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After The Rescue (Part II): Beyond freedom

The children came home. The harder task begins now: helping them reclaim their childhood—and ensuring another school never suffers the same ordeal.

Law & Society Magazine Special Report

For several days, the story was measured by numbers.

How many pupils had been taken. How many teachers disappeared with them. How many suspects had been arrested. How many security personnel joined the search. Finally, after weeks of uncertainty, the figure that mattered most emerged: every child had been rescued alive.

It was a moment of genuine national relief.

The operation that secured the release of the pupils and teachers abducted from their school in Oyo State deserved the praise it received. Behind every successful rescue lies painstaking intelligence gathering, coordination among multiple security agencies and the willingness of officers to enter dangerous environments where a single mistake can cost lives. Those achievements should not be diminished.

Yet the rescue also marked the point at which a different responsibility began.

The children had escaped captivity. They had not escaped its consequences.

Long after the security operation ended, they returned to classrooms, homes and communities carrying experiences that cannot be measured by the number of days they spent in the forest. Some may resume their education with remarkable resilience. Others may struggle with fear, disrupted sleep, anxiety or an inability to concentrate. Parents who once regarded school as the safest place for their children may now hesitate each morning before allowing them to leave home. Teachers, too, face an unfamiliar challenge: helping pupils recover their confidence while restoring a sense of normality inside classrooms that have become associated with danger rather than learning.

The story therefore did not end with the rescue.

It simply changed.

For more than a decade, Nigeria has become painfully familiar with school abductions. Each incident has its own geography, its own victims and its own circumstances, but the pattern rarely changes. Armed men strike vulnerable schools, families descend into uncertainty, governments launch rescue efforts and, if the outcome is favourable, public celebration follows. Once the immediate crisis passes, attention gradually shifts elsewhere until another community finds itself confronting the same nightmare.

That recurring cycle raises an uncomfortable question.

Has Nigeria become better at responding to school kidnappings than preventing them?

The distinction matters because a rescue, however successful, represents the recovery of something that should never have been lost in the first place. Every child rescued from captivity is first a child who was failed by the systems designed to protect him or her.

That observation should not be mistaken for criticism of the security agencies that carried out the Oyo operation. On the contrary, their success underscores the professionalism and persistence required to recover hostages without further loss of life. The larger issue lies elsewhere. It concerns whether the country is investing as much effort in preventing attacks on schools as it invests in rescuing children after those attacks occur.

Education occupies a special place in every democratic society because it represents more than the acquisition of knowledge. Schools embody continuity, stability and the promise that childhood will unfold in safety. When classrooms become targets, the damage extends beyond those directly affected. Communities begin to lose confidence in institutions that once symbolised hope. Parents reconsider whether education is worth the risk. Attendance falls. Teachers request transfers. Development slows, not because schools have disappeared, but because trust has.

International experience suggests that recovering from attacks on education requires more than repairing buildings or increasing the number of security personnel around school compounds.

In Pakistan, where schools were repeatedly targeted by extremist groups, reforms gradually expanded beyond physical security to include emergency preparedness, stronger coordination between education authorities and security agencies, and sustained psychological support for affected children. Colombia’s long internal conflict forced educators and local authorities to rethink how schools could continue functioning in communities affected by violence while protecting pupils from recruitment and intimidation. Kenya drew similar lessons after attacks on educational institutions exposed weaknesses in local security coordination.

The circumstances differ from one country to another, but the broader lesson is remarkably consistent.

Children rescued from violence require more than a journey home.

They need structured support that recognises captivity as an experience capable of reshaping how young minds perceive safety, authority and the future.

Psychologists who work with children affected by armed conflict frequently caution against assuming that visible recovery reflects complete healing. Some children speak openly about their experiences. Others withdraw into silence. Many recover quickly once they are reunited with family and familiar routines. Others carry emotional wounds that become apparent only months later through declining academic performance, behavioural changes or persistent anxiety.

Recovery therefore cannot be reduced to celebration.

It requires sustained attention from parents, teachers, counsellors, health professionals and public institutions working together to ensure that a child’s return from captivity also becomes a return to ordinary life.

That responsibility belongs first to the family, but it cannot end there.

Read Also: Law & Society Magazine Special Report: Home, but not yet free

Read Also: Echoes of Trauma: Life on Hold — The waiting that changes us (Part 2)

Schools require trained counsellors capable of identifying signs of trauma before they become long-term barriers to learning. Teachers need guidance on helping pupils who may react differently to stress or reminders of their ordeal. State governments must recognise that psychological recovery deserves the same seriousness as physical recovery, particularly where children have experienced prolonged fear or violence.

These responsibilities are not simply matters of compassion.

They are increasingly recognised as obligations under international standards governing the protection of children affected by conflict and insecurity.

Nigeria endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration, a political commitment through which governments undertake to strengthen the protection of education during armed conflict and minimise the disruption that violence inflicts on learners and educational institutions. The declaration encourages practical measures ranging from safer school planning and risk assessments to improved emergency response systems and stronger coordination between education authorities and security agencies.

Its central message is straightforward.

Protecting education cannot begin only after an attack has taken place.

It must become part of national planning before armed groups identify schools as vulnerable targets.

The same principle runs through Nigeria’s Child Rights Act, which recognises the best interests of the child as the primary consideration in decisions affecting children. Although implementation varies across states, the broader constitutional and legal framework reflects a clear expectation that governments should create conditions in which children can grow, learn and develop in safety.

That expectation becomes especially significant after incidents such as the Oyo abduction.

Rescuing children fulfils one urgent responsibility.

Helping them rebuild their lives fulfils another.

To be continued

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The Sundiata Post Model (2): Historical and intellectual foundations of a knowledge-producing newsroom

​By Max Amuchie | The Sunday Stew

​Every institutional framework has a history, even when it introduces something new. Ideas rarely emerge in complete isolation; they arise from deep, structural conversations that began long before us, evolving across generations as societies confront new realities, systemic shocks, and unanswered questions.

​The Sundiata Post Model is no exception. ​Although formally introduced in the previous essay as an institutional framework for media-based knowledge production, its intellectual roots extend much further back. They lie within a long tradition of journalism’s engagement with ideas and society, while simultaneously responding to a distinctly twenty-first-century challenge: the transformation of the newsroom in the age of artificial intelligence, digital knowledge architectures, and global scholarly networks.
​The question at the heart of this essay is therefore not whether journalism has ever produced ideas—history provides an unequivocal answer to that. The more critical question is whether the modern newsroom can become an institution deliberately organised to generate original analytical constructs that contribute simultaneously to journalism, deep scholarship, and public policy. That is a different, more demanding question altogether.

