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Extradition by Hon. Justice Usman Bukar Bwala

Extradition is as old as criminal law since criminals run away from the place or country where a crime is committed to a different place or country seeking safety from prosecution. Avoiding prosecution has always been central to criminals. How to get the fugitive after he has run away to a foreign country to face prosecution in the country he is alleged to have committed a crime is the question now?

Hon. Justice Usman Bukar Bwala

The short answer is extradition. What is extradition? In Nigeria, extradition is specifically contained in the constitution and it is exclusively a federal matter so no state can legislate on. It is contained in the Second Schedule to the constitution item no 27 of the 1999 amended constitution which reads “SECOND SCHEDULE (Section 4), Part 1, Exclusive Legislative List item No. 27 “Extradition.”

What is contained in the exclusive federal list, no state or local government can legislate on it S. 4(2) of the constitution reads “The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule of this Constitution.”

As extradition is on the exclusive legislative list, power to entertain extradition is exclusively conferred on the Federal High Court to the exclusion of all other courts Section 251(i) of the Constitution reads: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters – (i) citizenship, naturalisation and aliens, deportation of persons, who are not citizens of Nigeria, extradition, immigration into and emigration from Nigeria, passports, and visas.” To deport a citizen of Nigeria amounts to infringement of his fundamental right and the deportation will be null and void and attracts award of damages by court Shugaba vs The Min. of Internal Affairs 1982 3 NCLR 306.

 Other laws dealing with extradition in Nigeria are the Extradition Act 1966, Federal High Court (Extradition Proceedings) Rules 2015, and The Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The Federal Government of Nigeria has entered treaties on extradition with many countries example extradition treaty between Nigeria and Benin, Ghana, Togo, and others. There is also The Extradition Act (Modification) Order 2014 which modified the Extradition Act 1966 by removing jurisdictions of state high courts and magistrates to entertain extradition matters. The President under section 315 of the Constitution can modify any existing law in Nigeria including the Extradition Act, 1966 as was rightly done by the Modification Order.

A fugitive who has been detained awaiting deportation under extradition order can challenge his detention through habeas corpus is century old common law right which accrues to a fugitive offender Schtraks vs Govt of Israel 1962 3 All E.R. 529.

 Courts do not consider extradition of a fugitive when the case against him in the requesting country is of political nature Schtraks vs Govt of Israel supra, R vs Brixton Prison (Governor) Exparte Enahoro 1963 2 All E. R. 477. Section 3(1) of the Extradition Act 1966 reads:  “A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the Attorney-General or court dealing with the case is satisfied that the offence in respect of which his surrender is sought is an offence of a political character.” Sub-section (2) (a) of section 3 of the Act also prohibits surrendering a fugitive on account of his race, religion, nationality or the application is not made in good faith in the interest of justice.

A court hearing extradition matter must be satisfied on the evidence before it of a criminal act committed by a fugitive in the requesting country R vs Governor of Brixton Prison Exparte Sadri 1962 3 All E.R. 747.

The Federal High Court (Extradition Proceedings) Rules 2015 have set out in details the procedure for extradition cases before a court. Order 1 of the Rules have stated the objectives of the Rules as: “The objectives of these Rules are to – (a) ensure clarity of extradition proceedings; (b) set out in details the requirements for specific Orders; and (c) minimise the time spent during extradition proceedings as a result of interlocutory applications, undue adjournments and other causes of delay.”

Another useful subsidiary law dealing with extradition is the Guidelines Issued by the Federal Ministry of Justice dated 1st October 2013. The Guidelines have given a concise definition of extradition as “Extradition is the surrender by one State (the Requested State) of a person present in its territory to another state (the Requesting State) that seeks the person either in order to prosecute him or her to enforce a punishment handed down by its courts after conviction of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Requesting State.” See also George Udeozor vs FRN CA/L/376/05 of 26th day of February, 2007.

Extradition of a fugitive is a sure method of preventing criminals from evading prosecution in a requesting country by fleeing to another country or entering embassy of a foreign country the requested state.

Hon. Justice Usman Bukar Bwala, J.P. retired from the High Court of ustice Maiduguri, Borno State.

Taxation – Payment of Tax by Law Firms

 – Whether law firms are taxable persons and bound to remit Value Added Tax to the Federal Inland Revenue Service on the fees they charge their clients

The thrust of the appellant’s case in the lower Court is whether as a law firm which provides services to members of the public for profit she is actually a taxable person within the meaning of the Value Added Tax Act Cap V1 of 2004 and so liable to collect value-added tax from her clients and remit to the respondent.

The learned trial Judge thought she was and dismissed her case for lacking in merit. After first stating the trite position that the primary rule of interpretation is that words be given their ordinary meaning, His Lordship Abubakar, J. resolved that issue this way: “Applying the principles of law, therefore, I am of the considered legal view that the list of ‘services’ exempted from paying VAT by the aforesaid schedule clearly did not include ‘legal service’ which the plaintiff firm renders to the society. In other words, legal services unlike medical services is chargeable for the purpose of payment of Value Added Tax. In the circumstances, therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the plaintiff that because Legal Practitioner does not engage in production or distribution or consumption of goods and for this reason should not be VAT collection agent is baseless. This is because rendering service of professional expertise is what is in issue and not the production or consumption of consumable goods.

“I, therefore, resolve issue 1 in the negative and hold that the plaintiff is not exempted from registration with the defendant for the purpose of charging or collection of Value Added Tax on the professional services she collects from her clients. I would like to make it clear to the plaintiff that Value Added Tax is paid by the client in addition to the professional fees. See S.12 of the Act. In fact S. 8 of the Act made it mandatory for the plaintiff to register with the defendant failing which the plaintiff will be sanctioned. Consequent upon this section, I also resolve issue 2 in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff.”

