By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

“On matters of security, the bulk (sic) stops at the President’s table.” Bola Ahmed Tinubu April 2014

On 26 January 2009, the Mamman Bello Ali died. He was the governor of Yobe State in north-east Nigeria. At around the same time, an anti-terrorism campaign by the government of Nigeria in Yobe State and its neighbour, Borno State, was about to make a murderous transition into a full-blown insurgency. As Governor Mamman Ali made his earthly transition in a Florida hospital, his deputy, Ibrahim Gaidam assumed office on the same day as the new governor of Yobe State. Today, as Minister of Police Affairs in the federal government, Governor Gaidam, whose life in politics has included a stint as a member of the Senate, has high responsibility for policing the country. He is so ineffectual in this role that few Nigerians notice his existence.

Around 9 November 2014, a suicide-bomber dressed as a student detonated himself in the middle of school assembly at the Government Boys Secondary School in Potiskum, Yobe State. The police confirmed that the attack “left 47 people dead, including the suicide bomber. Another 79 were wounded. Dozens of students were injured so severely medics were unable to save them.” It was a tragedy on an unspeakable scale. The blame for the attack fell on Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, (the Islamist insurgency better known as Boko Haram). Ibrahim Gaidam was still Governor.

The following day, President Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign was in full swing as he sought the support of the country for his re-election in 2015 under the banner of the then ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party. The All Progressives Congress, then newly formed as an opposition Alliance was quick to take political advantage. It described Jonathan’s campaign launch as “insensitive and callous” and accused him and the PDP of “dancing on the graves of the pupils as well as of all the victims of Boko Haram insurgency.” The APC took the opportunity to recall another mass-casualty bombing incident in Nyanya on the outskirts of Abuja in April 2014 and said that following that incident, “President Jonathan went dancing ‘Azonto’ in Kano less than 48 hours later.”

In the period from 2009 to 2014, when Islamist violence of Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria transitioned into a full-blown insurgency, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) was in power. Educational infrastructure bore a major brunt of the attacks by the group which built a brand in murderous violence by campaigning against Western education. The worst-affected states – Borno and Yobe – happened to be outside the orbit of the ruling party. In the half-decade to 2014, the violence accounted for at least 611 teachers reportedly killed and another 19,000 forced to flee. In 2014 alone, the insurgency killed over 6,644 persons in the affected states.

In May 2014, the United Nations Security Council listed Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation. Three years earlier, the Gaji Galtimari Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria had reported that the group “started as an innocuous non-violent group” around 2003.

This rise in Boko Haram’s campaign of mass-casualty violence was both new and shocking. The response of the then ruling government appeared slow, ponderous, and mal-adapted. It was also political season. The escalation in the attacks and killings from the Islamist insurgency in north-east Nigeria in 2014 coincided with the run-up to Nigeria’s 2015 general elections.

For the PDP in power at the time, it was a struggle to manage the optics of campaigning in the midst of growing carnage. The APC, then a new opposition formation, relished in its role, making political capital out of the situation. Its forceful critique of the PDP’s management of the Boko Haram insecurity or lack of it was central in ensuring the defeat of the ruling party in the 2015 election.

The popular narrative of Muhammadu Buhari, the APC candidate for the presidency in 2015, as a no-nonsense soldier did more than any other thing in reassuring Nigerians that the party would bring competence to the handling of the crisis of insecurity in the country. Instead, since then, insecurity in Nigeria has metastasized under the successive presidencies of President Muhammadu Buhari and his successor, Bola Ahmed Tinubu. The violence, which was mostly confined in the states of the north-east one decade ago, has become hydra-headed under various nomenclatures all over the country.

In its latest Conflict Barometer (2024) report, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research identified at least 10 sites of active, conflict-related killings in Nigeria, at least five of which fall into the highest classifications of seriousness.

In the north-east, Boko Haram has mutated into a confederacy of mass-murder under different appellations, each seeking supremacy in an Olympiad of mass-casualty violence.