​Nigeria’s Tradition of the Newspaper as an Intellectual Institution

​Long before the emergence of today’s hyper-accelerated digital media, some of Nigeria’s most influential newspapers were already serving purposes far beyond the passive reporting of daily events.
The press architectures established by pioneers like Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo—both of whom I previously discussed, alongside Chinweizu, as members of Nigeria’s rare tradition of framework builders—became foundational vehicles through which sophisticated ideas about nationalism, constitutional development, socio-economic planning, democracy, and self-government entered the public consciousness. Their publications did not merely describe political transformation; they actively generated the conceptual architecture that shaped it.
​Crucially, they achieved this by building powerful media infrastructures designed to carry these ideas at scale. Azikiwe did not just publish in Lagos; he deployed a sweeping, cross-regional syndicate anchored by the West African Pilot alongside a network of provincial pillars including the Eastern Guardian in Port Harcourt, the Nigerian Spokesman in Onitsha, and the Southern Nigeria Defender in Warri. Similarly, Awolowo founded the Nigerian Tribune in 1949 as a highly structured institutional vehicle to systematically articulate socio-political theory and regional constitutional destiny.

​In his seminal work, Renascent Africa (1937), Azikiwe laid out a broad intellectual and ideological vision that extended far beyond the immediate horizon of standard journalism, charting a course for mental emancipation and African self-determination. A decade later, Awolowo’s Path to Nigerian Freedom (1947) demonstrated how a publisher and institutional thinker could systematically articulate a rigorous, structured constitutional vision for a developing nation.
​This historical experience reminds us that journalism in Nigeria has never been confined solely to stenography. At critical turning points in the nation’s history, newspapers operated as the primary intellectual laboratories through which society debated its structural future.

This tradition of intellectual leadership through journalism is not merely of historical interest. In The Sunday Stew essay mentioned earlier, ‘The Insecurity Triad: Azikiwe, Awolowo, and Chinweizu — Nigeria’s Elite Class of Framework Builders’, I argued that Nigeria has, on rare occasions, produced public intellectuals who moved beyond commentary to construct enduring analytical frameworks. Azikiwe and Awolowo exemplified that earlier tradition, while Chinweizu demonstrated that independent conceptual innovation could continue outside formal state institutions and conventional academic structures. The present essay extends that argument by asking a different question: can the contemporary newsroom itself become an institution deliberately organised for systematic framework building and knowledge production?

​Yet, an important distinction must be recognised between that era and our contemporary challenge:
​The Nationalist Press primarily advanced political ideas, anti-colonial mobilisation, and national aspirations.
​The Sundiata Post Model represents a shift from ideological mobilisation to systematic institutional knowledge production. It asks whether an independent newsroom can generate original analytical constructs capable of standing up to the rigorous validation of the global academic ecosystem while serving active policy discourse.
​The distinction is subtle, but fundamental. It marks the evolution from political journalism to scholar-journalism.

​Journalism and the Life of Ideas

The structural relationship between journalism and ideas extends well beyond regional borders. To understand the global intellectual foundations of this model, we must reconcile two complementary traditions of public thought—both of which proved invaluable in shaping the conceptual foundations of my Trinity of State Decay (TSD) theory. ​

In framing the mind dimension of the Money–Land–Mind dynamic of the TSD, I found the works of Walter Lippmann and Hannah Arendt particularly illuminating, insightful, and enriching. Few journalists have shaped modern thinking about public communication as profoundly as Lippmann. Throughout his six-decade career in American journalism, he demonstrated that journalism could become far more than a chronicle of events; it could serve as an instrument for decoding how societies acquire knowledge, construct public opinion, and navigate increasingly complex realities.

In his foundational classic, Public Opinion (1922), Lippmann demonstrated that journalism could contribute not merely rapid information, but macro-level interpretation, permanently altering how we view the relationship between media, knowledge, and public policy. It is this Lippmannesque understanding on how information is filtered, misperceived, and understood that informs the epistemic foundations of the TSD.

From a different, deeply philosophical tradition, Hannah Arendt, a political theorist and independent scholar whose ideas reached wide audiences through public intellectual magazines and cultural journals, devoted her life’s work to understanding the structural anatomy of politics, authority, institutional decay, and the conditions that make collective civic life possible.

In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt examined human action, public space, and the enduring value of disciplined conceptual inquiry in explaining political reality far beyond the fleeting nature of immediate headlines. Her profound insights into the erosion of institutional authority and the fragility of the public realm provide an important philosophical foundation for understanding the Trinity of State Decay’s vectors of systemic fragility.

​Although operating within vastly different institutional environments, Lippmann and Arendt represented complementary pillars of intellectual rigor:
​One demonstrated journalism’s unmatched capacity to shape and democratise public understanding.
​The other demonstrated the enduring value of rigorous, uncompromised conceptual thinking regarding public life and the human world.

Together, they illuminate an important institutional possibility. If journalism can generate immediate public understanding, and disciplined inquiry can generate enduring concepts—as demonstrated by their influence on the conceptual foundations of the Trinity of State Decay—might there exist an institutional framework capable of integrating both traditions within a single, independent newsroom?

​That synthesis is the exact intellectual domain of the Sundiata Post Model.

​An Abuja Newsroom and a Contemporary Question

​The Sundiata Post Model emerged not from an insular academic department, a government research institute, or a foreign-funded policy think tank, but from an independent newsroom in Abuja. That geographical and operational fact is highly significant.

​The framework did not begin as an abstract theory searching for practical application. It emerged from journalism itself—from the lived, daily experience of reporting, investigating, analysing, and reflecting on the severe structural forces shaping Nigeria and the wider Global South.
​Over time, The Sunday Stew gradually evolved beyond a weekly opinion column into a platform for systematic, empirical inquiry. Through that deliberate evolution emerged a succession of original analytical frameworks:
•The Insecurity Triad: A conceptual framework explaining how kidnapping (Money), banditry (Land), and terrorism (Mind) function as mutually reinforcing dimensions of contemporary insecurity, generating parallel systems of violence, governance, and authority;
•The Trinity of State Decay (TSD): A macro-theoretical formulation explaining how the interaction between the Institutional Mirage, the Shadow Order, and the Money–Land–Mind dynamic drives the decoupling of formal sovereignty from effective state authority, and
•The Decoupling Sovereignty Index (DSI): An indigenous, multidimensional measurement framework designed to quantify the extent to which effective sovereignty has decoupled from formal state authority across subnational territories.

