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The Insecurity Triad: Azikiwe, Awolowo, and Chinweizu — Nigeria’s elite class of framework builders

By Max Amuchie

Last Sunday, I indicated that this week’s edition of The Sunday Stew would pay tribute to the late political economist and public intellectual, Claude Ake. That tribute remains, but its timing has shifted. Later this year will mark the 30th anniversary of his passing — a more fitting moment to revisit the life and legacy of one of Africa’s most consequential intellectual minds. Until then, this column turns to a related but less discussed tradition in Nigerian thought: the rare lineage of framework builders who operated outside the academy yet reshaped how society understood itself.

Nigeria’s intellectual landscape faces a persistent challenge: not the total absence of indigenous frameworks, but their relative scarcity and limited institutional consolidation. Much of our analytical vocabulary still arrives pre-assembled from elsewhere — adapted to Nigerian conditions rather than born from them. We reach habitually for tools forged in other fires, calibrated for other crises, and carrying the residue of other civilisational assumptions. The consequence is not merely intellectual dependency. It is explanatory incompleteness. Borrowed frameworks, however sophisticated, can illuminate local realities, but they do not always capture the structures beneath them.

Yet Nigeria has never been entirely without its own framework builders. What it has lacked is not indigenous conceptual production itself, but its sustained institutionalisation. Alongside the academy, it has historically produced another tradition — rarer, more independent, and deeply sovereign in character.

It is a tradition built largely beyond university faculties and disciplinary boundaries. Its practitioners did not merely interpret events; they created new conceptual vocabularies. They refused inherited explanatory tools when those tools proved insufficient, choosing instead to engineer indigenous frameworks for immediate national and civilisational questions. Their objective was not institutional approval but conceptual sovereignty.

This is the elite class of Nigeria’s framework builders. And it is within this largely extra-academic lineage — one operating beyond the formal boundaries of university production and disciplinary gatekeeping — that figures such as Azikiwe, Awolowo, and Chinweizu emerge — not merely as statesmen or writers, but as framework builders. Each refused the role of interpreter. Each chose, instead, the more demanding vocation of architect.

Nnamdi Azikiwe: The Newsroom as Primary Laboratory

To understand what Azikiwe accomplished, one must resist the temptation to reduce him to his political biography — to the president, the governor-general, the nationalist icon. These are accurate descriptions, but they obscure the more foundational achievement. Before Azikiwe was any of those things, he was a theorist of communications power.
His intellectual contribution extended beyond communications infrastructure into explicit framework construction. Through Zikism in Africa and works such as Renascent Africa and Liberia in World Politics, he advanced a political philosophy centred on spiritual balance, social regeneration, mental emancipation, economic reconstruction, and political resurgence. Zikism was not merely nationalist rhetoric. It was an indigenous ideological framework — an attempt to articulate a distinctly African vocabulary for liberation, modernity, and civilisational renewal.

Azikiwe understood, with unusual clarity for his era, that newspapers were not passive instruments of reportage. They were engines of consciousness formation. Through The West African Pilot, launched in 1937, he built a mass communications infrastructure designed not merely to inform but to manufacture national awareness where none yet existed in consolidated form. The newsroom became a laboratory of political imagination.
The West African Pilot therefore functioned not only as a newspaper but as the transmission mechanism for Zikism itself — a vehicle through which ideas moved from theory into public consciousness.

This was framework building in the most consequential sense: the creation of a conceptual technology — the politically purposive newsroom — that could transform the relationship between a population and its own self-understanding.

Azikiwe drew from global traditions of activist journalism but adapted them into a distinctly West African instrument of nationalist mobilisation.
The lesson for the contemporary era is unmistakable, and uncomfortable. The modern digital newsroom has, in large measure, abandoned this mandate. Optimised for traffic, calibrated for virality, and disciplined by the imperatives of advertising revenue, it has become a largely reactive institution — faster than its predecessors, but shallower in purpose. Azikiwe’s example issues a rebuke and a challenge in equal measure: the newsroom cannot survive, in any meaningful civilisational sense, as a purely commercial machine. It must recover its older mandate as a theory laboratory — a place where original socio-political frameworks are serialised, tested, refined, and introduced into the public square. The medium has changed. The obligation has not.

Obafemi Awolowo: The Geometry of State Architecture

Where Azikiwe worked through the newsroom, Awolowo worked through the monograph. And where Azikiwe’s primary instrument was consciousness, Awolowo’s was structure.
Awolowo approached the Nigerian state with something that can only be described as geometric discipline. He did not merely criticise colonial administration or lament political dysfunction. He subjected the Nigerian project to systematic, structural examination. Through works such as Path to Nigerian Freedom (1947) and Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution (1966), he mapped constitutional arrangements, regional balances, socio-economic organisation, and the friction points embedded within the federation with a precision that distinguished him from his contemporaries. He treated governance as architecture — as a designed system with load-bearing elements, stress points, and the capacity to collapse if its internal logic was violated.
This temperament is what separates framework builders from analysts. The analyst produces interpretation. The framework builder produces a map of the system generating the events that require interpretation. Awolowo was interested not in the headline but in the structure producing the headline — and he was willing to do the painstaking intellectual labour of rendering that structure visible and legible.
The diagnosis of state fragility demands this same architectural temperament today. Nigeria’s security crisis is narrated, almost universally, at the level of events: the attack, the abduction, the reprisal, the press release, the lament.

But events are symptoms. Framework builders map systems. They move beneath the surface of occurrence to identify the structural arrangements generating those occurrences — the incentive structures, the sovereignty vacuums, the institutional failures that are not aberrations but outputs of a deeper logic.

His engagement with federal design, regional autonomy, and constitutional engineering reflected an understanding of governance not as administration alone, but as institutional geometry.
Awolowo’s method remains not only valid but urgently necessary.