His Lordship also resolved against the appellant the consequential issue of the respondent’s right to demand Value Added Tax from the appellant, saying: “The 3rd issue is whether the defendant has the statutory power to demand payment of VAT from the plaintiff, this question is answered in the clear and unambiguous provision of S. 42 of the Act which provided that the chairman of the defendant Board or any Senior staff of the defendant can write to taxable person like the plaintiff and demand for payment of VAT. In fact, the provision was reinforced by S.15 of the Act which stated in plain and clear terms that it is mandatory for the plaintiff being a taxable person to render a return to the defendant on all legal services she rendered to the public. Therefore the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that there is no provision in the Act which empowers the defendant to demand VAT from the plaintiff is without legal foundation and therefore baseless. Consequently, I hold that the letters of the defendant to the plaintiff demanding the plaintiff to render monthly returns on VAT is proper and in order.”

This decision is undoubtedly well-rooted in the provisions of the Value Added Tax Act Cap IV of 2004 and I do not see how I can fault it. The Value Added Tax Act, which also states in its section 7 that the Respondent shall be responsible for the administration of value-added tax and shall do all such things as it may deem necessary and expedient for the collection and assessment of the tax and shall account for all amounts so collected in accordance with the provisions of the Act, provides in its Sections 1, 2 and 3 that: 1.

There is hereby imposed and charged a tax to be known as the Value Added Tax (in the Act referred to as ‘the tax’) which shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 2. Tax shall be chargeable and payable on the supply of all goods and services in this Act referred to as ‘Taxable goods and services’ other than goods and services listed in the First Schedule to this Act. It is worthy of note that, contrary to the appellant’s argument, the Act does not limit itself to only suppliers of goods but extends the duty of collection and remission of VAT to also those who only supply services. A lawyer or firm of lawyers in private practice undoubtedly supplies legal services to the public for a fee and so caught by this provision and bound to charge and remit to respondent value added tax as stipulated by the Value-Added Tax Act on the fees they charge their clients.

In fact, Section 46 of the same VAT Act (as amended) puts this beyond doubt by its definition of the terms ‘supply of services’ ‘taxable goods and services’ and ‘taxable person’ which it defined thus: ‘Supply of services’ means any service provided for consideration. ‘taxable goods and services’ means the goods and services not listed in the First Schedule to this Act. “Taxable person’ includes an individual or body of individuals, family, corporations sole, trustee or executor or a person who carries out in a place an economic activity, a person exploiting tangible and intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom by way of trade or business or a person or agency of Government acting in that capacity.

The same statute imposes an obligation on taxable persons (including lawyers and law firms) to charge and collect from their customers or clients value-added tax and remit to the respondent, thus: “14. Collection of tax by a taxable person (1) A taxable person shall on supplying taxable goods or services to his accredited distributor, agent, client, or consumer, as the case may be, collect the tax on goods or services at the rate specified in section 2 of this Act.”

“15. A taxable person to render returns: (1) A taxable person shall render to the Board, on or before the 21st day of the month following that in which the purchase or supply was made, a return of all taxable goods and services purchased or supplied by him during the preceding month in such manner as the Board may, from time to time, determine.” What is more, Section 8 of the statute makes registration with respondent by taxable persons like appellant mandatory.

It reads: 8(1) A taxable person shall, within six months of the commencement of the Act or within six months of commencement of business, register with the Board for the purpose of this Act. Subsection 2 of the same section goes on to impose on defaulting persons penalties of N10,000 for the first month of failure and N5,000 for each subsequent month.? The goods and services that are exempted from the collection of VAT are also specifically listed in the First Schedule to the Act thus: PART 1: GOODS EXEMPT:

1. All medical and pharmaceutical products.

2. Basic food items.

3. Books and educational materials.

4. Baby products.

 5. Fertilizer, locally produced agricultural and veterinary medicine, farming machinery, and farming transportation equipment.

6. All exports.

7. Plant, machinery, and goods imported for use in the export processing zone or free trade zone: Prided that 100 percent of production of such company is for export otherwise tax shall accrue proportionately on the profits of the company.

8. Plant, machinery, and equipment purchased for utilization of gas in downstream petroleum operations.

9. Tractors, ploughs, and agricultural equipment and implements purchased for agricultural purposes.

PART II: Services exempt

1. Medical services.

2. Services rendered by Community Banks, People’s Bank, and Mortgage Institutions.

3. Plays and performances conducted by educational institutions as part of learning.

4. All export services.

PART III Zero-rated goods and services.

1. Non-oil exports.

 2. Goods and services purchased by diplomats.

3. Goods purchased for use in humanitarian donor-funded projects. ‘Humanitarian donor-funded projects’ include projects undertaken by non-Governmental Organizations and religious and social clubs or societies recognized by law whose activities are not for profit and in the public interest.

Legal Practitioners and law firm is not mentioned here. The rule of interpretation is that when something is specifically mentioned in a statute the intendment is that it excludes whatever is not mentioned: P. & C.H.S.C. Ltd & Ors. v. MIGFO Nig. Ltd & Anor. (2012) SCM 205. That is just as it is also the law that whenever a word or expression is defined in a statute, that definition applies for the purposes of that statute to the exclusion of any other meaning that same expression may have.”

Al-Maseer Law Firm v. FIRS (2019) LPELR-48628(CA)

Per Boloukuromo Moses Ugo, JCA (Pp 15 – 22 Paras B – E)

What history says about how Buhari’s successor will emerge

By Azu Ishiekwene

I think the most frequently asked question today is, who will succeed President Muhammadu Buhari? With over 35 aspirants openly declaring their interest as of today, a few still in the closet, and more coming out, the field has never looked more crowded.

And last week, the decision by former President Goodluck Jonathan to put one leg in the ring, while pretending that he is being dragged, got party and non-party members even more confused.

Of course, those who are pressing him into the race – Governor of Yobe State and former All Progressives Congress (APC) interim Chairman, Mai Mala Buni; Kebbi State Governor Abubakar Atiku Bagudu, and a few ministers from the North – wish it would happen. But they know it won’t. Buni once led a delegation to Jonathan, to explore the possibility of the former president running with the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami, as his running mate.