In North-Central Nigeria, the party chose to mis-characterise as “farmer-herder” clashes, a methodical campaign of land-grabbing by people described by the government mostly as “foreigners.”

Under the watch of the APC government, in 2021, the north-west overtook the northeast in mass-casualty atrocities. Unable to manage the situation in the region, the government took to labeling the perpetrators of the atrocities in the north-west as “bandits.”

Unlike the north-east where improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide-bombers were major features of the insurgency, the major items in the violence in the north-west are motor-bikes and Kalashnikovs. Yet, the government cannot account for how these bikes and guns get into the hands of those who use them to habitually liquidate Nigerians on an industrial scale.

Kaduna was central in this shift. Installed in power in 2015 in the APC Tsunami as the new APC Governor of strategically significant Kaduna State, Nasir El-Rufai, was voluble in promoting mass-murder as profitable, incredibly proclaiming on national television how he paid the killers of Nigerians in order to encourage them to stop killing. The casual malevolence of his proferred justification was beyond shocking: “We got a group of people that were going round trying to trace some of these people in Cameroon, Niger and so on to tell them that there is a new governor who is Fulani like them and has no problem paying compensations for lives lost and he is begging them to stop the killing.”

Even worse, the mis-management of the insecurity under the government of the APC has smacked of a level of indifference, cynicism, and lack of empathy that the PDP would never have dreamed of. In Benue State last week, all of this was on show. Forced by public opinion finally to re-route himself to visit victims of mass liquidation in Benue State, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu first had children line up in the rain to be splashed with mud by his majestic convoy before the obligatory serenading from uniformed women living in internal displacement from the violence. It was right out of the manual of political narcissism jointly authored by Louis VIX and Marie Antoniette.

While the country burns, the president has curiously eloped to Saint Lucia, a territory of about 179,000 persons described by the Global Organised Crime Index as “a key Caribbean transit hub for cocaine shipments bound mainly for the US, Europe or Canada.” To the Nigerians concerned about the optics of all this, it is as if all he can offer is the middle finger.

The only thing more abysmal than the indifference of the ruling APC government to the current crisis of mass-murder across the country has been the disgraceful abdication by the political opposition. In the midst of all this carnage, little has been heard from them. Instead, opposition politicians have been hyper-active in the political transfer season herding into the APC.

Those who expect the police, armed and security services to shoot the country out of this crisis are unlikely to get their wish. The durability of Nigeria’s insecurity crisis is essentially a crisis of irresponsible political leadership. The security services can only implement a strategy set by the politicians. At the moment, the politicians are fixated on 2027. By then, in many parts of Nigeria, there may be no voters left and many of those in place would have been displaced from their voters cards. But the politicians do not have to care because they do not need voters to get into office. That is the original sin of insecurity in Nigeria.

A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at [email protected]

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

Paper delivered by Prof. Mike Ozekhome, SAN, at a Public Lecture held at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Nigeria, a country endowed with vast human and natural resources, holds a central position in the African geopolitical and economic landscape. With a population of over 220 million people[1] and significant crude oil reserves, it stands as the continent’s most populous country and one of its richest in terms of natural endowment. Yet, in the face of such wealth and demographic strength, Nigeria continues to struggle with enduring challenges that undermine its national potential. These challenges include insecurity, political instability, widespread poverty, youth unemployment, institutional decay, and a general lack of trust in public leadership. In light of these contradictions, a growing number of Nigerians have begun to echo a timeless question: from where comes our help?

The question is derived from the first verse of Psalm 121 in the Christian Bible, which reads, “I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help?”[2] It is a question that is not merely spiritual but deeply existential, especially in the Nigerian context. It reflects the desperation of a people caught between national promise and persistent dysfunction. It articulates the psychological fatigue of citizens who, despite their resilience, continue to suffer under the weight of political mismanagement, corruption, violence, and socio-economic dislocation.