Chinweizu Ibekwe: The Mandate of the Intellectual Border Guard

If Azikiwe built the communications laboratory and Awolowo built the architectural method, Chinweizu performed a different but equally indispensable function. He stood watch.

Chinweizu’s role was expressed not only through critique but through conceptual production. Among his notable interventions was Culturecide — his framework describing the systematic erosion, displacement, and destruction of indigenous cultural systems through external domination and internalised dependency. It was an attempt to name a process that conventional political language often failed to capture: the destruction of a people’s civilisational software while the institutional hardware of the state remained formally intact.

Through works such as The West and the Rest of Us (1975) and Decolonising the African Mind (1987), Chinweizu issued one of the sharpest warnings in Nigerian — and indeed African — intellectual history: the danger of mental capture. He challenged imported analytical vocabularies with a directness that was, by design, confrontational. He questioned the dependence on external civilisational lenses for interpreting African realities. He argued, with sustained rigour and deliberate provocation, that a society which cannot explain itself to itself in its own conceptual terms is a society that remains, whatever its formal independence, intellectually colonised.
His role was that of an intellectual border guard. Not merely a critic — a guardian of the threshold between conceptual sovereignty and conceptual dependency.

The challenge Chinweizu issued has not expired. It has, if anything, intensified. For every contemporary Nigerian thinker, his questions remain active and uncomfortable: Where are your own tools? What indigenous vocabulary explains your society? What framework have you built rather than borrowed? What analytical structure emerges from your own reading of your own conditions — rather than from the application of a foreign theoretical template to a local dataset?

These are not rhetorical questions. They are the standard by which any serious tradition of framework building must measure itself.

The Lineage and Its Continuation

Azikiwe built both the communications laboratory and the ideological architecture of Zikism. Awolowo built the architectural method of state design. Chinweizu defended conceptual sovereignty while naming the dangers of civilisational erosion through frameworks such as Culturecide.

Together, they constitute a tradition — dispersed across time, never formalised as a school, but coherent in its underlying conviction: that the most consequential intellectual work is the construction of original frameworks capable of explaining a society to itself.

The Insecurity Triad is offered in continuity with that tradition. It is an attempt, specific to this moment and these conditions, to construct an indigenous diagnostic framework for Nigeria’s security crisis and its relationship to state decay — one that does not merely apply existing theory but builds the conceptual architecture from the ground up, from the evidence of Nigerian and Sahelian experience, on its own terms.
The tradition is older than any single framework. What matters is that it continues — that each generation of Nigerian thinkers refuses the false comfort of borrowed explanation and accepts, instead, the more demanding obligation of original construction.
Nations are sustained not only by institutions, but by the concepts through which they understand themselves.
That obligation is not academic. It is civilisational.

A Note on This Moment

This is the twelfth edition of The Sunday Stew.
Three months ago, this column launched with a single ambition: to occupy a different intellectual space — one between journalism and scholarship, between immediate events and deeper structures, where Nigeria’s crises could be examined not only through reportage or theory, but through original reflection and framework construction. What has emerged from that ambition has exceeded the original brief.

In twelve editions, this column has produced two original analytical frameworks. The Insecurity Triad — theorising the mechanism by which armed networks sustain themselves relative to state authority through the convergence of a ransom economy, land contestation, and ideological capture — has been presented and deposited across six scholarly repositories, and has received scholarly engagement.
It has increasingly moved beyond commentary toward contribution within debates on the Nigerian state.

The Trinity of State Decay, developed as its companion diagnostic, theorises the structural condition that the Triad sustains: a decoupling into rival sovereignties, in which the state performs authority it no longer possesses while shadow orders exercise authority the state has vacated.
These are not borrowed frameworks dressed in local language. They were built here, in this column, for this crisis.
That is what this lineage — from Azikiwe to Awolowo to Chinweizu — ultimately demands: not admiration, but continuation. The Sunday Stew is, in its modest but deliberate way, an attempt to honour that demand.
Twelve editions. Two frameworks. The work continues.

Trust is Sacred. Stay Seasoned.

Dr. Max Amuchie is the CEO of Sundiata Post and architect of The Insecurity Triad and Trinity of State Decay. He writes The Sunday Stew, a weekly syndicated column on faith, character, and the forces that shape society, with a focus on Nigeria and Africa in a global context.
X — @MaxAmuchie | Email: [email protected] | Tel: +234(0)8053069436

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

The Case for the office of Judge Dan Maliki

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

“Divine right is an old, established principle. It means that kings have the right – ordained by God – to act in any way they wish. Human-made laws are of no consequence beside the awesome power of God, and God’s representative, namely the monarch.” — Vija Prashad, Washington Bullets, 23 (2020)

Sovereignty is a complex concept in law and political science, but its primary attributes entail three inter-dependent monopolies. One is a monopoly of legitimate dispute resolution. The second is a monopoly of legitimate taxation; and the third is a monopoly of the instrumentality of legitimate violence.

Students of political science are most familiar with the last of these monopolies, but it is actually the first that guarantees coexistence in society. The polarizing 19th century German philosopher, Georg Hegel, was quite clear about the place of dispute resolution in the job specification of the ruler: “the administration of the law is to be looked upon as the duty quite as much as the right of the public authority. Whether to delegate the discharge of this office to some power or not is not at the option of any individual.”

Few – if any – of the offices in the state rival the judiciary in the skill of the dark arts. Professors in law faculties feed students with a deadly doctrinal diet of judicial independence. Some even manage to persuade themselves that judges are indeed independent.

In reality, judicial independence is more about appearances than reality. In his Draught of a new plan for the organisation of the judicial establishment in France issued in 1790, Jeremy Bentham boils down the expectations of a judge to two: “that he be a good one and that he be thought to be so.” To the question who must think the judge a good one, there has never been a straight answer and reasonable people mostly differ.