The strongest consideration is the potential four-year one-term limit of another Jonathan presidency. But the trap is that a post-election litigation over the 2017 constitutional amendment on “swearing-in”, could disqualify Jonathan and hand the position over to his running mate if he wins.

After the visit, Jonathan asked for time to consult. It was, however, clear from the criticism that followed that decamping from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and running on the ticket of the APC was a bridge too far.

Even if the APC were to grant the entry waiver, which Jonathan requested, he would still have to face the party primaries. And more important, the APC will have to convince its members, and perhaps the larger public, that the same man it branded Jonathan the Incompetent and Jonathan the Clueless has now become Jonathan the Messiah.

The renewed buzz about a potential Jonathan comeback, suggests that some elements in the APC still think that they can lead their party back to its vomit. And yet, they don’t think it’s an act of desperation. A number of insiders told me this week that nothing other than a desire to find someone who can preserve Buhari’s legacy is tempting the APC back to Jonathan. They obviously can’t imagine that the public will ask the APC, what legacy?

The noise about a possible Jonathan return and concerns that it could be disastrous for other aspirants may be good political gossip, but it’s a waste of time. Jonathan will not return unless the 18 registered political parties adopt him as their candidate and the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Mahmood Yakubu, agrees to write the presidential election result and personally deliver the certificate of return to him in Otuoke.

READ ALSO: Southeast, 2023 presidency and imperative of zoning

From his time as deputy governor to his tenure as Vice President, Jonathan has become so used to a life of ease, and well, good luck, that no matter how hard he tries, he can’t bring himself into this contest except the ducks are lined up for him in a row. Jonathan being Jonathan, unless the elements align again and fall on his lap, which is as likely as the appearance of a blue moon, he won’t try for it.

But history, that is, the history of the two major political parties could at least give us an idea of who in the APC might get it. There are teachable moments in the journeys of three former candidates – Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua and Buhari – that could provide an insight into how the candidates in the major parties would emerge.

One, there is something in the DNA of the power brokers that resents big political spenders. Although figures are hard to come by, anecdotal evidence suggests that MKO Abiola was probably one of the biggest pre-election spenders in the last three and a half decades. Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar could also be in the league, but more so because of his repeat races. Abiola, a multi-billionaire friend of the rich and powerful and candidate of the Social Democratic Party (PDP), ran a campaign that was colourful and massively funded.

His wealth was not only a source of envy, it was also a source of fear and resentment among the military elite who couldn’t bring themselves to hand over political power to a man who seemed to have it all.

If the political transition under military president Ibrahim Babangida was an attempt to depart from the unspoken tradition of not handing over power to candidates who are both rich and politically influential, the power brokers took the lessons from the Abiola misadventure to heart.

From Obasanjo to Yar’Adua and Buhari, three candidates who emerged between 1999 and 2014, not one, at least as far as the public knew, could fund their own party primaries, much less their election campaigns.

Obasanjo was broke when he left prison in 1998. His sprawling farm business was in ruins. He couldn’t rehabilitate his chicken coop much less fund the primaries of the PDP. Neither Yar’Adua nor Buhari was significantly better off financially. The party primaries and campaigns of all three were funded by interest groups that dragged them into the race.

This appearance of inadequacy, a sort of political crutch if you like, is the IOU that ensures that at least in form, if not substance, the interest groups can maintain a leverage on the candidate.

Two, the main parties would also be looking for political orphans – or at least those with a form of political naivety; that is, candidates who do not appear threatening, politically. All the talk about national interest is nonsense. If the candidate is from the South East, for example, “national interest” means public repudiation of the Biafra separatist agenda and disavowal of IPOB.

If he is from the South West, it means rejection of “Amotekun”, state police, or restructuring. And if, at this time, he is from the North – that is anywhere outside the North West – national interest will depend on whether he is Christian or Muslim. Of course, for all regions, religion has increasingly become a dominant issue in the last 30 years.

Nothing illustrates the obsession of the cabal with political control more than the story of the failed presidential ambition of former Rivers State Governor, Peter Odili. Just like Rotimi Amaechi did for Buhari in 2014, Odili put the treasury of the state at the disposal of the third term ambition of Obasanjo, under the notion that if it failed, he would benefit.

The accounts of this gamble in three books – Obasanjo’s My Watch; Peter Odili’s Conscience and History – My Story; Chidi Odinkalu’s and Aisha Osori’s Too Good to Die; and Nasir El-Rufai’s 2009 essay on Umaru Yar’Adua, suggest that Odili was a front-runner, first as presidential candidate and then as running mate, till the eve of the PDP convention.

From Obasanjo’s book, the screening committee dumped Odili despite the fact that he showed “a lot of commitment and loyalty to the party”, because “for some inexplicable reasons, he does not enjoy the support from other governors.”  Of course, because they fund the party, governors were important and would still be important, even in the current race.

But in a government where the President was famous for running dissenters, including governors out of town, to suggest that his choice was hindered by gubernatorial mushy-mushy is laughable. Not Obasanjo.

The unstated reason appears to have been Odili’s “unacceptability to foreign missions because of spurious allegations of corruption”, not to mention the fact that he knew a bit too much and had done a bit too much with the President to be allowed to cash his IOU.

Three, the history of presidential candidates also favours late, sometimes, unexpected and even unprepared entrants. For some reasons, the system appears to abhor preparation and readiness.

Obafemi Awolowo, perhaps one of the most prepared for the office for which reason Odumegwu Ojukwu described him as “the best president Nigeria never had”, contested twice for the position. Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, who is perhaps next to Awolowo, at least for resilience and organisation, also never got it.

