LAW & SOCIETY MAGAZINE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
PHASE ONE
The Historical Timeline
Objective:
To establish how Nigeria moved from fighting bandits to negotiating with them.
And this phase answers one critical question:
How did we get here?
PART ONE
From Armed Robbery to Rural Terror
Banditry in northwestern Nigeria did not begin as an organised insurgency.
Security experts generally trace its origins to armed cattle rustling, communal disputes over land and grazing routes, illegal mining, and the proliferation of small arms following conflicts in the Sahel. By the early 2000s, criminal gangs operating across Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto and parts of Niger State had begun attacking remote villages, stealing livestock and abducting wealthy individuals for ransom.
For years, these crimes were treated largely as rural criminality rather than an organised national security threat.
That assessment would prove costly.
As security weakened, criminal groups became increasingly sophisticated. They acquired military-grade weapons, established camps in vast forests such as the Rugu, Kamuku, Kuyanbana and Sububu forests, imposed taxes on rural communities, and created networks capable of launching coordinated attacks across multiple states.
By the late 2010s, kidnapping had evolved into a multi-billion-naira criminal enterprise, with schoolchildren, commuters, traditional rulers, health workers and even religious leaders becoming regular targets.
2014–2016
The Violence Escalates
Several developments transformed banditry from local criminality into a regional crisis.
Among them were:
- Collapse of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.
- Growing unemployment among young men.
- Illegal mining financing armed groups.
- Weak policing across rural communities.
- Easy access to sophisticated weapons flowing from Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
Entire villages began paying protection levies.
Farmers abandoned their land.
Schools shut down.
Communities emptied.
Yet government responses remained largely reactive.
2017
Zamfara Becomes the Epicentre
By 2017, Zamfara State had become synonymous with mass killings.
Entire communities were razed.
Hundreds were killed.
Thousands fled.
It was during this period that serious debate began over whether military force alone could stop the violence.
Some traditional rulers, religious leaders and politicians quietly initiated contacts with armed groups in an effort to reduce attacks.
These early contacts laid the groundwork for what would later become formal peace negotiations.
2018
The First Major Peace Initiative
The administration of Governor Abdulaziz Yari launched one of Nigeria’s earliest structured dialogue efforts with armed bandit groups.
Several meetings reportedly took place involving:
- traditional rulers
- security agencies
- community leaders
- representatives of armed groups
The objectives included:
- surrender of weapons
- release of kidnapped victims
- cessation of attacks
- reintegration into communities
Government officials argued that many fighters had turned to crime because of poverty and longstanding disputes with farming communities.
Critics disagreed.
They argued that dialogue was rewarding violence while victims received little or no justice.
Within months, many of the agreements began to collapse as fresh attacks were reported.
2019
Amnesty Becomes Official Policy
Following the inauguration of Governor Bello Matawalle in Zamfara, negotiations expanded dramatically.
His administration openly embraced dialogue with what it described as “repentant bandits.”
Weapons were reportedly surrendered.
Some fighters publicly renounced violence.
Several camps participated in reconciliation meetings.
Government officials expressed optimism that peace had finally arrived.
The policy attracted international attention.
Supporters argued that military victories alone had proved impossible.
Opponents questioned why people accused of mass killings were being rehabilitated rather than prosecuted.
As optimism grew, so did scepticism.
Fresh attacks soon followed.
2020
Peace Begins to Fracture
Despite repeated declarations that many armed groups had embraced peace, violence returned.
Communities that had celebrated peace agreements once again reported:
- kidnappings
- village raids
- cattle rustling
- killings
Security analysts increasingly warned that some groups were exploiting negotiations to regroup, recruit and acquire supplies.
Others argued that agreements involved only certain factions while rival commanders continued attacking civilians.
Government officials maintained that dialogue remained preferable to endless warfare.
2021
Sheikh Ahmad Gumi Enters the National Debate
Islamic scholar Sheikh Ahmad Gumi emerged as one of the country’s most prominent advocates for dialogue with armed groups.
His visits to bandit camps generated nationwide controversy.
Gumi argued repeatedly that many fighters were willing to negotiate and should not automatically be treated as terrorists.
He warned that declaring every bandit a terrorist could close channels for peaceful engagement.
His position divided public opinion.
Supporters saw him as a mediator trying to save lives.
Critics accused him of legitimising violent groups responsible for atrocities.
The Federal Government continued military operations while some state governments maintained varying degrees of engagement with armed groups.
2022
Terrorism Designation Changes the Conversation
A significant legal turning point came when Nigerian courts recognised bandit groups as terrorist organisations following applications by the Federal Government.
The designation expanded the legal powers available to security agencies and strengthened the basis for prosecuting suspected members under anti-terrorism laws.
It also complicated the question of dialogue.
Could governments continue negotiating with organisations now legally classified as terrorists?
That question remains unsettled.
2023–2025
Negotiation and Military Force Run Side by Side
Despite intensified military offensives, several northern states continued exploring various forms of dialogue, community engagement and reintegration.
At the same time:
- kidnappings reached record levels
- schools continued to close
- communities paid protection levies
- rural displacement increased
Security policy increasingly reflected two competing philosophies:
One advocated overwhelming military force.
The other maintained that some form of dialogue remained necessary.
Neither approach produced a decisive end to violence.
2026
New Questions, Old Controversies
The debate intensified after allegations emerged that Katsina State had sponsored Hajj for bandit leaders, claims the government firmly denied.
Days later, seven suspected Boko Haram and ISWAP commanders were arrested upon their return from the pilgrimage, according to the Minister of Interior.
Although the government insisted improved identity systems enabled the arrests, fresh questions emerged.
How had the suspects travelled without earlier detection?
Why were they identified only after the pilgrimage?
At the same time, Sheikh Ahmad Gumi again criticised the government’s designation of bandits as terrorists, arguing that some groups had previously demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and warning that closing avenues for dialogue could worsen insecurity.
His remarks came as fresh attacks continued across parts of Katsina, Zamfara and Niger States, where communities reported killings, mass abductions, the destruction of schools and the imposition of multimillion-naira levies despite ongoing security operations.
Phase One Conclusion
Over nearly a decade, Nigeria’s response to banditry has evolved from conventional policing to military campaigns, peace negotiations, amnesty initiatives and reintegration programmes. Yet violence has persisted, often shifting rather than disappearing. The result is a profound national dilemma: how should a democratic state confront armed groups responsible for grave crimes while remaining faithful to the rule of law and the rights of victims?
That question forms the basis of the next phase of this investigation.
To be continued.