Judges are not instruments of revolution. In reality, the judge has two primary jobs about which few, least of all lawyers, are willing to be honest: to protect themselves by protecting the sovereign. Put simply, the judiciary is an organ of the status quo. Therefore, strategic defection from the path of dependency on the ruler does not come easily to them.

For this purpose, every country maintains a judicial administration. Of the organs of the public service, few are as hierarchical as the judiciary. Judges may think themselves independent, but every judge is under the authority of an administration which must determine whether the judge measures up. Through this structure, every system determines what quantity and kind of judicial independence it can tolerate or live with in the interest of the ruler(s).

This is why judicial administration is a dark art. Those who run the judicial branch have to perform independence while at all essential times doing dependence. For this purpose, every system needs a “Judge dan Maliki”, that is to say; the judge who best embodies the attributes of a loyal son of the ruler.

Judicial administration under colonial rule found this relatively easy to accomplish because judges under that system held office at the pleasure of the foreign sovereign. They were expendable and there was no pretence about the absence of independence. To the natives, the language of the system and its traditions were foreign. Its location and routines were equally distant. There were also few natives knowledgeable enough in the ways of colonial law.

Following independence, judicial administration did not much depart from the path of fidelity to the interests of the ruler. In Uganda, for instance, the president appoints the Chief Justice, who notionally heads the judiciary; but real power lies in the Chief Administrator of the Judiciary, who is the Permanent Secretary and chief accounting officer of the judicial branch. He is also an appointee of the president.

Unlike the Chief Justice who is bound by the optics of judicial independence, the Chief Administrator has latitude to deploy dirty tricks or dark arts as the situation warrants and usually has a direct line to the president. When President Yoweri Museveni appointed a new Chief Administrator in July 2019, the leading newspaper in the country reported it the following day under the caption “[Pius] Bigirimana takes over judiciary.”

Below the office of the Chief Justice, different countries have other designations for the dispersal of hierarchies for judicial management. In Tanzania, the Jaji (Judge) Kiongozi is the name given to the principal judge, with responsibility for the administrative management of the High Court in Tanzania. The Judge Kiongozi is effectively the second-in-command in the country’s judicial hierarchy and manages deployment, postings, and dockets in the High Court.

In Nigeria, that role falls to the respective Chief Judges of the various High Courts across the country at both state and federal levels. The Chief at this level is both sorcerer and serpent. The most important role of the Chief is docket management and case assignment. For this purpose, the Chief must have a good nose for the predilections of all the judges under him or her as well as their foibles and failings.

The most important decision made on a case, especially one affecting the essential interests of the sovereign or his party, is which judge is to hear it. With just one stroke of the pen to assigning a case, the outcome is foreclosed. The most important role of the Chief Judge at this level, therefore, is to divine the will or interest of the ruler and to allocate case work so as to ensure that nothing concerning the ruler suffers in his court.

For this purpose, every Chief encourages the cultivation of judges deeply solicitous and protective of their ruler. As judges have become the ultimate deciders of electoral fates in Nigeria, the Federal High Court – which has primary jurisdiction in such cases – has emerged as the court system where this species of judging has become a career path and a guarantor of judicial career progression.

The most recent list of elevations to the Court of Appeal demonstrates why or how this works. The most prominent names on the list were judges of the Federal High Court whose claim to fame was that they enjoyed a near monopoly of cases involving high political interests of the ruling party or its acolytes. The predictability with which these cases ended up before them suggested that they had been cultivated or identified by the Chief for precisely that talent.

This is why it felt odd recently when it looked as if the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court was in trouble with allegations of code of conduct violations and appearances of high law enforcement interest in the peregrinations of Ghana-Must-Go bags of foreign currency reportedly associated with the movement of his spouse. As magically as they had appeared, those reports vanished with predictable alacrity. Whatever the problem was – assuming there was any – had been quickly settled.

With the resumption of normal judicial service in these circumstances, the search is on for a candidate in the Federal High Court for the role of Judge dan Maliki. The terms of the order granting bail to the former governor of Kaduna State, Nasir el-Rufai, in his on-going trial before the Federal High Court, suggest the search may already be over. The judge, Abdulmalik, granted him bail in the sum of N100 million. She required his surety to be a senior civil servant with property in the choicest part of Abuja.

The surety, she continued, must deposit their title instrument with the court together with their international passport. Importantly, the judge did not offer the putative civil servant any protection against reprisal. This is the art of the judicial dan Maliki at its finest – performing independence even when under “superior” orders.

Of course, any civil servant who meets these conditions will be neither free nor civil servant for much longer. The cap fits Abdulmalik. All that awaits now is the formalization of the office of Judge dan Maliki.

A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at [email protected]

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

ICJ Bombshell: World Court declares right to strike protected under international law, igniting global labour debate

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has delivered a landmark advisory opinion affirming that the right to strike is protected under international law, a decision already sending shockwaves through governments, labour unions, employers and legal systems across the world.

The historic opinion was delivered on Thursday, May 21, 2026, at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, following a request by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to clarify whether workers’ right to strike is protected under Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.

The ruling is already being hailed by labour advocates as one of the most consequential international labour law developments in decades.

The Court’s position effectively strengthens the argument that workers’ ability to withdraw their labour is not merely a political tool or industrial tactic, but a protected component of freedom of association under international law.

But even as unions celebrate, the advisory opinion has exposed deep ideological and judicial divisions within the world’s highest court, with several judges issuing sharply worded separate and dissenting opinions warning that the majority may have stretched the law beyond its original text.

Judge Georg Nolte, while agreeing with the Court’s conclusion, admitted that the wording of Convention No. 87 remains legally ambiguous on whether it expressly protects strike action. He argued that the treaty’s language could support both a broad interpretation recognizing strikes and a narrower one limited to the internal functioning of workers’ organizations.

Still, Nolte concluded that evolving international practice and widespread recognition of strike rights across nations ultimately tipped the balance in favour of recognizing strike action as protected under the Convention.