The Nigerian Constitution, which came into effect in 1999 at the beginning of the Fourth Republic which proclaims that: “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”[3] Despite this declaration, the lived experiences of millions of Nigerians suggest otherwise. Armed conflict in the northeast, kidnappings across the middle belt and southern regions, rampant banditry in the northwest, and urban violence in major cities all point to a severe failure of the state’s primary function[4]. Additionally, public infrastructure remains poor, healthcare systems are overstretched, and the education sector continues to suffer from underfunding and industrial actions[5]. About sixty-three (63) percent or 133 Million Nigerians are classified as multidimensionally poor according to a 2022 report by the National Bureau of Statistics[6].

This national predicament has caused many citizens, particularly young people, to seek opportunities abroad. The mass migration phenomenon, popularly referred to as “Japa,”[7] has become symbolic of the growing loss of faith in the Nigerian system[8]. Professionals, including doctors, engineers, and academics, are leaving the country in large numbers, further weakening an already strained domestic workforce. Trust in electoral processes has also declined, with the 2023 general elections drawing criticism over logistical failures, voter suppression, and credibility questions[9].

2.0       THE HISTORICAL BURDEN

Nigeria’s modern history is a tapestry of promise, pain, and unresolved contradictions. At independence, we inherited a nation bursting with potential—vast natural resources, a young and aspirational population, and a promising institutional framework. Instead, what followed was a pattern of squandered opportunities and structural erosion.

Enshrined in our national narrative is the repeated failure to translate constitutional gains into real development. Despite over six decades of self-rule, we remain “geometrically vast in population but arithmetically poor in growth and maturity”[10]. We are a country blessed with human and material wealth, yet we see systemic neglect that has left us living in poverty, craving justice, and struggling for basic dignity[11].

The collapse of industrial capacity—from Ashaka Steel and UAC to defunct national carriers—presents a haunting symbol of our reversal[12]. We once ranked among the world’s fastest-growing economies, yet today we languish as the poverty capital of the world[13]. Security, once taken for granted in our communities, has become a luxury beyond reach[14]. These are not isolated anomalies; they are the symptoms of deep-seated historical neglect and institutional decay.

2.1       The Leadership Question

If historical roots reveal the weeds, leadership is the rot at the core. Professor Chinua Achebe famously described our national pathology as “a failure of leadership.” Today, this remains painfully true[15]. Leadership in Nigeria has too often been about power without purpose, about patronage instead of public service—about self-enrichment rather than national enrichment.

We have seen leaders who see themselves not as servants of the people, but as lords over them. They are shielded from accountability by institutional fragility, surrounded by sycophants, and driven by self-interest—all while democratic forms mask oppressive realities[16].

Our leaders have weaponized ethnicity and religion to divide us, perpetuate fear, and justify incompetence. Where there should be bridges, they construct walls. Where there should be unity, they sow discord[17]. Boko Haram’s emergence is not simply about ideology—it is also a bitter outcry against exclusion and injustice perpetrated by the centre[18].

Yet all is not lost. Countries like South Korea, Singapore, and Rwanda—once in situations far worse than ours—found their way through transformative leadership committed to national unity and long-term planning[19]. These nations remind us: leadership matters. It can be the fulcrum on which fortunes change, or the pivot by which potentials perish.

2.2       The Socio-Economic Quagmire

Nigeria’s socio-economic landscape is stuck in a vicious cycle of poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment. Our nation, blessed with abundant natural and human resources, finds itself paradoxically impoverished—a phenomenon that Ozekhome aptly referred to as “economic insecurity,” where even formal recession looms amid plenty[20].

Consider the widening chasm between rich and poor. Oil revenues—our supposed lifeline—fuel government coffers but barely trickle to rural communities, where most Nigerians toil[21] . The result is an economy that offers few jobs, delivering neither dignity nor hope. Amid this landscape, disillusionment festers: “poor compensation or remuneration breeds inequality and affects productivity,” and, ultimately, fosters instability[22].

