusion;
  • reverse or substitute its final decision after becoming functus officio; or
  • sit on appeal over its own judgment unless expressly empowered by statute.

These principles have been affirmed in several decisions of the appellate courts, including Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250, Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) NMLR 106, and Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NLR 250 (SC).

Perhaps the most celebrated pronouncement on the subject was made by Oputa, JSC in Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya, where His Lordship stated:

“We are final not because we are infallible; rather, we are infallible because we are final. Justices of this Court are human beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be short-sighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is also true that this Court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions. Similarly, the Court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such a decision be overruled. This Court has the power to overrule itself (and has done so in the past), for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to persevere in error.”

This celebrated dictum, however, should be understood in its proper context. It recognizes the Supreme Court’s power to depart from its previous decisions in appropriate subsequent cases where justice so demands.

It should not be interpreted as conferring an unrestricted power to reopen or rehear a concluded appeal. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that it becomes functus officio once it delivers a final judgment, save in the narrow exceptions recognised by law.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated considerable reluctance to entertain applications seeking a review or reversal of its final judgments. This judicial attitude was particularly evident in the Bayelsa Governorship Election Review Applications.

In Biobarakuma Degi-Eremienyo & Anor. v. Duoye Diri & Ors. and All Progressives Congress v. Duoye Diri & Ors., decided on 26 February 2020, the applicants invited the Supreme Court to review and reverse its earlier judgment nullifying the election of the APC governorship ticket in Bayelsa State.

The Court held that it had become functus officio and that Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules did not permit a review of its judgment on the merits. The applications were consequently described as frivolous, vexatious and constituting an abuse of the process of the Court. The Court further imposed substantial personal costs against senior counsel who prosecuted the applications, explaining its determination to discourage frivolous attempts to reopen concluded litigation.

The message from these authorities is unmistakable: while the jurisdiction to revisit a judgment exists in narrowly defined exceptional circumstances, it is one that the courts exercise with great caution so as to preserve the finality and certainty of judicial decisions.

Conclusion

While applications seeking the reversal or setting aside of a court’s own judgment are not unknown to Nigerian jurisprudence, they remain exceptional remedies and are entertained only within the narrow confines recognised by law. The doctrine of functus officio remains a fundamental principle designed to ensure finality in litigation and to prevent abuse of judicial process.

Accordingly, although the order reversing the judgment in the NDC matter has understandably generated public debate—particularly having regard to the surrounding circumstances—it cannot be said that such an order is, in principle, alien to Nigerian law. The more pertinent legal question is whether the facts of the case bring it within any of the recognised exceptions that permit a court to revisit its own judgment. That question can only be answered through a careful examination of the record and the legal basis upon which the order was made.

— M. O. Idam

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