Judge Cleveland went even further, declaring that strikes are fundamentally “associational activities” through which workers pursue improved working conditions and workplace justice. She argued that excluding strikes from freedom of association would hollow out the very essence of labour rights protections.

Her opinion emphasized that collective bargaining, labour advocacy and industrial action are interconnected pillars of worker representation in democratic societies.

Yet the decision was far from unanimous.

In a blistering dissent, Judge Hmoud accused the majority of effectively beginning with a predetermined conclusion before assembling legal reasoning to justify it. He warned that the Court had inverted the proper judicial process and relied too heavily on interpretations from external treaties and labour supervisory bodies that were never expressly binding on all member states.

According to Hmoud, neither the wording nor the negotiating history of Convention No. 87 conclusively establishes a right to strike. He maintained that the Convention’s primary purpose was to protect organizational freedom rather than industrial action itself.

The dissent also raised concerns that the Court’s reliance on broader international human rights instruments risks expanding treaty obligations beyond what states originally accepted.

Despite the internal disagreements, the advisory opinion is expected to carry enormous political and legal influence globally, especially in countries where governments have increasingly cracked down on labour strikes, protests and union activities amid rising inflation, economic hardship and political unrest.

Legal analysts say the ruling could strengthen labour litigation worldwide and embolden unions challenging restrictive labour laws in both developing and industrialized economies.

For workers’ movements across Africa, Latin America, Europe and Asia, the decision is already being viewed as a powerful symbolic victory at a time when organized labour faces mounting economic and political pressures.

The opinion may not automatically rewrite national laws overnight, but experts believe it significantly reshapes the global legal conversation on labour rights, democratic participation and the limits of state power over workers’ collective action.

At its core, the ruling revives a question now echoing across courtrooms, union halls and presidential palaces worldwide: if freedom of association exists without the power to strike, is it truly freedom at all?

Click here to download the judgement.

ICJ-May-2026

Terrorism and Tinubu’s Yoruba test, By Farooq Kperogi

For more than a year, a conscientious, cosmopolitan retired senior military officer from the North has told me that his worst fear for Nigeria is the prospect of terrorists and bandits from the North extending their bloodstained tentacles into Yorubaland. He said it would provoke the sort of communal convulsion that would take on a regional and ethnic hue. He doubts Nigeria can survive it.

When news emerged of the abduction of students, teachers and other residents, including the chilling, tear-jerking slaughter of a teacher known as Michael Oyedokun in Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State by armed terrorists, he reached out to me again yesterday to say his worst fears appeared to be materialising.

Before he reached out, my own thoughts had gone to what he had been telling me immediately after I read the news. I kept thinking: How will the people of the Southwest react to this heartrending incident?

What happened wasn’t a run-of-the-mill terrorist or bandit attack. It was a vile, criminal spectacle calculated to elicit raw emotions. It’s the kind of tragedy that every part of the North has endured in silence for years.

Several people forwarded to me the video of Oyedokun’s beheading. I couldn’t bring myself to watch it. I simply lack the mental and emotional strength to put myself through that kind of soul-depressing anguish. Yes, I confess to being a wimp when it comes to issues like that.

Even so, the story of Oyedokun’s decapitation, especially the last words he was reported to have uttered before he was beheaded, still haunts me. What sort of insensate beasts in human form snuff out life like that for fun?

My older friend’s fear is that, human beings being human beings, villainy from outsiders tends to be refracted through primordial lenses. And recriminatory responses to assaults against a group identity tend to target innocent people living among the victims, which provokes an endless cycle of unjustified retaliatory violence.

We have seen that in the tragic rupture of the centuries-old relational harmony between Hausa and Fulani people in northern Nigeria, about which the country seems oblivious, but which has spilled over to social media and is becoming the inspiration for so-called Hausa-Zalla [Hausa-only] associations.

Years of sustained rural and urban banditry in the Northwest, particularly in Zamfara, Kebbi and Sokoto, have caused many Hausa people to interpret what is happening to them in ethnic terms, which is perplexing to outsiders because the depth and breadth of the ethnic and cultural alchemy of the two groups is such that only self-conscious genealogy can tell them apart.

Ordinary Fulani people in rural Northwest Nigeria, who are not bandits and who are themselves victims of the horrors of bandits who happen to be Fulani, became targets of attacks by Hausa victims of persistent banditry who had been stumped by the steadily escalating virulence of attacks against them.

The tit-for-tat violent attacks between Hausa and Fulani people in the Northwest are off the radar of the institutional media because, as I pointed out in my December 29, 2018, column titled “Triple Jeopardy of the Unending Zamfara Mass Murders”, the media “lack ready-made, stereotypical mental representations with which to frame the conflict, so they either avoid reporting it altogether or minimise its horrors if they report it at all. The news media thrive on Manichean binaries, conflictual differences, and sensation. The Zamfara mass slaughters don’t lend themselves to that.”

Of course, under Buhari’s presidency, many northern Muslims had an incentive to conceal the recriminatory violence that went on between the Hausa and the Fulani in rural areas. They did not want to “embarrass” or undermine Buhari. That incentive is gone now.

If attacks like the tragic incident at Community High School, Ahoro-Esinle, persist, extend to other parts of Yorubaland and cause serious threats to education, the most prized commodity in the region, something is going to give, and it won’t be pretty for Nigeria. That was the core of my friend’s concern.

Human beings, in general, do not interpret identical acts through identical moral categories. They interpret them through group identity, threat perception and prior suspicion. Had an armed gang of Yoruba youths done exactly what the terrorists from the North did in Ahoro-Esinle, Yoruba people would likely say, “These are criminals,” “These are area boys,” “These are jobless youths” or “The state has failed.” The crime would be individualised.

But because the perpetrators are northerners, it is more likely to be ethnicised or Islamised. The perpetrators cease to be merely criminals. They become representatives of a larger feared category.