Infrastructure, a critical foundation of development, often exists more as blueprint than reality—pipelines rusting unused, railways decaying, power grids failing to deliver. Industrial capacity has collapsed, smothered by theft, neglect, and foreign neglect. The country that could build steel now depends on soup-imported cans—and cooks with candles dusk till dawn.

Such socio-economic dislocation does more than impoverish—it erodes civic trust, deepens regional inequality, and fuels insurgencies. When work is scarce, and wages low, people withdraw from the system; some even take up arms. This quagmire, thus, is not merely about money—it is about hope, dignity, and the breach of the social contract.

2.3       The Identity Crisis & Insecurity

The insecurities of Nigeria are not solely a breakdown of public order; they are symptoms of a fractured national identity. Ozekhome has observed this as the “national question,” rooted in exclusion and aggravated by systemic non-inclusiveness—where minorities feel neither seen, heard, nor represented, and unity becomes a fragile facade[23].

Violent extremism, whether Boko Haram in the northeast or Biafra agitation in the southeast, is often less about ideology, more about grievance. The latter can be traced to hunger, unemployment, arbitrary governance, and perceived marginalisation in citizenship and opportunities[24].

Similarly, farmer-herder clashes, kidnappings, and communal violence act as distress calls from a society convulsed by contest for survival and dignity. These conflicts, often labeled as ethnic or religious, are more accurately a byproduct of structural failure—an economy and polity unable to ensure order, equity, or access.

We witness, then, an erosion of the sense of “Nigerian” as anything more than a temporary label. Instead, we retreat into sub-national identities—ethnic, regional, sectarian—because the larger nation has failed to guarantee basic rights and security.

2.4       Youth & Diaspora: Seeds of Hope

Amidst the prevailing gloom, Nigeria’s youth and its diaspora emerge not just as observers, but as active catalysts for transformative change. As I pointed out in a discourse on democracy and governance, our youth are the architects of national renewal—the energy, innovation, and creativity they bring forward is Nigeria’s greatest untapped asset[25].

The diaspora, too, plays a critical complementary role. Often maligned as detached, they are in fact bridges across continents, channeling ideas, remittances, and global advocacy for reform. In recent contributions, I highlighted how diaspora legal professionals, working in concert with civil society, can offer invaluable support to our institutions—whether advocating for judicial independence or providing technical training to Nigerian lawyers and judges[26].

Consider these real-world interventions:

• Diaspora groups funding leadership training and gender quotas, inspired by models like Canada’s Equal Voice program—boosting inclusivity and representation[27].
• Financial and technical support flowing to local initiatives such as BudgIT and Enough is Enough—vital for fostering budget transparency and youth engagement in political processes[28].
• Remittances—nearly $20 billion sent home in 2023 alone—acting as economic lifelines for millions of families, directly sustaining education, healthcare, and small enterprises These accomplishments are neither anecdotal nor peripheral; they are deep wells of possibility. They show that while the state may falter, individual Nigerians—especially the young and those abroad—continue to build, innovate, advocate, and reconnect Nigeria to global opportunities.

If “help” is to come from anywhere, it must come in part from the hands, hearts, and minds of these citizens—those within and beyond our borders who refuse to surrender to despair. They are our seeds of hope.

Click here to read and download the entire paper.

[1]WorldMeter, ‘Nigeria Population’ <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/> Accessed on the 20^th of June, 2025.

[2]Psalm 121:1 KJV.

[3]Section 14(2)(b) 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As amended).

[4]Nsirimovu, Okwuwada, ‘The modern day Consequences, Causes, and Nature of Kidnapping, Terrorism, Banditry, and violent crime in Nigeria: A comprehensive analysis’ (2023) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371691686_The_modern_day_Consequences_Causes_and_Nature_of_Kidnapping_Terrorism_Banditry_and_violent_crime_in_Nigeria_A_comprehensive_analysis> Accessed on the 20^th of June, 2025.

[5]ibid

[6]National Bureau of Statistics (2022) <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/news/78> Accessed on the 20^th of June, 2025.