​What gradually became apparent was that these were not isolated intellectual exercises. They were the deliberate products of an emerging institutional philosophy developed through the Sundiata Post Intelligence Unit (SPIU).
More importantly, these constructs did not emerge as a single research project conceived in advance. They appeared sequentially, each responding to new empirical observations while simultaneously expanding the analytical capacity of the newsroom itself. The Insecurity Triad provided a structured lens for understanding the interconnected dimensions of insecurity. The TSD extended that inquiry into a broader theory of institutional authority and governance. The DSI subsequently translated those theoretical insights into an operational framework capable of empirical assessment. Viewed together, this progression revealed something larger than the individual frameworks themselves. It demonstrated that the newsroom had begun to develop an internal capacity for cumulative knowledge production, with each construct building upon and extending the intellectual foundations laid by its predecessor.

The fundamental question therefore shifted from “What new framework has been developed?” to “What kind of newsroom structure makes the systematic development of such frameworks possible?” ​The answer is the Sundiata Post Model.

​A New Institutional Proposition

​The Sundiata Post Model does not argue that journalism should become academia, nor does it suggest that scholarly research should migrate from the university to the newsroom. ​Instead, it advances a new institutional proposition:

​The Core Proposition: An independent media institution can systematically integrate high-velocity journalism, original qualitative research, conceptual innovation, and global scholarly dissemination within a single institutional framework, contributing simultaneously to
informed public discourse and the international knowledge ecosystem. The Sundiata Post experience demonstrates the practical viability of this proposition.

​This proposition reflects neither a rejection of journalism’s traditional role nor an attempt to merely imitate academic institutions. Rather, it represents a strategic institutional adaptation to the changing architecture of knowledge itself.
​In an era when global digital repositories, artificial intelligence discovery layers, academic networks, and news organisations increasingly intersect, the traditional boundaries separating journalism from formal knowledge production have become entirely permeable. The Sundiata Post Model seeks to explore what becomes possible when those boundaries are approached not as rigid barriers, but as unprecedented opportunities for intellectual sovereignty.

The historical journey from Azikiwe and Awolowo to Lippmann and Arendt reveals a long-standing, symbiotic relationship between journalism and ideas. The Sundiata Post Model does not seek to replicate any of those legacy traditions perfectly. It seeks to answer a contemporary institutional question:
​What becomes possible when an independent newsroom deliberately organises itself as a primary knowledge-producing institution?

​The answer begins with philosophy. The next essay examines structure.

Trust is sacred. Stay seasoned

•Dr. Max Amuchie is a Scholar-Journalist, Media CEO, Lead Researcher at the Sundiata Post Intelligence Unit (SPIU), and an Expert Member and Peer Reviewer at ScienceOpen. He is the architect of The Insecurity Triad framework for African security analysis as well as the Trinity of State Decay theory, and the Decoupling Sovereignty Index (DSI)—original frameworks for understanding, categorising, and measuring conflict, state decay, and sovereignty in the Global South. He writes ‘The Sunday Stew’, a weekly syndicated column on faith, character, and the structural forces that shape society, with a focus on Nigeria, Africa, and the Global South in a changing world.
X (formerly Twitter): @MaxAmuchie | Email: [email protected] | Tel: +234(0)8053069436

#NBADecides2026: What future for an independent bar?

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

Three score and three years ago, a defining dispute erupted in the old Western Region of Nigeria over the scope and reach of constitutional conventions in determining or terminating the tenure of high-level political leadership. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which ultimately had to pronounce on the matter, described conventions in that case as “a body of understandings which no writer can formulate.” The aftermath of that decision took the country to the brink of ruin.

This year, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) confronts its own moment of truth concerning how far conventions initially designed to accommodate national diversity in its leadership processes can be converted into ethno-tribal vetoes by entities that in fact are not part of its institutional or constitutional organs. The consequences for the association could be far reaching.

For context, the NBA elects a new set of leaders every even number year. It has for long been the assumption that “the NBA is too important to be left alone.” Elections into its leadership organs unfold as a political market-place for a complex competition of interests, many of them external to the legal profession. This year, the biggest issue is arguably the role of ethno-tribal caucuses at the Nigerian Bar.

The road to this point was paved by a combination of ordinarily unrelated events. On 14 August 1991, Taslim Elias died. He was Nigeria’s Attorney-General at independence at a time when the position was deservedly prefixed with the honorific “honorable” (hence HAGF), later becoming Chief Justice of Nigeria. At his death, he was a judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). To replace Elias for the remainder of his ICJ tenure, Nigeria nominated Bola Ajibola, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), who was then serving himself as HAGF.

That step opened up a vacancy for the designation of a new  HAGF. To fill that vacancy, military ruler, Ibrahim Babangida, nominated Clement Akpamgbo SAN. At the time, Akpamgbo was in the middle of his tenure as the 15th president of the NBA. To succeed Akpamgbo as president and in keeping with its constitution, the NBA’s first Vice-President, Priscilla Kuye, succeeded Akpamgbo as president. She was the first woman in that position.

The next cycle of elections into the leadership of the association were scheduled to occur the following year in 1992. In August 1992, members duly convened in Port Harcourt, capital of Rivers State, for the elections but the conference broke up in extraordinary fracas. Five years later, as the embers of military rule began to fade, the association was resuscitated.

In the aftermath of that crisis and at the turn of the Millennium, the NBA introduced two reforms into its leadership  process, one explicit and the other initially by convention. First, it abolished universal suffrage among its members, replacing it with a delegate system of leadership selection. In 2015, however, universal suffrage returned. Second, it introduced a convention of rotating the most important leadership positions in the association among the founding three regions of the country – Eastern, Northern, and Western regions.

15 years later, the NBA wrote this convention into its constitution by way of an amendment which mandated that “the Association shall for the purpose of elections of National Officers be divided into three geographical zones namely – Northern zone, Eastern zone and Western zone.” The positions of President, three Vice-Presidents, and General-Secretary rotate among the three zones. In particular, the NBA constitution prescribes that eligibility to run for any of the rotated offices shall be determined with reference to natal origins not establishment.

Far from stopping here, the NBA constitution goes further to prescribe that “where a position is zoned to any particular geographical zone, the position shall be rotated and held in turn by the different groups and/or sections in the geographical zone.” Remarkably, it does not say who can have a say in deploying these arrangements concerning zoning and micro-zoning.

