By Professor Ajovi Scott-Emuakpor
Dr. Atake’s central thesis is that State Police is now a constitutional and security necessity because the centralized Nigeria Police Force has demonstrably failed to provide adequate security. This is a powerful argument and difficult to dismiss. However, the article sometimes presents a false choice between:
A failing national police system, and
A successful State Police system.
The real choice is between two systems that are both susceptible to political abuse, corruption, and institutional weakness.
The crucial question is not whether policing should be centralized or decentralized, but which arrangement is more likely to protect citizens from both criminals and politicians.
Strengths of the Article
- He correctly identifies the failure of the current system
This is perhaps the strongest part of the article.
Nobody can seriously argue that Nigeria’s security architecture is performing satisfactorily. Kidnapping, banditry, communal violence, insurgency, and armed robbery continue despite a constitutionally centralized police force.
Read: Also: A Reply to Professor Ajovi Scott-Emuakpor on State Police, in Plain Terms
A key insight is that centralization did not eliminate abuse; it merely transferred control from regional politicians to federal politicians.
His observation is particularly important:
Local police were abandoned because they were used to harass enemies and intimidate opponents. Today the national police are often used for the same purpose.
That is difficult to refute.
Many Nigerians would agree that:
Opposition politicians are sometimes selectively investigated.
Political opponents are occasionally arrested under questionable circumstances.
Federal power can influence policing outcomes.
If abuse remains possible under centralization, then centralization cannot be defended solely as a safeguard against abuse.
- The article effectively exposes the contradiction in Nigerian federalism
Dr. Atake rightly notes the anomaly that Governors are called “Chief Security Officers” of their states while commanding no police force.
This creates a constitutional mismatch:
Responsibility rests with Governors.
Authority rests largely with Abuja.
As a result, each level blames the other when insecurity occurs.
This critique is persuasive from a federalist perspective.
- Comparative examples are useful
The article correctly notes that genuine federations such as:
United States
Canada
India
Australia
Germany
all have decentralized forms of policing.
The argument that federalism and decentralized policing generally coexist is historically accurate.
Weaknesses of the Article
- It understates Nigeria’s historical experience
The article acknowledges the abuses of Native Authority and Local Government Police but does not fully confront how severe they were.
The problem was not merely poor training.
The local police system became deeply embedded in patronage politics.
A critic could argue:
The historical record does not simply show isolated abuses. It shows that local political control over armed officers repeatedly produced systemic abuse.
The article treats this mainly as a design problem that better safeguards can solve.
That assumption may be overly optimistic.
- It assumes institutions that Nigeria does not yet possess
Much of the article’s confidence rests on safeguards:
Independent Police Commissions
Civilian oversight
Human rights protections
Merit-based appointments
Legislative scrutiny
The problem is that these same safeguards often fail in other sectors.
One might ask:
If State Independent Electoral Commissions are commonly accused of serving Governors, why should State Police Commissions be different?
This is perhaps the strongest challenge to Atake’s argument.
Nigeria’s constitutional problem is often not lack of rules but lack of enforcement.
- It underestimates gubernatorial power
Governors already wield enormous influence over:
State budgets
Local governments
Party structures
State legislatures
In many states, checks and balances are weak.
Giving such Governors armed forces could create what political scientists call “subnational authoritarianism”—a situation where democratic practices exist nationally but local rulers become nearly untouchable.
The article treats this danger as manageable.
Many critics would argue it is the central issue.
- The proposed federal intervention power may become a new source of abuse
This is one of the most interesting contradictions within the article.
Dr. Atake argues:
State Police should be independent.
Yet the President should have power to assume command during emergencies.
The danger is obvious.
If a President can determine that:
“public order is threatened”
or
“state police is being abused”
then political temptation may arise to intervene in opposition-controlled states.
Nigeria’s history of emergency powers suggests this fear is not theoretical.
Ironically, the stronger the federal takeover power becomes, the less independent State Police actually becomes.
The Missing Middle Ground
Perhaps the largest weakness in the article is that it frames the debate as:
National Police versus State Police
There may be a third option.
Regional Police
Some scholars propose police forces at the geopolitical-zone level:
South West Police
South East Police
North West Police
North East Police
North Central Police
South South Police
Advantages would include:
Larger professional institutions than state forces.
Reduced gubernatorial control.
Better funding capacity.
Greater operational reach across state boundaries.
This could balance local knowledge with protection against state-level political capture.
The article gives little attention to such alternatives.
The Strongest Counter-Argument to the Article
If I were critiquing the article academically, I would frame the central counterpoint this way:
Dr. Atake successfully demonstrates that centralized policing has failed to prevent insecurity and political abuse. However, he does not conclusively establish that decentralization will reduce either problem. The same political culture that has allowed abuse of federal policing may simply reproduce itself at the state level. The question is therefore not whether power should be decentralized, but whether sufficient institutional safeguards exist to prevent the abuse of coercive power regardless of where that power is located.
My Own Conclusion
I would arrive at a position very close to the one that Obiajulu seem to be expressing. “1. Raise entry standards, 2. Recruit better people, 3. For a few years, admit only university graduates. Philosophy. Law. Sociology. Psychology. Disciplines that teach people how to think, reason and understand society, 4. Study the best police services in the world. Learn from them. Adapt what works.” Hahahahaha! In what world is Don Kenobi living?
The historical justification for abolishing local police was that politicians abused them.
Today, many Nigerians believe political actors can influence the national police in similar ways.
Therefore:
The existence of abuse is not an argument for centralization alone, because centralization has not eliminated abuse.
However:
The existence of abuse is also not an argument for decentralization, because the same abuse may simply be relocated to the states.
Dr. Atake convincingly demonstrates that the current system is failing. What he does not fully prove is that State Police will succeed.
The strongest case for State Police is improved local security and accountability.
The strongest case against it is that Nigeria’s institutions may not yet be strong enough to prevent Governors from transforming state police forces into instruments of political control.
In short, the article proves that the status quo is inadequate; it does not definitively prove that State Police is the safest remedy. That remains the central unresolved question.
- Professor Ajovi Scott-Emuakpor, Michigan State University.