As I said, this isn’t unique to Yoruba people. It’s a human trait. And it’s not hypocrisy. Were the situation to be reversed, that is, an armed gang that happened to be Yoruba abducting and slaughtering innocents in any part of the North, it would be interpreted in ethnic terms.

Scholars actually have a name for this. It’s called intergroup attribution bias. Some call it the ultimate attribution error. It means people tend to explain bad behaviour by in-group members as situational, individual or exceptional, but explain bad behaviour by out-group members as revealing something about the out-group’s character, culture or hidden agenda.

As I despair over the disquieting prospect of terrorist and bandit attacks by northerners devolving into a theatre of mutually assured destruction, I recall President Tinubu’s self-professed raison d’être for being president in his memorable 2022 “Emi lo kan” speech in Abeokuta, and it gives me a little relief.

He said the irreducible minimum condition he gave Muhammadu Buhari for supporting his presidential aspiration in 2015 was that Buhari “must not joke with Yoruba interests” [“Mo sì sọ fún un pé kí ó má fi ọ̀rọ̀ Yorùbá ṣeré.”]

He also framed his presidency as the turn of the Yoruba. People don’t seem to realise that before he said “Emi lo kan” [It is my turn], he first said, “Yoruba lo kan” [It is the turn of the Yoruba]. “This time, it is the turn of the Yoruba,” he said. “And among the Yoruba, it is my turn.”

Especially with the appointment of Major General Adeyinka Famadewa (rtd) as Special Adviser on Homeland Security, perhaps Tinubu will prove, as he told Buhari not to “joke with Yoruba interests”, that his presidency won’t countenance terroristic banditry in Yorubaland.

Should he do that, that would be one instance when I would celebrate ethnic particularism. It would be a positive use of ethnic solidarity for at least two reasons.

One, seeing the government aggressively and concertedly go after these bloodthirsty scum of the earth whose only reason for existing is to visit violence, death and misery on innocent people will reduce the temptation toward retaliatory violence against innocent northerners in the Southwest, which could propel reprisals against innocent southerners in the North.

We all know that in moments of inflamed national passions, most southerners can’t tell Hausa, Fulani, Nupe or Angas people apart. And northerners lump Yoruba, Igbo, Bini, Efik and other southerners into one undifferentiated group.

Second, if the terrorists from the North who have crossed over to the Southwest are vanquished, they won’t be alive to torment our people anywhere. And, of course, they won’t be alive to “repent”, be “de-radicalised” and “re-integrated” back into society, from where they wreak more havoc.

Yoruba lo kan shouldn’t be limited to exclusivist elite appointments. It should manifest in protecting the people from the existential threats posed by terrorists and bandits. That would, interestingly, benefit everyone in the country. I hope Yorubaland is where terrorism and banditry finally go to die.

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

Ezza North LGA Received N3.2bn in FAAC Funds in 6 Months — Yet pupils still sit on muddy floors

Ebonyi State’s Ezza North Local Government Area, where a headmaster was recently suspended for showing the dilapidated state of a community primary school, received at least N3.2 billion from the Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) within six months, FIJ has gathered.

From the data transparency website built by BudgIT, FIJ found that Ezza North received N1.57 billion in the first three months of 2026 alone.

The local government got its highest funding during this period in January, when it received N559 million.

MONTHALLOCATION RECEIVED
2026
JANUARYN559,411,389
FEBRUARYN533,611,940
MARCHN480,901,281

2025
DecemberN507,096,226
NovemberN557,973,544
OctoberN575,113,241

An overview of what Ezza North has received in the last six months.

Furthermore, the total for October, November and December 2025 amounts to N1.6 billion.

In fact, throughout 2025, it received allocations totalling N5.86 billion.

FIJ reported on Thursday that the local government education authority (LGEA) of Ezza North suspended Iloke Hyacienth, the headmaster of Community Primary School, Obulechi Umuoru, after he allowed a blogger to publish details about the dilapidated conditions of the school.

According to the posts shared by Ezza TV, the pupils are being forced to learn in mud-built structures lacking walls, a fence and even roofs.

In one of the clips, the pupils sit on very low benches and the bare muddy floor.

Credits: FIJ

Medical Students Protested Three Years Without Accreditation — University evicted them indefinitely

For protesting the university’s inability to secure regulatory permits for their programme, medical students at the Federal University of Health Sciences Otukpo (FUHSO) in Benue State were ordered to leave the school “with immediate effect until further notice” on Monday.

Without already possessing the licence to run the programme, the school management admitted students for three years to study the course.

Click here to continue reading.

Years of Killings, Few Convictions: How impunity fuels violence in Plateau State

After every attack in Plateau State, the pattern is painfully familiar. The dead are buried. Officials condemn the violence and promise action. Security agencies announce investigations. Communities mourn, rebuild and wait for justice that, for many residents, never comes. Then another village is attacked.

Across Plateau’s battered communities, years of killings, displacement and unresolved grievances are changing how people think about survival, coexistence and the Nigerian state itself. In many places, grief has hardened into anger, while fear is steadily giving way to thoughts of retaliation. Increasingly, residents say they no longer believe the government can protect them.

Over several weeks, FIJ travelled across Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Mangu, Riyom and Jos North local government areas, speaking with survivors, displaced families, Fulani herders, community leaders, vigilantes and residents whose lives have been shaped by recurring violence. Their accounts reveal a region trapped in an exhausting cycle of attacks, military deployments, official promises and little visible accountability.

For many people living in Plateau’s conflict-hit communities, the fear is no longer whether another attack will happen. It is when.

Nanpan Jonathan*, the wife of a youth leader in Chikam community in Bokkos LGA, was eight months pregnant when armed men residents identified as Fulani attackers stormed the village and killed her. The attackers also hacked her seven-year-old child to death. Her infant son, now six years old, survived with deep machete wounds after the attackers left him for dead.

Mafulul Jonathan*, Nanpan’s husband, said he was ill that night and unable to defend his family when the attackers descended on the community.