[7]ThisDay News, ‘Nigeria and Burden of Japa Syndrome’ (2023) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/2023/05/02/nigeria-and-burden-of-japa-syndrome/> Accessed on the 20^th of June, 2025.

[8]ibid

[9]Dii, Christian, ‘Voters’ disposition and the outcome of 2023 general elections in Nigeria’ (2023)International Journal of Development and Management Review18 (1).

[10] Ozekhome, Mike, Nigeria @60: No social justice, religious and inter-ethnic tolerance (commentary, 2020), The Niche, The Vanguard Nigeria, https://thenicheng.com  and https://www.vanguardngr.com. (accessed June 2025)

[11]  Ozekhome, Mike, [Ibid. n.3]

[12] Mike Ozekhome, Me Celebrate Nigeria at 60? Sorry, No!!! – HARD FACTS, 2020. (newswirelawandevents.com) (accessed June 2025)

[13] Ibid n.3

[14] Ozekhome, Mike, Me Celebrate Nigeria at 60? Sorry, No!!! – HARD FACTS (2020), Newswire Law & Events, https://newswirelawandevents.com. (accessed June 2025)

[15] Ozekhome, Mike, Is This the Nigeria of Our Dream? (lecture, 2015), Mike Ozekhome Chambers, https://mikeozekhomeschambers.com. (accessed June 2025)

[16] Ibid

[17]Ozekhome, Mike, Me Celebrate Nigeria at 60? Sorry, No!!! (2020), Newswire Law & Events, https://newswirelawandevents.com. (accessed June 2025)

[18] Ozekhome, Mike (quoting James Madison on Boko Haram), A New Nigeria of Our Dream (2015), The Eagle Online, https://theeagleonline.com.ng. (accessed June 2025)

[19] Ibid n.2

[20]Ozekhome, Mike, “Economic Insecurity” (commentary, 2025), Mike Ozekhome Chambers Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ozekhomemikeSAN/ (accessed June 2025).

[21] Wikipedia, Poverty in Nigeria, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty_in_Nigeria  (accessed June 2025).

[22]Ozekhome, Mike, Minimum Wage, Maximum Rage (2024), BarristerNG, https://barristerng.com/minimum-wage-maximum-rage-by-professor-mike-ozekhome-san-con-ofr/  (accessed June 2025).

[23]Ozekhome, Mike & Sani, Shehu, “Ozekhome, Sani Others Seek Constitution Review to Address Nationality Problem” (2023), The Guardian Nigeria, https://guardian.ng/news/ozekhome-sani-others-seek-constitution-review-to-address-nationality-problem/  (accessed June 2025).

[24] Vanguard, “Ozekhome on IPoB and National Inclusivity” (2022), https://www.vanguardngr.com  (accessed June 2025).

[25] Ozekhome, Mike, Has Democracy Led to Good Governance for Nigerians? (Part 1) (2025), Mike Ozekhome Chambers, https://mikeozekhomeschambers.com/nigerias-political-leadership-since-1960-and-rhythms-of-corruption-part-8/ (accessed June 2025).

[26]Sight News, “The Role of Nigerian Diaspora Groups in Enhancing Electoral Processes, Governance and Democracy,” by Ozekhome (May 2025), https://thesightnews.com/2025/05/01/the-role-of-nigerian-diaspora-groups-in-enhancing-electoral-processes-governance-and-democracy-by-prof-mike-ozekhome-san/  (accessed June 2025).

[27] Sight News, [Ibid.] (ref. 19).

[28] Sight News, [Ibid.] (ref. 19).

By Chuks Iloegbunam

Chief Victor Umeh, the Senator representing Anambra Central at the National Assembly, has instituted a lodestar that must henceforward be emulated by all legislators from the South East geopolitical zone, whether serving in their states of origin or Abuja. Last week, Senator Umeh called General Yakubu Gowon, Head of State of Nigeria from August 1966 to July 1975 to order.

He told Gowon that he owed Ndigbo an unreserved apology, the absence of which is at the root of the nation’s enduring instability.