The result has been a bazaar in nativist interest groups of lawyers in Nigeria, such as the Arewa Lawyers Forum (ALF); Eastern Bar Forum (EBF); Egbe Amofin Oodua (Egbe) Middle-Belt Lawyers Forum (MBLF); and Mid-West Bar Forum MWLF). They are not organs of the NBA in any form. Operating as ethno-tribal caucuses, these interest groups have sought to mediate the jostling for positions in the NBA. Until now, their roles have been informal operating at best at the level of unwritten conventions.

In 2018, when the presidency of the NBA rotated to the east, the EBF endorsed Arthur Obi-Okafor, SAN as their preferred candidate. In the election, however, Paul Usoro, who also came from the same region was declared winner.

In 2026, the presidency of the NBA rotates to the west. The Egbe, (an association of lawyers of Yoruba descent) and the MWBF are both active in this region. In the current election cycle, the MWBF decided not to run any candidates for the presidency, ceding it to lawyers native to the six states of south-west Nigeria.

The Egbe asserts primacy in the role of mediating the ambitions of those from that region desiring to run for presidency of the association. This year, it put forward Muyiwa Akinboro SAN as its candidate. However, Yemi Akangbe SAN and Oyinkan Badejo-Okusanya, SAN, who are both from the same region, declined to step down their ambitions. Egbe argues that it micro-zoned the position to the part of south-west from which Mr. Akinboro comes and asked the NBA to elbow the other candidates out of the contest so that he can emerge effectively unopposed.

In reality, this micro-zoning that the Egbe speaks of had been in existence since 2019. But in the 2020 contest for a president of the NBA from the western region, both Dele Adesina SAN and Tunde Ajibade SAN who contested the position came from outside that micro-zone. In 2008, Rotimi Akeredolu SAN emerged unopposed as the 24th president of the NBA by persuading other aspirants informally to stand down for him. The ethno-tribal trump asserted by the Egbe this year would be unprecedented.

In the face of predictable resistance, the association sued at the High Court in Ibadan seeking to get its way. The court issued rapid fire interim injunctions against the election process of the NBA. The NBA appealed. On 11 June, the Attorney-General of the Federation, who is a named defendant in the suits in Ibadan, claiming ostensible permission from the Court of Appeal, called a meeting of the disputing parties with all living former presidents of the NBA.

The meeting constituted a three-person subcommittee headed by Wole Olanipekun SAN, the 20th president of the NBA. It included Lanke Odogiyan and Paul Usoro SAN, respectively the 22nd and 29th presidents of the association, but there is a dispute as to what it asked the sub-committee to do.

An unsigned majority report by Olanipekun and Odogiyan claims it was constituted to inquire into “the causes of the present conflicts within the NBA” and to make recommendations as to the way forward to the HAGF. A separate report by Paul Usoro disputes this and says the sub-committee was confined to helping the HAGF to fulfill his commitment to the Court of Appeal to broker an amicable settlement among the parties.

The Olanipekun-Odogiyan report makes far reaching recommendations. Among them, it asks for the postponement of the elections (to August) and mandates the incorporation of the National Identification Number (NIN) as a voter identifier, claiming – rather incredulously – that the enrollment number, a unique identifier assigned by the Supreme Court to each lawyer in Nigeria “is not a security number.” In particular, they want an end to universal suffrage in the NBA and insist that “The micro-zoning done by the Egbe in line with the NBA Constitution should be allowed to stand.” Paul Usoro largely disagreed.

The main recommendations of the report are mutually irreconcilable.

If the Olanipekun-Odogiyan report had investigated the matter, it would have learnt that the bureaucratic and data integrations that should precede NIN integration into the unique identification system for all lawyers in Nigeria can only be implemented by the Supreme Court in collaboration with the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC). This cannot be accomplished before August 2026 “or soon thereafter.” By prescribing impossible conditions, that report effectively sought to create conditions for the tenure of the current leadership to lapse, which would enable government to end the idea of an independent bar, just as the military did in 1992.

Rather than take his proposals to the parties or to the Court of Appeal from which he claimed his mandate, the HAGF mostly amplified the Olanipekun-Odogiyan report, endorsing nearly all of its recommendations in an error-strewn document ostentatiously headed “Directions and Outcomes.” But even he could not bring himself to accept the Egbe’s insistence on imposing its ethno-tribal preference on the NBA in the current cycle.

On 8 July, the Court of Appeal declined his thinly disguised effort to end-run the cases before the court. Judgment by the court is awaited.

Pending that, the NBA’s leadership election is likely to proceed as scheduled on 18 July under court protection. Two offices will be returned unopposed while eight will be contested. When the association last voted in 2024, there were 72,071 eligible voters. On 18 July, there will be 82,213 eligible voters, (an increase of 14.07%). It is the largest in the history of the association.

A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at [email protected] 

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

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AFBA defends AGF, challenges Amnesty’s position on NBA election dispute

The controversy surrounding the forthcoming Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) elections has taken a new turn, with the African Bar Association (AFBA) strongly defending the intervention of the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and criticising Amnesty International for what it described as an unwarranted intrusion into a dispute over the governance of Nigeria’s foremost professional legal body.

In a statement issued from Nairobi on Saturday, AFBA rejected Amnesty International’s characterisation of the Attorney General’s intervention as executive interference, insisting that the comments attributed to the Chief Law Officer of the Federation were intended to encourage dialogue and a lawful, peaceful resolution of disagreements arising from the NBA electoral process.

The latest exchange comes amid continuing debates over the conduct of the NBA elections and the extent to which external actors should engage in disputes involving the internal governance of an independent professional association.

AFBA in the statement signed by its Director, Publicity and Protocol, Nicholas Sumba maintained that while the Nigerian Bar Association must preserve its institutional independence, efforts aimed at encouraging adherence to the rule of law and peaceful dispute resolution should not automatically be construed as attempts to undermine that independence.

“The Attorney General’s intervention, as publicly communicated, amounted to suggestions intended to facilitate an amicable, lawful and institutional resolution of a dispute affecting Nigeria’s foremost professional legal association,” the Association said.

“It neither constituted coercion nor usurpation of the NBA’s autonomy but reflected the legitimate interest of the Chief Law Officer of the Federation in promoting respect for the rule of law and institutional stability.”

AFBA said it was therefore “profoundly disappointed” by Amnesty International’s public criticism of the Attorney General, describing the organisation’s position as “both unwarranted and misplaced.”