On the contrary, from Shehu Shagari to Obasanjo and from Umaru Yar’Adua to Jonathan, accidental candidates have had an edge, making you wonder if there’s something about the office that cannot coexist with preparation. Even Buhari, who cried a river after three failed attempts, only got elected at his fourth, when he was thought to have given up.

Of course, there would always be room for surprises and outliers and any of the over 35 aspirants in the field could buck the trend. Also, it means little to the cabal that in spite of its best efforts and elaborate care to control the process, things still go wrong, sometimes consuming it in its own experiments. Babangida, for example, misjudged Obasanjo, both as candidate and later as president; the same way Obasanjo misjudged Yar’Adua and was already regretting his role in the late president’s emergence before he died.

The selection default mode appears to be serviceability to the appointors. Usefulness to the country or the task at hand is incidental. Whatever happens in the next few weeks, just as surely as the apple doesn’t fall far away from the tree, it’s improbable that history would disappoint.

Ishiekwene is Editor-In-Chief of LEADERSHIP

Pitfalls of Section 850 of CAMA Law

By Jesuloluwa

Section 850 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 2020, empowers the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) to withdraw, cancel or revoke the certificate of an association at will. When this is done, it provides grounds for the subsequent dissolution of such association by an order of the court.

The case of Salomon v. Salomon is a locus classicus on the fact that a registered company under the law is different from its owners or members. It becomes a separate entity from its members upon its registration as a corporation. This is because incorporation confers upon the company the status of a legal person. This status is defined in Section 42 of the CAMA 2020.

Once a company is incorporated, it is awarded a certificate of incorporation in accordance with Section 41 (6) of the act, and this certificate shall be primary evidence of the fact that the requirements of the act in respect of registration and matters precedent and incidental to it have been complied with, and that the association is a company authorised to be registered and is in fact duly registered under the CAMA 2020.

However, Section 41 (7) gives the CAC the power to withdraw, cancel or revoke a certificate of incorporation. According to the act, a withdrawal, cancellation, or revocation of a certificate of incorporation may be carried out if it is discovered that such certificate was procured fraudulently, improperly, or unlawfully. Section 41 (8) of the Act also provides that the withdrawal, cancellation, or revocation of a certificate of incorporation may also be published in the Federal Gazette.

In relation to incorporated trustees, Section 850 of the act provides for the dissolution of an association by the court upon the application of the governing board, one or more trustees, the members of the association constituting at least 50 percent of the total membership of the association or the commission itself. Hence, any of the four aforementioned categories can validly apply for the dissolution of an association.

Furthermore, the grounds for the dissolution stipulated in the act include where the aims and objectives of the association have been fully realised or where such aims and objectives have turned illegal; where the association’s period of existence has expired; where it is just and equitable to do so; or where the certificate of incorporation has been withdrawn, cancelled or revoked by the commission.

There shall, in addition, be a notice to members, which may be affected by such dissolution. Also, the extra property remaining after the satisfaction of assets and liabilities shall either be paid to associations with similar objects or a charitable object and not to any trustee or member.

From the above, the grounds for the dissolution of an association include where the certificate of its incorporation has been withdrawn, cancelled, or revoked by the CAC, at will. However, there are no clearly stated grounds for the withdrawal, cancellation, or revocation of the certificate of incorporation, unlike the case of a company where such certificate has been fraudulently, improperly, or unlawfully obtained.

It is my opinion that the persons and entities qualified to apply for the dissolution of an association may not entirely act in the joint interests of its trustees. For example, the governing body or council may choose to act selfishly in the decision-making of the association and not protect the general interest. One or more trustees may also decide to compromise the association. The 50 percent membership requirement is also unjust on the argument that at least 51 percent should be stated as the standard. While the CAC must rightly be empowered to carry out its duties of revoking, cancelling or withdrawing the certificate of incorporation, it doing so at its will is extravagant.

In conclusion, the grounds for dissolution of the incorporated trustee’s association are fair enough except with regard to the withdrawal of the certificate at will. The positive objectives intended by the act are also defeated by the qualified applicants stated in the same. This is due to the possibility of conflicting interests, detrimental decisions, and frustrating consequences to the association. Where a portion of the association believes that the association has fulfilled its objectives but the other half claims otherwise, there is a question of truth to be answered.

In improving the state of the law in Section 850 of the CAMA 2020, a review of that provision is necessary. It is without doubt that there will be unending debate and chaos from the interpretation of the section. It is important to note that the CAC has also been vested with enough power and control over incorporated trustees, and so it is rather excessive that it also reserves the right to deprive the association of its certificate of incorporation at its own discretion. An attempt to amend the provision must ponder on the principles of fairness, equality of interests, and justice.

Jesuloluwa is a 500 Level Law student of Adeleke University, Ede, Osun State.

Credit: The Metro Lawyer

Is the Supreme Court on a flip flop with respect to the legal status of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act?

By Emmanuel Abasiubong Bassey and Ifeoluwa Oyemade

1. Introduction

There are two laws that regulate the enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria. The first is the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act², (“the Ordinance”), which was enacted to facilitate the reciprocal enforcement of judgments obtained in Nigeria and in the United Kingdom and other parts of Her Majesty’s Dominions and Territories under Her Majesty’s protection.

The second law which is largely unsettled, and which is the crux of this discourse is the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act³ (“the Act”). The Act is made up of two major parts, Part 1 and Part 2. Part 1 which spans from section 3 to section 10, contains the provisions for the registration of foreign judgments in Nigeria, while Part 2 contains the miscellaneous provisions of the Act.

Section 4 of the Act stipulates that a foreign judgment creditor may apply to a superior court in Nigeria within a period of 6 years from the date of the last judgment in the matter to have the judgment registered in that court for the purpose of enforcement in Nigeria, subject to the reciprocity requirement under Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act stipulates that the Minister of Justice, may by order direct, that Part 1 of the Act

shall extend to a foreign country if he is satisfied that substantial reciprocity of treatment will be assured as regards the enforcement in that foreign country of judgments given in the superior courts in Nigeria. It should be noted that the Minister of Justice has not yet made any order pursuant to Section 3 of the Act extending the application of Part 1 of the Act to any country.