What had Gowon done wrong? For the third time since October, when he turned 90, the man has, in three public statements on the Nigerian condition, demonstrated that appropriating the truth was beyond his competence. Had he heard of and listened to Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), Gowon would have remembered the German philosopher’s warning that, “By a lie a man throws away and as it were annihilates his dignity as a man.” Just by the one lie, warned Kant. Of Gowon, however, the dreadful reality is his preponderance of concocting a legion of barefaced lies, a chronic incapability to face the truth, even for one millisecond.

General Gowon granted an interview to the Daily Trust on October 19, 2024. He spoke again on June 7, 2025, when he was honoured for, believe it or not, “Integrity and Achievement” by a Christian body of the Abuja Anglican Diocese. Finally, on June 18, he granted Arise TV an 80-minute interview. It raises eyebrows that a man central to Nigeria’s contemporary history, who had remained taciturn since his ejection from power half a century ago, has suddenly become enamoured of mass media profusion. It is astonishing that in all three of the cited interventions, he reiterated his proclivity to distort the truth to the imperatives of his sectional political agenda.

Among the living, the questions Gowon is best suited to answer are only a handful. What happened during the coup d’état of January 1966? What happened during the countercoup d’état of July 1966? How did he, as Nigeria’s commander-in-chief, prosecute the Biafran war? What is his scorecard as the country’s leader for nine years? What is the state of the country he bequeathed to posterity? Unfortunately, his answers to these inerasable questions fly in the face of logic and veracity.

Arise TV’s Charles Aniagolu asked Gowon about the current state of Nigeria. The General replied that the entity was surviving! His interviewer’s polite reminder that there was a distinction between surviving and thriving sounded to him like a rifle shot aimed at the moon. There are, however, more sensible opinions on the subject. In 1995, Jerome Udoji, a career public servant, published his memoirs titled Under Three Masters. (Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan). Chief Udoji (CFR) became a household name when, in 1972, the Gowon regime appointed him the Chairman of the Public Service Review Commission, which recommended, among other things, hikes in civil service salaries that became known as the Udoji Awards.

With his boundless experience, Chief Udoji commented on the state of Nigeria on page 154 of his book: “It is a matter of regret that I have to conclude this account of my forty-five-year career with a feeling of disappointment and concern. Disappointment because Nigeria in 1992 and 1993 is not the Nigeria of my dreams when, in 1948, I decided to join the administrative service of Nigeria, nor is it the Nigeria I knew when we got our independence in 1960. Then everyone both in Nigeria and outside hoped that she would be the show case of democracy and stability in Africa. That expectation was borne out of her vast reservoir of human and natural resources. What does one find today? A country without national consciousness, loyalty or identity; a country torn by the cleavages of tribe and ethnicity; a country that was ravaged by a Civil War barely five years after independence; a country which during its thirty-three years of independence, has seen five military coups, four attempted ones, six military leaders and only nine years without soldiers in power; a country with frequent religious riots, election malpractices and widespread corruption; above all, a country where the governed have lost confidence and hope in government.”

Thirty years after the publication of Udoji’s memoirs, the evils he lamented have become compounded by out-of-gear corruption, the cowardly capitulation of two of the three main arms of governance – the Judiciary and the Legislature, a steep, upward spiral in violent crimes, including wide-ranging incidents of kidnapping, piracy, insurgency, and terrorism, as well as the decapitation of sense from the essence of elections. Yet Gowon claimed that Nigeria was thriving.

Incongruously, Gowon professed to Arise TV an undying love for Ndigbo. But he pointed to nothing in support of his fatuous claim. His aggression against Biafra in the name of keeping Nigeria one had not caused the large, excruciating movements of the Igbo population, he stated. Ndigbo, who fled advancing Federal forces, should have stayed put because his soldiers were firing, not at humans, but palm trees.