“By the time everything had settled, I saw what was left of my family,” he told FIJ. “I knew things were never going to be the same again. Nothing can compensate for the lives I lost that day.”

The April 18, 2025 attack was followed by fresh incidents of violence in the area. Some residents warned Jonathan that he may have been deliberately targeted because of his position as a youth leader and advised him to leave Bokkos for his own safety. He refused.

“It was after they killed my wife and two children that I decided I would never leave,” he said. “I am ready to die for my people, my faith and my land. Experiences like this change a person. If another attack happens, I will stand and defend this community.”

Jonathan’s words reflected a growing sentiment FIJ encountered across Plateau. In many communities, residents increasingly believe survival depends less on the state and more on their own ability to defend themselves.

Across Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Mangu, Riyom and Jos North, residents told FIJ they no longer trust authorities to prevent attacks or ensure justice afterward. Many communities now view local vigilante groups as their first and sometimes only line of defence.

In April, frustration boiled over in Kassa community in Barkin Ladi, where residents protested against soldiers stationed in the area, accusing security personnel of failing to stop repeated killings. Carrying branches and chanting angrily, the protesters demanded the withdrawal of troops from their communities.

Distrust of security agencies cuts across ethnic lines. Fulani groups have also accused authorities of bias and selective enforcement. Earlier in 2025, the Coalition of Fulani Registered Organisations in Plateau called for an independent investigation into the conduct of security personnel and demanded the removal of a sector commander over allegations of partiality and unprofessional conduct.

Residents across Plateau described the same recurring pattern: attacks occur, villages are emptied, troops arrive afterward, officials promise investigations and, with time, the cases fade from public attention without visible accountability.

Many survivors told FIJ they could not recall any major prosecution linked to attacks that devastated their communities over the past decade.

For many residents, the violence that swept through Mangu in 2023 and the Christmas Eve attacks later that year marked a turning point. The scale and frequency of the killings deepened fears that entire communities had become vulnerable despite the presence of security forces.

In May 2023, violence erupted across Mangu following disputes that escalated into wider attacks and reprisals. Villages were burned, farmlands destroyed and thousands displaced.

Residents said tensions escalated after armed men attacked Kubat, a Mwaghavul community in Mangu, killing residents and destroying property. Witnesses identified the attackers as armed Fulani men, although authorities never publicly confirmed responsibility.

In the days that followed, retaliatory violence spread into Fulani communities, triggering broader clashes and displacement across the area. Between May 15 and 16 alone, at least 87 people were reportedly killed.

Months later, coordinated attacks struck multiple communities in Bokkos and Barkin Ladi during Christmas Eve celebrations. Between December 24 and 26, attackers raided villages, killing residents, burning homes and forcing thousands to flee. FIJ found that more than 160 people were killed during the attacks and in the weeks that followed.

Residents repeatedly described the attackers as “Fulani militias”, “herdsmen” or “marauders”. Some alleged that nearby settlements provided support to the attackers.

The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), however, disputed those narratives and argued that Fulani communities were themselves victims of violence and cattle rustling. The group claimed the crisis escalated after an attempted cattle theft targeting Fulani herders on December 23, 2023. FIJ could not independently verify those claims.

The conflicting accounts reflect a crisis in which nearly every side sees itself as a victim abandoned by the state.

The roots of Plateau’s violence stretch back decades. Long before large-scale attacks on villages became common, tensions revolved around disputes over land ownership, political representation and indigene rights.

Under Nigeria’s indigene-settler system, access to land, education, political office and employment opportunities often depends on whether a group is officially recognised as indigenous to a particular area.

For decades, many Hausa-Fulani residents argued they remained politically excluded in areas dominated by ethnic groups such as the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, despite generations of residence in Plateau.

One of the earliest major outbreaks of violence occurred between 1994 and 1995 during disputes surrounding local government elections in Jos. Tensions over political representation and district boundaries escalated into violent clashes that displaced many residents.

By 2001, religion had become deeply intertwined with the conflict. Violence erupted after the appointment of Alhaji Muktar Mohammed, a Hausa Muslim official, as coordinator of a federal poverty alleviation programme in Jos North. The unrest left around 1,000 people dead, according to multiple reports.

Further violence followed in Yelwa in 2004 and spread more deeply into rural Plateau after the 2008 elections. Farmer-herder disputes increasingly merged with ethnic and religious tensions, making attacks more frequent and harder to contain.

Judicial panels established after major outbreaks repeatedly identified political incitement, arms proliferation and the manipulation of ethnic and religious divisions as major drivers of the crisis. Residents say many of the recommendations were never fully implemented.

In communities across Plateau, the effects of repeated violence are visible everywhere. FIJ visited abandoned settlements, overgrown farmlands and villages where damaged buildings remain untouched years after attacks.

Rakwork village in Barkin Ladi is one example. Many homes are collapsing, and public infrastructure is largely absent. Residents say the village has steadily emptied over the years following repeated attacks.

Dauda Boyi, a retired soldier who lives in Rakwork, said the community’s decline began after armed men attacked the village in 2014.

“The most severe attack was on November 30, 2023,” Boyi said. “More than four people were killed that day. In 2024, six young men from this community were also killed. Through all of this, we have felt alone.”

In Njevao community in Jos North, residents warned FIJ against visiting the settlement because of security fears. Once home to thousands of residents, the community is now largely deserted.

“The community is empty now,” Augustine Akoh, a former resident, said. “There is hardly any structure still standing. We were told our offence was that we created speed bumps on roads they used.”

He said residents initially continued coexisting with nearby Fulani communities during earlier waves of violence in surrounding areas, but tensions eventually escalated.

“They said they would come back for us,” Akoh recalled. “That night, we moved many children to safety. Even then, people were killed, especially those who could not escape.”

Across Plateau, many residents said they no longer sleep inside their homes at night because of fear of attacks.