Worthy of note also is Section 10(a) of the Act which appears to provide for the enforcement of a foreign judgment obtained before the commencement of an order under section 3 of the Act. It stipulates thus:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act: a judgment given before the commencement of an order under section 3 of this Act applying Part I of this Act to the foreign country where the judgment was given may be registered within twelve months from the date of the judgment or such longer period as may be allowed by a superior court in Nigeria.”

The provision of section 10(a) of the Act has been the subject of almost unending controversy when it comes to the powers of the courts to register judgments under that section of the Act. While some authorities have stated that the right of a judgment creditor to register a foreign judgment under the Act is inchoate since the entire Part 1 of the Act requires positive action on the part of the Minister of Justice of the Federation under section 3 of the Act to bring that part of the Act into force (see for example Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v. Ghassan Halaoui,4 other authorities, as we shall see hereunder, have decided that section 10(a) of the Act permits the registration of foreign judgments under the Act pending an order by the Minister of Justice extending the application of other sections of Part 1 of the Act to such countries.

2. Judicial Pronouncements and Commentary on the Legal Status of Part 1 of the Act

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Teleglobe America Inc. v. 21st Century Tech. Ltd5is the most telling in respect of the legal implication of section 10(a) of the Act. In that case, the Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of the Federal High Court which refused to register a judgment obtained in Fairfax County, Virginia, United States of America, and held that the foreign judgment was registrable under section 10(a) of the Act. The Court of Appeal, in coming to its decision relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Macaulay v. R.Z.B Osterreich Akiengesell Schaft of Austria6 where the Supreme Court while interpreting section 10(a) of the Act held per Kalgo J.S.C as follows:

“By this provision, irrespective, regardless or in spite of any other provision in the 1990 Act, any Judgment of a foreign country including United Kingdom to which Part I of that Act was not extended, can only be registered within 12 months from the date of the judgment or any longer period allowed by the court registering the judgment since the provisions of Part I of the said Act had not been extended to it. Section 4 of the 1990 Act which speaks of registering a judgment within 6 years after the date of judgment only applies to the countries where Part I of the said Act was extended, that is to say when the Minister made an order under the 1990 Act.”.

Whilst maintaining that section 10(a) of the Act permits the registration of a judgment obtained from any foreign country within 12 months pending an order by the Minister of Justice under Section 3 of the Act, the Supreme Court has also held in a seemingly sweeping fashion in some of its judgments, that the entire Part 1 of the Act requires a positive action on the part of the Minister of Justice of the Federation under Section 3 of the Act to bring that part of the Act into force. For example, the Supreme Court per Mohammed, J.S.C in Marine & General Assurance Company Plc v. Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. & Ors7 held thus:

“…the entire provisions of Part 1 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Cap. 152 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 containing Section 4 of the Act required a positive action on the part of the Minister of Justice of the Federation to bring that part of the Act into force…. Part 1 of the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act Cap. 152 of the Laws of the Federation 1990, comprises Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. From the provisions of Section 3 of the Act quoted above, it is quite clear that the provisions of Part 1 of the Act remains dormant or inactive until life is breathed into them by an order promulgated by the Minister….”

If, as it was held by the Supreme Court that, the entire provisions of Part 1 of the Act, which includes Section 10(a) of the Act remain dormant or inactive until the Minister of Justice makes an order under section 3 of the Act, can we still say that a foreign judgment is registrable under section 10(a) of the Act as decided by the Supreme Court in Macaulay v. R.Z.B. of Austria?8The Supreme Court answered this question in Marine & General Assurance Company Plc v. Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. & Ors., (supra) when, despite its aforesaid pronouncement in the same case, it cited with approval its previous decision in Macaulay v. R.Z.B. of Austria9and held that the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales, in that case, was registrable within 12 months under either Section 3(1) of the Ordinance or Section 10(a) of the Act. This decision of the Supreme Court has given a fillip to the argument that pending the making of an order by the Minister of Justice extending the application of Part 1 of the Act to any country, foreign judgments from any country in the world are registrable within 12 months under section 10(a) of the Act.

In a more recent judgment, the Supreme Court in Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v Ghassan Halaoui10raised the issue of whether the application to set aside the registration of the judgment was properly brought under Section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that both the Ibadan High Court and the Court of Appeal were wrong to have decided the case under Section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court stated that since the Minister of Justice had not made any order pursuant to Section 3 of the Act extending Part 1 of the Act to any country, the proper law that was applicable to the case was the Ordinance since the judgment was from the High Court of England. The Supreme Court relied on the case of Macaulay v. R.Z.B. of Austria11 and in the end dismissed the appeal relying on the provisions of the Ordinance.

It is interesting to note that in coming to its decision, the Supreme Court did not specifically overrule that part of the decision in Macaulay v. R.Z.B. of Austria where another panel of the Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 10(a) of the Act a judgment from any foreign country to which Part 1 of the Act has not been extended can be registered in Nigeria within 12 months. Thus, it would appear that the current position of the Supreme Court is that Section 10(a) of the Act provides a leeway for the registration of a judgment from any foreign country under the Act within 12 months pending the making of an order by the Minister of Justice extending the application of other provisions of Part 1 of the Act to such foreign country. This position is bolstered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Obasi v. Mikson Establishment Industries Ltd,12which is arguably the most recent decision of the Supreme Court on the point. In the Obasi v. Mikson case, the judgment in issue was obtained in Niger Republic and the Respondent had applied to the Kano State High Court for the registration of the judgment pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act for the purpose of enforcement, which application was duly granted. The Appellant was aggrieved with the registration and enforcement of the judgment against him and thus brought an application to set aside the registration of the judgment. The application was dismissed by both the Kano State High Court and the Court of Appeal.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court was, among other things, invited to determine the applicability of Section 6 (1)(a)(vi) of the Act to setting aside a judgment obtained in Niger Republic and registered under section 10(a) of the Act. After due consideration of the submissions of both parties, the Supreme Court held that an application to set aside the registration of a foreign judgment can properly be brought under Section 6 (1)(a) (vi) of the Act if the judgment debtor satisfies the court that the rights under the judgment are not vested in the applicant for registration. In that case however, the Supreme Court stated that the Appellant did not satisfy the court that the rights under the judgment from Niger Republic were not vested in the Respondent and thus affirmed the registration of the judgment under Section 10(a) of the Act.

