By M.O. Idam, Esq.
The Certified True Copy (CTC) of the judgment/ruling of the Federal High Court, Lokoja Judicial Division, now in circulation has generated varying interpretations across legal and political circles.
Having carefully reviewed the decision, I offer the following considered legal opinion, devoid of emotion and political sentiment.
My considered view is as follows.
As a general rule, once a court delivers a final judgment on the merits of a matter, the dispute becomes res judicata and the court becomes functus officio—that is, it has discharged its judicial duty in respect of that case.
The law presupposes that there must be an end to litigation. Consequently, a court that has finally determined a matter lacks jurisdiction to revisit it, either by rehearing the case or by sitting on appeal over its own decision. Any party dissatisfied with such judgment is expected to pursue the appellate process.
This principle explains the hierarchical structure of the Nigerian judicial system—from the Magistrate Courts, High Courts (including the Federal High Court), Tribunals and the National Industrial Court, to the Court of Appeal and ultimately the Supreme Court, which serves as the final court of the land.
Exceptions to the Rule
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the law recognizes limited circumstances in which a court may vacate, set aside, or vary its own judgment. These include where:
- The judgment is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
- The judgment was procured by fraud or deceit.
- There was a fundamental denial of fair hearing, rendering the proceedings a nullity.
- The judgment was entered in default of appearance, and the applicable rules permit the court to set it aside.
- There exists a clerical mistake or accidental slip capable of correction under the Slip Rule. This power is limited to correcting accidental errors and does not permit the court to alter the substance of its decision.
- A statute or the applicable Rules of Court expressly confer a power of review in the particular circumstances.
Outside these recognized exceptions, a court cannot ordinarily:
- rehear a matter merely because it believes it reached the wrong conclusion;
- reverse or substitute its final decision after becoming functus officio; or
- sit on appeal over its own judgment unless expressly empowered by statute.
These principles have been affirmed in several decisions of the appellate courts, including Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250, Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) NMLR 106, and Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NLR 250 (SC).
Perhaps the most celebrated pronouncement on the subject was made by Oputa, JSC in Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya, where His Lordship stated:
“We are final not because we are infallible; rather, we are infallible because we are final. Justices of this Court are human beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be short-sighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is also true that this Court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions. Similarly, the Court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such a decision be overruled. This Court has the power to overrule itself (and has done so in the past), for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to persevere in error.”
This celebrated dictum, however, should be understood in its proper context. It recognizes the Supreme Court’s power to depart from its previous decisions in appropriate subsequent cases where justice so demands.
It should not be interpreted as conferring an unrestricted power to reopen or rehear a concluded appeal. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that it becomes functus officio once it delivers a final judgment, save in the narrow exceptions recognised by law.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated considerable reluctance to entertain applications seeking a review or reversal of its final judgments. This judicial attitude was particularly evident in the Bayelsa Governorship Election Review Applications.
In Biobarakuma Degi-Eremienyo & Anor. v. Duoye Diri & Ors. and All Progressives Congress v. Duoye Diri & Ors., decided on 26 February 2020, the applicants invited the Supreme Court to review and reverse its earlier judgment nullifying the election of the APC governorship ticket in Bayelsa State.
The Court held that it had become functus officio and that Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules did not permit a review of its judgment on the merits. The applications were consequently described as frivolous, vexatious and constituting an abuse of the process of the Court. The Court further imposed substantial personal costs against senior counsel who prosecuted the applications, explaining its determination to discourage frivolous attempts to reopen concluded litigation.
The message from these authorities is unmistakable: while the jurisdiction to revisit a judgment exists in narrowly defined exceptional circumstances, it is one that the courts exercise with great caution so as to preserve the finality and certainty of judicial decisions.
Conclusion
While applications seeking the reversal or setting aside of a court’s own judgment are not unknown to Nigerian jurisprudence, they remain exceptional remedies and are entertained only within the narrow confines recognised by law. The doctrine of functus officio remains a fundamental principle designed to ensure finality in litigation and to prevent abuse of judicial process.
Accordingly, although the order reversing the judgment in the NDC matter has understandably generated public debate—particularly having regard to the surrounding circumstances—it cannot be said that such an order is, in principle, alien to Nigerian law. The more pertinent legal question is whether the facts of the case bring it within any of the recognised exceptions that permit a court to revisit its own judgment. That question can only be answered through a careful examination of the record and the legal basis upon which the order was made.
— M. O. Idam