According to the Association, Amnesty International has earned international respect for its work in promoting and protecting human rights through research, advocacy and campaigns against human rights abuses. However, it argued that internal electoral disagreements within a professional association do not ordinarily fall within that mandate unless they involve demonstrable violations of constitutionally or internationally protected rights.

“By entering a debate that principally concerns institutional governance and professional self-regulation, Amnesty International risks extending its public advocacy beyond the sphere of its recognised competence,” AFBA stated.

“It may inadvertently politicise issues that are better addressed through established legal and institutional processes and undermine the organisation’s perceived impartiality on matters that genuinely implicate human rights.”

The Association reaffirmed its commitment to the independence of the legal profession, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes through constitutional and institutional mechanisms.

It urged all stakeholders, including candidates, members of the Bar, senior lawyers and NBA leadership, to approach the electoral process with restraint, fidelity to the NBA Constitution and respect for established dispute-resolution mechanisms.

AFBA also called on Amnesty International to exercise institutional restraint and remain focused on its internationally recognised mandate of protecting and promoting fundamental human rights.

According to the Association, preserving the clarity of Amnesty’s mandate would strengthen its credibility and effectiveness in addressing the serious human rights challenges confronting Nigeria, Africa and the wider international community.

The statement concluded by reaffirming AFBA’s commitment to constructive engagement with institutions working to advance justice, democracy and the rule of law while maintaining that questions relating to professional self-governance should be resolved within appropriate legal and institutional frameworks.

The statement was signed by Nicholas Sumba, AFBA’s Director of Publicity and Protocol.

### Why This Matters

The exchange reflects broader tensions over the delicate balance between the autonomy of professional bodies, the advisory role of public institutions and the advocacy role of civil society organisations.

While some lawyers have viewed the Attorney General’s comments as an attempt to encourage dialogue and institutional stability, others—including Amnesty International—have argued that any intervention by the country’s chief law officer in the affairs of an independent Bar Association risks creating the perception of executive influence over a body whose independence is fundamental to the rule of law.

With the NBA national elections scheduled for 18 July 2026, the debate underscores the importance of ensuring that disputes are resolved transparently, constitutionally and in a manner that preserves public confidence in both the electoral process and the independence of the legal profession.

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AFBA seeks return of Abuja headquarters as AGF backs permanent secretariat for continental lawyers’ body

  • Fagbemi pledges support as African Bar says Nigeria’s host status deserves a befitting headquarters nearly three decades after original secretariat was taken over

Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Prince Lateef Fagbemi, SAN, has pledged support for the African Bar Association’s renewed push to establish a permanent headquarters in Abuja, backing efforts to provide Africa’s foremost body of lawyers with what he described as a property it can truly call its own.

Fagbemi gave the assurance on Friday while receiving the leadership of the African Bar Association (AFBA), led by its President, High Chief Ibrahim Eddy Mark, during a courtesy visit to the Federal Ministry of Justice in Abuja.

The meeting focused largely on AFBA’s long-standing quest for a permanent secretariat in Nigeria, the association’s preparations for its 2026 Annual Conference in Cape Verde, and ongoing engagements with key Nigerian institutions ahead of the continental gathering.

Although AFBA’s permanent secretariat is officially domiciled in Nigeria, Mark told the Attorney-General that the continental body still operates without a permanent physical headquarters and appealed for the Federal Government’s support in providing a befitting secretariat in the nation’s capital.

Responding, Fagbemi, who has been a Life Member of the African Bar Association since 2017, assured the delegation of his support.

“You are not yourself until you have a property you call your own,” the Attorney-General said, while also pledging to attend and support the association’s forthcoming annual conference.

He commended AFBA for rotating its annual conferences among African countries, saying the practice promotes inclusiveness and gives members across the continent a stronger sense of ownership.

A decades-old issue

AFBA’s request is rooted in a history stretching back more than three decades.

According to a memorandum previously submitted to President Bola Tinubu through the Attorney-General, Nigeria agreed in 1991 to host the Association’s permanent headquarters following an AFBA conference in Abuja. The Federal Government subsequently handed over a purpose-built secretariat at Plot 2031, Wuse Zone 6, Abuja, in January 1995 in fulfilment of that commitment.

The Association, however, said the building was taken over by the Federal Government in 1996 on what it described as a temporary basis following internal challenges within the organisation. AFBA maintains that the property has remained occupied by a government agency for almost three decades without the conditions attached to the temporary takeover being fulfilled.

The continental body further stated that after resolving its internal challenges, it resumed full operations but has continued to function from rented accommodation while seeking the return of its permanent headquarters.

AFBA argued that restoring the secretariat would reaffirm Nigeria’s commitment to hosting one of Africa’s oldest continental legal organisations and strengthen Abuja’s position as a hub for legal diplomacy and continental engagement.

Conference to focus on security, economy and legal reforms

Mark also briefed the Attorney-General on preparations for AFBA’s 2026 Annual Conference, scheduled for September 20 to 24 in Cape Verde.

He disclosed that the association has extended invitations to several Nigerian institutions, including the Minister of Finance, who is expected to lead a dedicated session on Nigeria’s tax reforms and their implications for investment and economic competitiveness.

According to him, the session is intended to provide investors and the international business community with greater insight into Nigeria’s evolving fiscal framework and demonstrate the country’s commitment to improving the business environment.

Mark also informed the Attorney-General that the Association had begun consultations with major security institutions, including the Nigerian Navy, as part of preparations for the conference, which will examine issues of security, economic stability and sustainable development across Africa.

Fagbemi welcomed the initiative and reaffirmed his commitment to supporting both the conference and the Association’s broader objectives.

Other members of the delegation included Prof. Agbo Madaki, Major General Shalangwa, Mimi Ayua, Teyojesam Eko and Lillian Okenwa.

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DigiCivic Initiative condemns detention of journalist Zainab Sodiq, demands respect for press freedom and due process

DigiCivic Initiative has expressed deep concern over the reported arrest and detention of journalist Zainab Sodiq by operatives of the Department of State Services (DSS), describing the incident as one that raises serious constitutional and human rights concerns regarding press freedom, due process and the rule of law.

According to media reports, Sodiq’s detention followed her professional investigation into issues surrounding the use and possession of drones, including compliance with End User Certificate (EUC) requirements.

While acknowledging the constitutional responsibility of Nigeria’s security agencies to safeguard national security and regulate sensitive technologies, DigiCivic Initiative stressed that such powers must always be exercised within the limits of the Constitution, the rule of law and Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.

“A democratic society cannot flourish where journalists face intimidation, arbitrary arrest or prolonged detention simply for carrying out their constitutional duty of gathering and disseminating information in the public interest,” the organisation stated.