A review of the above cited decisions of the Supreme Court suggests that the apex court has been on a flip-flop on the relevance and applicability of section 10(a) of the Act vis-à-vis the reciprocity requirements of section 3. In one breath holding that Part 1 of the Act is not yet in force since the Minister of Justice has not made any order under Section 3 of the Act extending Part 1 of the Act to any country, and in another breath holding that foreign judgments from any country can be registered in Nigeria under section 10(a) of the Act (which is under Part 1 of the Act) pending the aforesaid order by the Minister of Justice, and such registration may be challenged under section 6(1)(a)(vi) of the Act. If that is the case, of what use then is the requirement of reciprocity under Section 3 of the Act. One would have thought that the intent of the draftsmen of the Act was to get other countries to provide the same avenue for the enforcement in their countries of judgments obtained in Nigeria, so that judgment creditors in Nigeria would be able to reap the fruit of their judgment against judgment debtors that have assets outside the country. But that seems to be defeated by Section 10(a) of the Act which is apparently inconsistent with section 3 of the Act.

It is strongly arguable that Section 10(a) of the Act is completely unnecessary given that it defeats the purpose of the Act, which presumably is to ensure reciprocity of enforcement of judgments between Nigeria and other countries. This is more so, given that foreign judgments obtained outside of the UK and those countries to which the Ordinance is not applicable can still be enforced in Nigeria under common law by the judgment creditor filing a fresh action with the judgment as the cause of action. Thus, there was really no need for the draftsmen of the Act to create a leeway for the enforcement of foreign judgments under Section 10(a) of the Act pending the making of an order by the Minister of Justice under Section.

It is, however, curious that since the Act came into force on 1st February 1961, the Minister of Justice has not made an attempt to make an order pursuant to Section 3 of the Act, extending the application of Part 1 of the Act to any country. Perhaps, this is because no country has extended reciprocal enforcement to judgments obtained in Nigeria, on the terms envisaged by the Act. This is the more reason why Section 10(a) of the Act ought not to have been inserted into the Act to provide benefits of the Act to judgments obtained from a country which has not provided reciprocal enforcement of judgments obtained in Nigeria on the terms envisaged by the Act.

3. Conclusion

It is trite that where there are conflicting judgments of a court on an issue, it is the latest judgment that represents the position of the law on the issue.13 Accordingly, on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Obasi v. Mikson Establishment Industries Ltd (supra), it is safe to assert that a foreign judgment obtained from any country other than a commonwealth jurisdiction is registrable under section 10(a) of the Act. It can also be safely said that such registration may be challenged under Section 6(1)(a)(vi) of the Act until there is any contrary decision by the Supreme Court.

Footnotes

1 Emmanuel Bassey, Ifeoluwa Oyemade, Associates SPA Ajibade & Co., Lagos, Nigeria.

2 Cap. 175, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958.

3 Cap. F35, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

4 (2009) 10 NWLR 309).

5 (2008) LPELR-5006(CA).

6 (2003) LPELR-1802(SC).

7 (2006) LPELR-1840(SC) (pp. 15-17, paras. F-A (pp. 15-17, paras. F-A).

8 Ibid n. 3.

9 Ibid n. 4. See also, Witt & Busch Ltd v. Dale Power Systems Plc (2007) LPELR-3499(SC) (pp. 14-15, paras. D-F).

10 Ibid n. 1.

11 Ibid n. 4.

12 (2016)16 NWLR (Pt. 1539) 335.

13 Ikeni & Anor v. Efamo & Ors (2001) LPELR-1474(SC) (pp 21 – 21 paras C – D).

Vaginal Discharge Colours 

By Dr. Njideka Kalu

Vaginal Discharge Colours || Normal Vs Abnormal Discharge || Prevention & Treatment

May Day Celebration: Rt. Hon. Eugene Odoh hosts community in Abuja

A former Speaker of the Enugu State House of Assembly and 2019 All Progressives Congress (APC) senatorial candidate for Enugu North Senatorial District, Rt. (Hon.) Barr Eugene Odoh, will in the month of May host his Ukehe community’s Town Hall meeting in Abuja.

Rt. (Hon) Odoh who was Speaker of the Enugu State House of Assembly between 2007 to 2015 is also a member of the Governing Council, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), IIe-Ife.

A statement signed by Chairman of the town union, Barr Ifesi Nwodo, Secretary of the association, Mr. Edward Okoro, and the PRO, Peter Ugwu disclosed that the monthly meeting will be held at Tickles Garden Wuse Zone 5, on Sunday 1st May 2022 by 3 pm.

Nwodo said the meeting is going to be an opportunity to celebrate all their members that are workers. He encouraged new members to join.

A major trouble with Nigeria’s Federalism by Ikeazor Akaraiwe, SAN

Nigeria’s Federalism is majorly in trouble because the States are too small and have become the personal fiefdoms of significant persons. I will explain. These persons have an attitude of entitlement to the resources of the State, such that for a Governor to know peace, he has to distribute State resources to these significant persons. There is no accountability. Indeed, the masses of the people are too impoverished and generally insufficiently educated to challenge these excesses, especially when these ‘rent collectors’ spread some of the largesse across their fawning adulators. Besides, for the most part, the people are culturally socialised to sycophantic adulation of leaders. If the governor does not readily distribute State resources to ‘the owners of the State’, he will be badly troubled throughout his regime with plots, plans, and ploys to undermine him, sponsored bad press, and sundry acts of sabotage, to say the very least.