“Our houses are no longer safe,” a community leader in Nding, Barkin Ladi, told FIJ. “By evening, people leave and hide in surrounding areas. If attackers find you inside, escaping becomes difficult.”

One striking feature of Plateau’s crisis is that both Fulani communities and indigenous groups describe themselves as victims.

Fulani residents interviewed by FIJ accused authorities of failing to protect them from reprisals and cattle rustling. Indigenous communities, meanwhile, accused security agencies of failing to stop armed groups operating in rural areas.

Abdullahi Idris, a Fulani resident of Mushere district in Bokkos, said Fulani communities also live under constant fear.

“We don’t find it easy,” Idris said. “There have been repeated attacks and harsh treatment because they want to push Fulani people out.”

Dashal Panna, a Mwaghavul resident of Mangu who lost a leg during an attack, said many people in his community believed the violence had become organised.

“It may have started as reprisals, but it felt organised, as if people were being pushed from their land,” he said.

The violence has also reshaped livelihoods across Plateau. Thousands of people have been displaced, farms abandoned and grazing routes disrupted.

Masu Maccu, a Fulani herder originally from Mangu, said his family lost nearly everything during attacks in 2023. Once wealthy, with more than 900 cattle, he now works as a labourer in Bauchi State.

“Four of my brothers were killed and everything we owned was taken,” he said. “My father died after hearing what happened.”

For years, Plateau’s violence has produced familiar official reactions. Governments condemn attacks, impose curfews, deploy troops and promise investigations.

Residents say meaningful accountability rarely follows.

FIJ reviewed public statements issued after major attacks between 2018 and 2025 and found repeated announcements of arrests and investigations, but few publicly documented prosecutions.

Except for the ongoing prosecution connected to the Angwan Rukuba killings, FIJ could not independently verify whether many arrests announced after previous attacks resulted in successful prosecutions.

For many residents, justice means more than punishing perpetrators. It means being able to return home safely, rebuild destroyed property and live without fear.

“What we want is for those responsible to be identified and held accountable,” said Mark Locheng, a farmer in Barkin Ladi. “We want peace to return to our communities.”

Community leaders and clergy warned that years of unresolved violence are increasing the risk of reprisals and radicalisation among young people.

“There is a lot of pain and, in some cases, a desire for revenge,” said Matthew Malau, secretary of St Thomas Catholic Church in Bokkos. “But we continue to preach forgiveness because it is necessary.”

Others fear the long-term consequences of allowing the violence to continue unchecked.

Panam Amuna, a community leader in Mangu, warned that prolonged insecurity had contributed to the spread of weapons and growing criminality in some areas.

“My worry is not only about the present situation, but what happens afterward,” he said. “If weapons remain in circulation, they may eventually be used for other crimes. At that point, the issue may no longer be about identity, but opportunism.”

He paused before adding quietly: “Unless justice is applied fairly, regardless of background or affiliation, it will be difficult to bring this crisis to an end.”

“We May As Well Outsource the Presidency”: A nation’s angry conversation with power

By V.C Mba, Esq.

Citizens: Mr. President, we’re hungry and destitute.

Mr. President: Oti o, mba nu, please hold your governors responsible, they have received a thousandfold more than all their predecessors combined since the dinosaurs roamed the earth.

Citizens: We can’t Sir, they do not owe us their offices, they owe it to you as the command in chief who never hesitates to further fortifications around the already impregnable firewalls around them. They’re neither answerable nor accountable to us.

Mr. President: Find a way around it to hold them to account.

Citizens: Such as?

Mr. President: Such as going to court to compel them to make chapter two of the constitution justiciable.

Citizens: Well, Mr. President, why not lead by example?

(Flustered but managing to remain calm)

Mr. President: Don’t get me angry, I’ve told you how much I’ve given to your governors, all you have to do is to hold your state governors to perform or account for the trillions I’ve graciously given and still giving them.

Citizens: (exasperated) ok, Mr. President, provide for us at least security of lives and property so we could till our lands, harvest our crops and raise our families in peace.

Mr. President: defend yourselves.

Citizens: How, Mr. President, with barehands, our states governors are mere figure heads and chief security officers and not even the Boys Scouts Movements and other unarmed voluntary and paramilitary outfits take orders from them, they’re as useless as we are helpless. Please help us, Mr president.

Mr. President: I won’t entertain further questions gentlemen, I’d have to catch my flight for an all important multilateral economic summit in France, sort yourselves out how best you can.

Citizens: (a cacophony of several voices simultaneously asking several imponderable questions all at the same time as Mr. President saunters away leaving unanswered nagging questions nibbling away the soul of the country.

We may as well outsource the presidency Mr. President, a citizen cried in a loud gutteral voice, since you’ve outsourced everything else to the states governors, who themselves are equally as useless to the solutions as we’re helplessly hopeless, he shouted as Mr president disappears through the exit wing of the International airport.

(Somehow swore on the grave of his ancestors that he heard another citizen asked)

Citizen: But Mr. President, babies, some as young as two years and their caregivers have been abducted and have been in custody for more than a fortnight, is there not anything this government could do about the worsening insecurity, you son of a b.. tch?

The lights fade, and exit all.

Father Chairs NUC, Son Takes Over JAMB: Tinubu’s new appointment sparks attention

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has appointed Segun Aina, a 39-year-old Professor of Computer Engineering at Obafemi Awolowo University, as the new Registrar of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board, placing one of Nigeria’s youngest professors at the helm of the country’s most powerful university admissions agency.

But beyond the headline-grabbing age factor, the appointment is also drawing attention because it places two influential public appointments within the same family — and further highlights the longstanding proximity between the Aina family and Nigeria’s ruling All Progressives Congress establishment.

The appointment, announced Thursday in a statement signed by presidential spokesman Bayo Onanuga, will see Segun Aina succeed outgoing registrar Is-haq Oloyede, whose second five-year term expires on July 31, 2026.