DigiCivic noted that Section 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to receive and impart information without interference. It further observed that Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) reinforce the protection of press freedom and the public’s right to access information.

The organisation emphasised that investigative journalism plays a vital role in promoting transparency, exposing corruption, strengthening accountability and ensuring that citizens remain informed about issues affecting governance and national development.

Without prejudging the outcome of any investigation, DigiCivic Initiative called on the relevant security and regulatory authorities to clarify:

  • Whether the drones in question were lawfully imported into Nigeria;
  • Whether an End User Certificate issued through the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is a mandatory legal requirement for owning or operating drones in Nigeria;
  • Whether all statutory licensing and national security requirements governing the importation, possession and deployment of drones have been complied with; and
  • Whether the same legal standards are being applied consistently to all drone users, regardless of nationality or institutional affiliation.

The organisation observed that while drones are legitimate tools for commercial, industrial, environmental and security purposes, their regulation must remain transparent, consistent and compatible with constitutional rights.

“Legitimate national security concerns cannot become a justification for suppressing investigative journalism or discouraging public-interest reporting. Security and press freedom are not mutually exclusive; both are essential pillars of constitutional democracy,” it stated.

DigiCivic Initiative therefore called for:

  1. The immediate disclosure of the legal basis for the journalist’s detention and, where no lawful basis exists, her immediate release.
  2. Full respect for the constitutional rights of journalists during investigations involving matters of public interest.
  3. Transparent communication by the relevant authorities regarding the status of investigations into the reported drone possession and compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.
  4. Stronger institutional safeguards against the intimidation, harassment or arbitrary detention of journalists carrying out their lawful professional duties.

The organisation maintained that a free press is not an adversary of the State but an essential democratic institution that promotes accountability, strengthens public trust and contributes to national development through factual reporting and informed public discourse.

It urged security agencies, regulatory authorities, civil society organisations, media practitioners and the international community to uphold the principles of constitutional democracy, transparency, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights.

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Law & Society Magazine Special Report: Home, but not yet free

The rescue of Oyo’s abducted pupils and teachers ended one of Nigeria’s most agonising hostage crises in recent years. It also marked the beginning of a far more difficult test—whether the country knows how to help children recover after surviving terror.

By Law & Society Magazine Investigations

When the rescued pupils and teachers from Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State appeared in a video thanking President Bola Tinubu and the security agencies that secured their freedom, the relief was unmistakable. After fifty-six days in captivity, they were alive. A military operation involving the armed forces, intelligence services and the police had succeeded where many feared time had already run out.

For their families, there was every reason to celebrate. For the country, the operation brought an end to weeks of anxiety that had followed one of the most disturbing school abductions ever recorded in Nigeria’s South-West.

But successful rescue operations often create an illusion of closure.

The images broadcast across the country captured the moment the captives returned. They could not reveal what nearly two months in the custody of armed kidnappers may have done to children whose lives had barely begun, to teenagers whose education was abruptly interrupted, or to teachers who were forced to protect frightened pupils while fearing for their own lives.

Those are questions measured not in days but in years.

Among those taken on May 15 were children as young as two, three and four years old. Others were in primary school, preparing for examinations or simply expecting another ordinary school day before heavily armed men stormed their classrooms and marched them into the forest. Their teachers, entrusted with keeping them safe, became captives alongside them. Two colleagues never returned alive.

It is tempting to see the operation that brought them home as the end of the story. In reality, it is the point at which another, less visible chapter begins.

Medical science has long established that prolonged captivity leaves consequences that are not always immediately apparent. Malnutrition, untreated infections and physical exhaustion are often the first concerns. The deeper injuries can emerge more gradually: disrupted sleep, persistent fear, difficulty concentrating, emotional withdrawal, developmental regression in younger children, or an overwhelming sense that ordinary life no longer feels ordinary.

Children experience trauma differently from adults because their brains are still developing. A toddler who spends weeks under the control of armed men may not remember every detail of the experience years later, but the prolonged absence of safety, routine and trusted caregivers can shape emotional development in ways that specialists recognise long after physical recovery. Older children and adolescents face different risks, including anxiety disorders, depression, survivor’s guilt and difficulty returning to learning environments associated with the abduction.

That is why, in countries that have confronted similar hostage crises, rescue marks the beginning of a carefully coordinated response rather than its conclusion. Paediatricians, psychologists, psychiatrists, trauma specialists, teachers and social workers are brought together to assess not only what survivors endured, but what they will need in the months ahead. Recovery is treated as a process rather than an event.

Nigeria now faces the same responsibility.

President Tinubu has directed emergency agencies to work with the Oyo State Government to provide medical and relief support for the rescued pupils and teachers. The directive acknowledges that the state’s duty does not end once hostages are freed. The next challenge is whether that commitment develops into a structured programme that addresses physical health, mental wellbeing, educational reintegration and long-term monitoring, particularly for the youngest survivors whose needs may not become fully apparent for some time.

The questions are neither academic nor premature. They go to the heart of what governments owe citizens after acts of terror. A child who survives fifty-six days in captivity should not have to navigate recovery alone. Nor should teachers who witnessed violence be expected to return to classrooms without professional support. If recovery is left entirely to families already struggling with the emotional and financial consequences of the ordeal, the effects of the kidnapping may outlast the captivity itself.

The contrast is already evident in one family.

While parents across Oriire embraced children they feared they had lost, the relatives of teacher Michael Oyedokun were preparing to welcome no one. Abducted alongside his colleagues, he was reportedly killed in captivity, turning a story of reunion into one of permanent absence. After the rescue, his family spoke of their happiness for the children who had returned while mourning the man who never would. It was a reminder that even the most successful rescue operation cannot restore every life that violence has taken.

That reality extends well beyond one community in Oyo State. It raises a broader question for a country that has endured years of mass kidnappings, from Chibok and Dapchi to Kankara, Kuriga and now Oriire. Nigeria has invested increasing effort in rescuing victims. It has devoted far less attention to understanding what becomes of them afterwards.

Escaping the forest is one milestone. Rebuilding a life is another.

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WHEN TERROR PAYS (Part IV D): The new sovereigns

How armed groups are quietly building parallel governments inside Nigeria

By Law & Society Magazine Investigations

How do you recognise a government?

The obvious answers are familiar. Governments make laws. They collect taxes. They protect citizens. They administer justice. They regulate movement. They resolve disputes. Above all, they exercise authority over the territory and people within their borders.