  1. To have 38 Civil Services including that of the Federal Government, and Commissioners, Special Assistants and Advisers and Rent Collectors replicated across 38 Federating Units, whereas the 1st Republic had 5 Federating Units including the centre, with better governance delivered, is self-explanatory of the conundrum Nigeria has boxed itself into.
  2. But of course, some State governors are the chief landlords and ‘rent collectors’ of their States. They are beholden to no one but to their whims and caprices. The State is both their deep pocket and in their pockets. To use that quaint Nigerianism, in short, they have ‘pocketed’ the State. And the cycle continues. When one Governor leaves, succeeded almost inevitably by his proxy, the proxy either throws off his yoke from his shoulders, becomes his own man, another strong man, submitting to his favorite rent collectors for his safety; Or continues as a lackey to the ‘rent collectors’ who put him there in the first place. We have however seen a few, all-too-few, Chief Executives who were beholden to no one but the masses of their people.
  3. What shall Nigeria then do? 36 States, a Federal Capital Territory, and 774 local governments were created by military adventurers masquerading as messiahs. Many centres of power, and ‘rent collectors,’ have thus emerged.
  4. Shut down these centres of power by merging the States. The good additional reason being that the current States are not economically viable, and can not generate their own resources. Indeed, they were not created with viability in mind but as political gifts on the basis of agitation and sometimes, friendship and marriage.
  5. Merging the Federating Units will tend to disrupt the trend of ‘Rent Collecting’ as different groups of ‘Rent Collectors’ in the previous Federating Units emerge and compete among themselves for access to State power and resources. There is, of course, always a possibility that the enlarged group of ‘Rent Collectors’ will unite and bring rent collecting pressure upon the newly merged Federating Units.  This is extremely unlikely however because the ‘rent collecting greed patterns in Nigeria and tribal or statist geopolitical tendencies have largely ossified over time, the last States created having been created over 25 years ago.
  6. Thus, merging some of the Federating Units will create mutually opposing Rent Collectors from the previous Federating Units, with the effect that an inbuilt house divided against itself becomes the norm. Division among an extremely rapacious and insensitive elite as is Nigeria’s lot will be a win-win for the nation, and certainly for any governor with a mind to work. This lack of unity among the rapacious Nigerian rent collecting class to be fostered by the merger of Federating units will hopefully bring great developmental benefit to the people.
  7. Finally, the kind of deliberate house divided itself I have in mind brings to mind the principle of Separation of Powers in the United States of America where the three arms of government are seemingly at war against one another. Many people do not realise that the constant bickering between the United States Legislature and Executive arms was deliberately structured by the Founding Fathers to prevent a return to the situation when the British Monarch who ruled America in colonial times was too powerful and uncontrollable. So, the Americans did not want an all-powerful sovereign. But this is a discussion for another day.
  8. Similarly and idiosyncratically for Nigeria, restructuring and merging states will create in each Federating Unit a deliberate house divided against itself such that the traditional rulers and power elite who own the current states will have to share ownership with others. This house divided against itself syndrome ought to weaken the grip of the Rent Collectors and work out for the overall good of the people.
  9. The new Federating Units should be merged on the basis of economic viability. So, two or three may come together, while currently viable ones may stand alone or merge with non-economically viable Federating Units. I have about 12 Federating Units in mind as both pragmatic and apposite, as opposed to the current 37.

Ikeazor ‘Kizor’ Akaraiwe, SAN, Convener, Federalists for Good Governance [FFGG] and Moderator, Rule of Law-Nigeria [RoL]

Enugu community monarch places embargo on dead widow burial following land dispute with radio personality, as family seeks justice at WACOL

In the history of humankind, arguably the most enduring farewell message one can give to the dead is “Rest in peace (RIP)”. Unfortunately, one dead person that has been fighting a battle to rest serenely was the late Mrs. Elizabeth Ogbodo Egbuna. Her peaceful internment is under threat because the traditional ruler of the community Ogbeke Agbani in Nkanu West LGA, HRH Igwe Okechukwu Nwobodo Egbuna has vehemently refused to allow the deceased family to bury her. 

The traditional ruler, Igwe had accused the late widow of contravening the community law by reporting a member of the community Mr. Chizoba Ani (alias Chizzy) to WACOL, and subsequently, taking him to court over a land matter.

The late Mrs. Elizabeth Ogbodo Egbuna

 The immediate family of late Mrs. Ogbodo Egbuna had fixed the burial date of their beloved mother for Thursday 28, April 2022 (count-down to 4days) but, the monarch has vowed never to allow such a ceremony to happen in his kingdom. 

He is perpetrating this act in connivance with members of his cabinet, the chairman of the Ogbeke, and the Ukuruta autonomous community. The Igwe also barred visitors from attending the burial ceremony, adding that violators of this order would be fined N10, 000.

 The Igwe also ruled that should Mrs.  Ogbodo Egbuna’s family proceeds with the funeral ceremony against his pronouncement, they would be banished from the village.

 It was based on this premise, that the WACOL team paid a visit to the palace of the paramount ruler on Wednesday, 21 April 2022, to ascertain the veracity of his declaration against the burial of this poor widow who died heartbroken fighting for her inheritance. At the traditional ruler’s palace, the WACOL team met his wife at home, but, she said that her husband went for a burial ceremony. However, when the team contacted him on the phone, the Igwe said he was attending the Enugu State Traditional Rulers Council meeting. Based on this conflicting report of the royal father and his spouse on his whereabouts, the team concluded that he was not ready to accept the “Olive Branch” being offered to him by WACOL.

 Again, on a further telephone chat with the king, our staff appealed to him to rescind his declaration, and allow the deceased to be given the last respect. He further maintained his stand, saying that it was impossible to so do. He added that the only condition for him to do so is if the family withdraws the pending court case against Mr. Chizoba Ani alias Chizzy the person involved in the land dispute.