Aina’s formal takeover is expected to coincide with his 40th birthday.

The State House described the new appointee as “a distinguished academic and systems expert” with extensive experience in digital infrastructure, national examination systems and institutional reform.

Yet the appointment also carries unmistakable political and symbolic undertones.

Aina is the son of Olu Aina, an 85-year-old emeritus professor of Technical and Vocational Education who currently serves as Chairman of the Governing Board of the National Universities Commission — another high-profile federal appointment approved by President Tinubu in 2025.

The emergence of father and son in two strategic education-sector positions within a short period has already triggered conversations in political and academic circles about influence, elite continuity and the expanding network of technocrats aligned with the ruling party.

The elder Aina is widely regarded as a respected figure in technical and vocational education, but he is also known to maintain longstanding ties with key figures in the APC.

A personal associate of Adebisi Akande, the emeritus professor has for years operated within the intellectual and policy orbit of the ruling party.

He previously served as the pioneer Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the National Business and Technical Examinations Board between 1992 and 2002 and has remained influential in vocational education policy for decades.

Now, with his son taking over leadership of JAMB — the institution responsible for conducting Nigeria’s high-stakes Unified Tertiary Matriculation Examination (UTME) — the Aina family’s footprint within Nigeria’s education bureaucracy has expanded significantly.

For supporters, Segun Aina’s rise reflects merit, academic excellence and deep technical competence.

For critics, however, the optics of two major federal education appointments within one politically connected family are likely to fuel renewed debate about elite networks, patronage and access to power under the current administration.

Aina’s credentials are formidable.

Born in Otan Ayegbaju, Osun State, he studied Computer Systems Engineering at the University of Kent before earning a master’s degree in Internet Computing and Network Security, as well as a PhD in Digital Signal Processing, from Loughborough University.

He later attended the Senior Management Programme at Lagos Business School.

Before entering academia fully, Aina reportedly had his first exposure to JAMB during his National Youth Service Corps posting, where he worked with the examination body and developed early experience in admissions systems and data-driven institutional management.

At 39, he became one of Nigeria’s youngest professors in Computer Engineering after his elevation at Obafemi Awolowo University.

His professional portfolio stretches beyond the university system.

He has consulted for major examination agencies, including the National Examinations Council and NABTEB, while also advising state governments and the Office of the Vice President on technology systems, digital reforms and operational efficiency.

In 2010, he co-founded Fluid Click Solutions Ltd, a technology and engineering firm with interests spanning education technology, agriculture, hospitality and technical education.

He is also affiliated with several professional organisations, including the Nigerian Society of Engineers and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

The presidency says it expects Aina to build on the reforms introduced by Oloyede, whose tenure transformed JAMB into one of Nigeria’s most financially transparent examination agencies while aggressively digitising its operations.

Still, the appointment arrives at a politically sensitive moment, with scrutiny growing over appointments into strategic national institutions and concerns over whether competence alone determines access to influential public offices.

As preparations quietly begin for the 2027 political cycle, the emergence of another politically connected technocrat within a major federal institution is unlikely to escape public attention.

Court Bombshell: Key points from landmark judgment stripping INEC of control over primaries, defection deadlines

By John Azu

A Federal High Court in Abuja on Thursday delivered a landmark judgment that could dramatically reshape political calculations ahead of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections, ruling that the Independent National Electoral Commission lacks the legal authority to impose certain deadlines and restrictions on political parties beyond what is expressly provided in the Electoral Act.

In the ruling delivered by Justice Mohammed Umar, the court voided INEC’s directive requiring political parties to submit membership registers and databases by May 10, 2026, declaring that the commission cannot abridge statutory timelines through administrative guidelines.

Key Points From the Judgment:

1. INEC Cannot Fix Timelines for Party Primaries

The court held that although INEC has powers to monitor and observe party primaries, it does not have the authority to prescribe when political parties must conduct those primaries.

According to Justice Umar, the Electoral Act does not empower the commission to dictate internal political party schedules beyond statutory requirements.

2. Political Parties Have Until 120 Days Before Election to Submit Candidates

His Lordship ruled that under Section 29(1) of the Electoral Act 2026, political parties are only required to submit the particulars of candidates not later than 120 days before an election.

The court said INEC cannot lawfully shorten that timeline through regulations or election guidelines.

3. INEC Cannot Impose Earlier Deadlines for Candidate Substitution

The court further ruled that INEC cannot set earlier deadlines for withdrawal or replacement of candidates outside the period already provided under Section 31 of the Electoral Act.

Under the law, parties are permitted to substitute candidates up to 90 days before an election.

4. Court Reaffirms Supremacy of Electoral Act Over INEC Guidelines

The judgment emphasized that administrative guidelines issued by INEC remain subordinate to the Electoral Act and cannot override or diminish rights granted by statute.

The ruling reinforces the legal doctrine that subsidiary regulations cannot supersede laws passed by the National Assembly.

5. Judgment Reopens Political Defection Window Ahead of 2027

The decision is expected to trigger major political realignments as politicians now potentially have more time to defect to new parties and secure nominations before the 2027 elections.

Analysts say the ruling could intensify coalition talks, internal party battles and last-minute political negotiations across major parties.

6. INEC’s Regulatory Powers Now Under Judicial Scrutiny

The ruling significantly narrows INEC’s room to impose administrative controls outside the Electoral Act and may force the commission to redesign parts of its 2027 election timetable.

Legal experts believe the matter could eventually reach the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court because of its constitutional implications.

Why the Judgment Matters

The ruling is already being viewed as one of the most consequential pre-election decisions ahead of 2027 because it directly affects:

  • party primaries,
  • defections,
  • candidate substitutions,
  • and the balance of power between INEC and the judiciary.

For political actors preparing for 2027, the judgment could fundamentally alter the timeline and strategy of the next election cycle.

TIPS