These powers are so fundamental that citizens rarely stop to think about them. They simply assume that the Nigerian state—and no other authority—determines who governs every community from Lagos to Maiduguri, from Sokoto to Calabar.

Yet in parts of Nigeria scarred by years of insurgency, banditry and organised violence, that assumption is facing an uncomfortable test.

Across some rural communities, according to numerous reports by security analysts, humanitarian organisations, media investigations and testimonies from affected residents over the years, armed groups have done far more than terrorise civilians. In some locations they have reportedly demanded levies before farmers cultivate their fields, imposed charges for harvesting crops, regulated access to forests and grazing routes, controlled movement along certain roads, dictated commercial activity and enforced their own rules through violence and intimidation.

These arrangements are rarely recognised by law. They are born of fear rather than legitimacy.

Yet they raise one of the most profound constitutional questions confronting Nigeria today: when citizens increasingly depend on armed groups—not public institutions—to determine how they live, who is actually exercising authority?

This is no longer merely a security story. It is a story about sovereignty.

When survival replaces citizenship

The Nigerian Constitution is built on a simple democratic premise: that governmental authority derives from the people and is exercised through institutions established by law.

Section 14(2)(b) declares that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. The Constitution also contemplates a state that alone possesses the lawful authority to enforce order, investigate crime, prosecute offenders and protect lives and property.

In many communities affected by persistent violence, however, daily reality has become considerably more complicated.

For families living under the constant threat of attack, constitutional theory often collides with the demands of survival. When security personnel are absent or unable to maintain a continuous presence, communities sometimes make decisions that would once have seemed unimaginable.

Read Also: WHEN TERROR PAYS (Part IV C): Justice deferred | As Nigeria negotiates with terror, is the rule of law becoming the biggest casualty?

Some negotiate directly with armed groups. Others reportedly pay levies to gain temporary access to farmland. Some abandon entire villages. Others rely on informal understandings simply to avoid further bloodshed.

These choices should not be mistaken for acceptance of criminal authority. They are, in many cases, desperate attempts to preserve life where lawful protection appears insufficient.

But desperation can produce consequences extending far beyond individual communities.

The slow emergence of parallel authority

Political scientists have long observed that armed groups seeking prolonged influence rarely rely on violence alone. History suggests that many eventually attempt something more enduring: they establish systems of control that resemble the functions of government.

The methods vary from one conflict to another. Some collect taxes. Some regulate markets. Some settle disputes. Some determine who may travel through territory under their influence. Some provide rudimentary security—often from rival armed groups. Others enforce their own codes of conduct through fear.

The objective is not simply to defeat the state militarily. It is to make the state increasingly irrelevant in the daily lives of ordinary people.

Across parts of Nigeria, security experts have warned that elements of this pattern have become visible in areas repeatedly affected by banditry and insurgent violence.

Communities have described paying so-called protection levies. Farmers have reported seeking assurances before returning to cultivate abandoned land. Transport operators have spoken of unofficial payments along dangerous routes. In some areas, traditional institutions have found themselves negotiating with armed actors simply to secure temporary peace.

Each arrangement may appear isolated. Taken together, however, they reveal something far more significant. They suggest that organised violence is beginning to reshape relationships between citizens and the state.

When criminals perform governmental functions

Governments derive legitimacy through constitutions, elections and the rule of law. Criminal organisations derive power through coercion. Yet from the perspective of frightened communities, the distinction can become blurred when both claim the ability to determine what people may or may not do.

Who decides whether farmers may harvest crops? Who controls movement through particular forests? Who determines whether traders may enter local markets? Who resolves disputes when police stations are distant or non-functional? Who imposes financial obligations on local residents?

These are not merely criminal acts. They are functions traditionally associated with governance.

That is precisely why constitutional scholars often argue that sovereignty is measured not only by legal authority but also by effective authority.

A constitution may declare governmental powers on paper. The more difficult question is whether those powers are exercised consistently across every part of the country.

Lessons from beyond Nigeria

Nigeria is by no means the first nation to confront this challenge.

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) established extensive systems of taxation, dispute resolution and local administration across territories where state institutions were weak.

Before returning to national power in Afghanistan, the Taliban operated parallel courts that many rural residents reportedly used because they were viewed as faster than formal judicial institutions, even though their procedures attracted widespread criticism for failing to meet internationally recognised human rights standards.

In parts of Iraq and Syria, the so-called Islamic State attempted to create an elaborate administrative structure, collecting taxes, regulating commerce and providing basic public services alongside brutal repression.

These situations differ substantially in history, ideology and scale from Nigeria’s security challenges.

Nevertheless, they illustrate a common lesson recognised in conflict studies: armed groups frequently seek influence not only by defeating governments militarily, but by replacing governmental functions wherever state authority becomes weak or inconsistent.

The constitutional cost

The consequences extend beyond immediate security concerns.

Every unofficial levy paid because government cannot guarantee safe access to farmland weakens confidence in lawful authority. Every community forced to negotiate its own security arrangements raises difficult questions about the practical reach of constitutional governance. Every child growing up believing that survival depends more upon agreements with armed groups than confidence in public institutions inherits a profoundly altered understanding of citizenship.

This transformation is gradual. It seldom attracts dramatic headlines. There is rarely a single moment when sovereignty visibly changes hands. Instead, authority erodes incrementally.

One abandoned police outpost. One inaccessible court. One unsafe highway. One village negotiating alone. One harvest protected by payments to criminals rather than the presence of lawful institutions.

Over time, these individual compromises can reshape public expectations of government itself.

Reclaiming more than territory

Military operations remain indispensable in confronting violent criminal organisations. Security agencies have continued to conduct operations resulting in the rescue of hostages, the neutralisation or arrest of suspects and the disruption of criminal networks. Those efforts remain essential to restoring public safety.

Yet experience from other jurisdictions suggests that military success alone rarely ends prolonged insurgencies or entrenched organised violence.

Territory can be recovered. Public confidence takes considerably longer to rebuild. Communities must once again believe that reporting crimes matters. Farmers must trust they can cultivate land without seeking permission from armed groups. Markets must function under the protection of law rather than negotiated tolerance.

Courts, schools, local governments, health centres and policing institutions must become visible symbols of state authority rather than distant promises.

In the end, sovereignty is sustained not simply by soldiers defending borders but by citizens experiencing the everyday presence of lawful government.

The deeper battle

Perhaps the greatest danger confronting Nigeria is not that terrorists or bandits seek to overthrow the Federal Government in Abuja. Rather, it is that in isolated communities they may gradually persuade frightened citizens that government no longer occupies the centre of everyday life.