 Against this backdrop, WACOL reaffirmed, that the court remains the last arbitrator and hope for the poor, and vulnerable people in the society. That it is within the fundamental human rights of every citizen, irrespective of their religion, gender, or ethnic inclination to approach the court of law for justice when their rights are threatened, as such no citizen should suffer any form of victimization or unjustifiable traditional sanctions for accessing the instrument of justice of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

We, therefore, call on the Enugu State government, the state Ministry of Local Government, and Chieftaincy Matters under the leadership of Rt. Hon. Charles Egumgbe, as well as the Nigerian Police Force to intervene, and avert an impending breakdown of law, and order in the Ogbeke-Agbani community.

 Relevant authorities should rein on the HRH Igwe Okechukwu Nwobodo Egbuna to desist from his anachronistic, and brutish style of leadership, and stop the further desecration of the spirit of the dead widow. He should respect the family’s wish to pay last respect to their dearly departed.

The community should be reminded that such outdated custom is horrendous, anachronistic, bizarre, and inimical to all known rules of law, justice, and equity, which formed the tripod on which Nigerian democracy flourishes, hence, should be consigned to the dustbin of history.

The family has invested huge resources towards arrangements for this planned burial including, purchasing all perishable goods, as well as printed materials such as posters and banners. All these would be wasted should the burial fail to hold.

 WACOL will continue to uphold its mandate which is to promote the rights of women, and girls and protect them, as well as other poor/vulnerable groups in the society from all forms of intimidation, abuse, and discrimination occasioned by obnoxious norms, and practices aimed to silence them, and stifle their spirit of survival and development.

 The Late Mrs. Elizabeth Egbuna was 80 years old when she departed this mother earth three months ago. But, before her death, she fought many battles to sustain the landed properties she inherited from her late husband. One such battle which she never concluded, was the battle with Mr. Chizoba Ani popularly known as Chizzy from the same town, Ogbeke Agbani. Chizzy as he is called is an On-Air Personality (OAP), who is currently working with the Solid FM Radio in Enugu as the host of “Ihe Omenani”.

While she was alive, Mrs. Egbuna had brought a complaint before WACOL Legal Clinic, alleging that Chizzy encroached on her piece of land at Adauru in Ogbeke Agbani community, on the pretense of creating an access road. She noted that despite all her effort to give the said Chizzy an alternative road, he was bent on grabbing her land, leaving her with no other choice than to seek help at WACOL.

 She informed that she first reported to her kinsmen through the chairman, then later to the chairman of the Town Union of Ndigu- Ogbeke. According to her, the chairman frowned at Chizzy’s behavior. The community later resolved that he should use the access road which has been created for him by Mrs. Egbuna at the boundary of the said land, rather than dividing her land into two. But, he defiled the community.

 Again the case was taken to the traditional ruler HRH Igwe Okechukwu Nwobodo Egbuna, the traditional ruler of Ogbeke-Agbani. In his judgment, Igwe blamed Chizzy and advised him to use the access road from the boundary instead of dividing the widow’s land into two. Yet again, Chizzy was adamant.

To also expedite actions, Igwe further advised late Mrs. Egbuna to go the extra mile and create the road for Chizzy at the boundary in the interest of peace. They not only accepted but, also complied. Unfortunately, after spending funds, and time to create the road, Chizzy rejected it and went back to destroy the widow’s crop inside the land in question and even expanded the access road further.

 It was when the Igwe told the widow that he could not intervene further, because Chizzy has been adamant, and had fragrantly defiled all his rulings, that the late Mrs. Egbuna was left with no other option than to seek justice at the WACOL. 

Expectedly, on receiving the complaint, WACOL activated our mechanism for mediating a peaceful resolution but Mr. Chizoba Ani the accused person blatantly refused to honour our invitation. When all efforts to hold a talk with him failed, WACOL was left with no other choice than to take the case to court on behalf of the family. The matter is before High Court at Agbani in suit no HAGB/7/22. 

Parties in the suit are Elizabeth Egbuna as the complaint, Chizoba Ani as the first respondent, and Mr. Reuben Eneh as the second respondent and cousin to the deceased.

Competence doesn’t compensate for insecurity

Human Insecurity. Photo Credit: Doc Ayomide | Evocations | Medium

25 APRIL 2022

‘From that time on Saul kept a jealous eye on David.’
1 Samuel 18:9 NLT

One of the truest tests of leadership is how you respond to somebody else’s success. Do you rejoice, or secretly resent them? Do you feel like their blessing somehow came at your expense? King Saul sent David out to fight Goliath. When he succeeded and the Israelites began to sing David’s praises, Saul couldn’t handle it. ‘From that time on Saul kept a jealous eye on David.’ Leaders who lack confidence are a danger to themselves, their followers, and the groups they lead. That’s because leadership doesn’t camouflage your flaws; it puts them on display. Whatever negative baggage you’re carrying grows heavier when you attempt to lead others. Insecure leaders generally have four common traits: 1) They don’t provide security for others. To be a good leader, you must make your followers feel good about themselves. Honour them. Reward them. Promote them. 2) They take more than they give. Insecure leaders are on a continual search for validation, acknowledgement, and love. And because of that, their focus is on obtaining personal security, not instilling it in others. 3) They continually limit their best people. Insecure leaders don’t see their best people as co-workers; they see them as potential competitors who might rise up through the ranks and threaten their position. Such leaders generally find ways to take the credit for work that was done by others. 4) They continually limit their organisation. When followers are undermined and go unrecognised, they become disheartened and eventually stop performing to their potential. When that occurs, the whole organisation suffers. Today, examine your leadership style and see if any of these shoes fit you.

Enjoy a rewarding week.

Bible in a Year: 1 Samuel 7-9, John 10:1-21

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