Violence then becomes more than an instrument of fear. It becomes an instrument of governance.

History teaches that states seldom lose authority overnight. They lose it slowly, often while their formal institutions continue to function. Courts still sit.Budgets are passed. Elections are conducted. Ministries operate. Yet somewhere beyond the reach of those institutions, another authority slowly begins to emerge—one enforced not by constitutional legitimacy but by armed coercion.

For Nigeria, that is the larger constitutional warning.

The struggle against terrorism is not simply about reclaiming forests, rescuing abductees or neutralising criminal gangs, important as those objectives remain. It is about ensuring that every Nigerian, regardless of geography, experiences the Constitution as the highest and only legitimate source of public authority.

For where citizens must negotiate with armed groups to farm, trade, travel or simply survive, the contest is no longer only over security. It is over sovereignty itself.

Tomorrow (Final Part): WHEN TERROR PAYS – Sunday Magazine Special: The Republic Under Siege | Can Nigeria reclaim the rule of law before terror permanently reshapes the State?

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As Eastern Bar Forum convenes, Afam Okeke urges lawyers to choose leaders of integrity

GOODWILL MESSAGE

I extend my warm goodwill to the Eastern Bar Forum on the occasion of its 2026 Second Quarterly Meeting in Owerri, Imo State.

Over the years, the Eastern Bar Forum has remained a formidable platform for professional excellence, regional collaboration, and constructive engagement on issues affecting the legal profession and the administration of justice. Your commitment to fostering unity among lawyers in the Eastern Zone continues to strengthen both the Bar and the justice sector.

As members gather to exchange ideas, review emerging legal developments, and chart a progressive course for our profession, I urge everyone to take full advantage of the opportunities for learning, networking, and collaboration.

I commend the Governor of the Forum, Sir Damian Nosike, Esq., the Governing Council, and the Local Organising Committee for their dedication in putting together what promises to be a successful and memorable meeting.

With the NBA National Elections approaching on 18th July, 2026, I urge members to make informed choices by carefully reviewing the records of service, competence, and vision of those seeking office. The future of our Association depends on electing leaders with the capacity, integrity, and commitment to build an accessible, efficient, and responsive Bar that will make every member proud.

I wish all delegates fruitful deliberations, safe travels, and a rewarding meeting.

AFAM O. OKEKE, Esq.
Candidate for General Secretary, Nigerian Bar Association (2026 – 2028).
Past Chairman, NBA Abuja (2022 – 2024)

#AccessibleSecretariat

#TheTimeIsNow

#ReadyToServe

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NBA-SPIDEL inaugurates national teams to strengthen legal aid, rights protection and access to justice

By Lillian Okenwa

For thousands of Nigerians unable to afford legal representation, victims of unlawful detention, and citizens seeking greater accountability from public institutions, the Nigerian Bar Association’s Section on Public Interest and Development Law (NBA-SPIDEL) says help may soon become more coordinated.

In a move aimed at strengthening public interest law across the country, NBA-SPIDEL on Friday inaugurated a network of specialised national committees and regional coordinators expected to spearhead strategic litigation, monitor detention facilities, drive legal reforms, expand legal aid implementation and promote broader access to justice.

The virtual inauguration marks one of the Section’s most comprehensive institutional efforts in recent years to translate policy advocacy into practical interventions capable of addressing some of Nigeria’s most pressing legal and governance challenges.

Among the newly inaugurated bodies is the National Legal Aid Strategy Implementation Monitoring Committee, established to monitor the implementation of Nigeria’s National Legal Aid Strategy, identify gaps in legal aid delivery and advocate improved access to justice, particularly for vulnerable and underserved communities.

The Detention Monitoring Committee will monitor correctional and detention facilities across the country, identify cases of unlawful detention and engage relevant authorities to promote compliance with constitutional safeguards and human rights standards.

NBA-SPIDEL also inaugurated a Public Interest Litigation Committee, which will identify and prosecute strategic cases involving constitutionalism, human rights, governance accountability, environmental justice and access to justice, while the Legislative Reforms and Liaison Committee will engage lawmakers, monitor legislation and develop proposals aimed at strengthening Nigeria’s legal framework.

Other committees include the Research and Policy Committee, which will produce evidence-based recommendations to support legal and institutional reforms, and the Capacity Building, Knowledge Management and Mentoring Committee, established to strengthen professional development and mentor young lawyers committed to public interest practice.

To deepen its presence across the country, the Section also inaugurated Regional Representatives and Coordinators for different parts of Nigeria. They are expected to strengthen collaboration with NBA branches, civil society organisations, development partners and relevant government institutions while identifying emerging public interest concerns within their regions.

Speaking during the inauguration, NBA-SPIDEL Chairman, Dr. Uju Agomoh, described the exercise as more than the appointment of new officers, saying it signalled a renewed commitment to service, collaboration and institutional impact.

“Today’s event is not merely the inauguration of officers; it is the formal commencement of a strengthening of partnership in service, leadership and collective responsibility towards advancing the ideals and objectives of NBA-SPIDEL,” she said.

Agomoh urged members of the newly inaugurated committees to focus on measurable results rather than routine activities.

“We expect initiatives that address contemporary public interest issues, policy advocacy, legal reforms, capacity building, strategic partnerships and meaningful engagement with stakeholders. We expect collaboration rather than isolation, innovation rather than routine, and measurable impact rather than mere activity,” she said.

She reminded members that leadership within NBA-SPIDEL carries a responsibility to deliver meaningful change.

“History will judge us not by the titles we held but by the difference we made,” she added.

Even before Friday’s inauguration, implementation had begun. Earlier in the week, the newly constituted NBA-SPIDEL Public Interest and Development Law Media Network held its inaugural meeting under the chairmanship of former NBA Second Vice-President and ex- Chair of SPIDEL, Dr. Monday Ubani, SAN, to outline strategies for strengthening public engagement with constitutionalism, governance, human rights and the rule of law.

According to its Terms of Reference, the Media Network will coordinate media relations, expand public education campaigns, strengthen engagement with news organisations and improve public understanding of issues affecting justice, accountability and democratic governance.

The newly inaugurated committees are expected to begin implementing their work plans immediately, submit periodic performance reports and work closely with the Section’s Executive Council in advancing NBA-SPIDEL’s mandate.

For many Nigerians, the success of the new structure will ultimately be measured not by the number of committees created, but by whether it helps make justice more accessible, strengthens accountability and ensures that the law works more effectively for the people it is meant to serve.

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