What about the heavy artillery concentration that presaged every Nigerian attack? Were those aimed at iroko trees? Gowon blamed Ojukwu for hunger-induced deaths, not his junta, which proclaimed to the world that starvation was a legitimate instrument of warfare. After the war, said Gowon, his junta implemented the policy of Three Rs: Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation. Yet, there isn’t a single post-Biafra primary or secondary school that was rebuilt under his watch. He promulgated the Indigenisation Decree with undue haste, knowing that the people he so loved lacked the funds to buy shares.

Yakubu Cinwa Gowon, the Igbo lover, was the one who instituted the Abandoned Properties infamy.
Of course, his greatest affection for the Igbo is in his fictionalised versions of concrete historical occurrences. He claimed to have quelled the January 1966 coup. He most definitely hadn’t because he had no command at the time. He appropriated the credit that belonged to General Aguiyi-Ironsi and Lieutenant Colonel Hilary Njoku, who put down the action.

He persists with his fairy tale long after the Cameroonian Colonel Hans Anagho had come forward to state that, as a Captain in the Nigerian Army, he had led the troops that chased out the rebellious forces. If Gowon had credited Ironsi and Njoku for their feat, it would have mitigated the charge that January 1966 was an Igbo coup. Gowon spread the fiction that January 1966 had cost no Igbo life.

He allowed Professor Jonah Isawa Elaigwu, his biographer, to lie that Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Chinyelu Unegbe, the Quartermaster of the Nigerian Army and a victim of the January 1966 coup, was from the Mid West. Yet he was the best man at Chinyelu’s wedding and knew that the fallen officer had hailed from Ozubulu in today’s Anambra State.

Still, Gowon’s unsurpassed affection for Ndigbo is in the political upheavals of 1966 and how he twisted them to suit his imagination. A near countrywide pogrom against Ndigbo lasted for months. Contrary to Gowon’s claims that he acted decisively to check the massacres, General Ibrahim Babangida said this: “Unfortunately, Gowon’s commitments to the Igbos that their lives were safe in northern Nigeria were unfulfilled. Almost simultaneously with the deliberations of the Leaders of Thought taking place in Lagos, perhaps the most horrific killings of Igbos occurred in different parts of northern Nigeria on September 29, 1966. The killings were frightening. A deluge of refugees swamped eastern Nigeria from practically all parts of Nigeria.” See page 63 of Babangida’s autobiography, A Journey In Service (Bookcraft, Ibadan, 2025).

Gowon reneged on the agreements he freely entered into with Ojukwu in Ghana, which was termed the Aburi Accord. Among other things, they had agreed on the creation of Area Commands for the Armed Forces, the decentralisation of the Police Force, and a new revenue formula. For failing to announce the Aburi Accord, he claimed to have been carpeted by a fever. When he eventually did, what came out was a document unrelated to what he had appended his signature to. The authentic text of the Aburi Accord is in existence. Its recorded version is available. Yet, Gowon continues with the fallacy that Ojukwu had released other than what they had agreed.

What about the coup that toppled Ironsi and took the General’s life? Like Nero fiddling while a conflagration reduced Rome to ashes, Gowon claimed to have slept through that night of bloody orgy! Victoria, the wife of General Ironsi, got wind of the coup the moment it commenced. Rose, the wife of Colonel Njoku, learnt about the coup as soon as it started. None of them could reach Gowon on the phone.

Not even Ironsi and Colonel Francis Fajuyi, who were trapped inside the Ibadan Government House, and Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Okonweze, who was at the Ikeja Cantonment. But Gowon, who claimed to have been in a stupor, was able to hold a telephone conversation with Major T. Y. Danjuma, who received from him the command to do Ironsi in. No amount of lies will obliterate the fact that Gowon was the spearhead of the July 1966 countercoup, which is by far the bloodiest in African history.

Contextualised, the Gowon fabrications were grounds for Senator Umeh’s aggravation. His very words are apposite: “(Gowon) should be apologising to Ndigbo for the role he played in that coup instead of coming here to be insulting our sensibilities that the war was not against the Igbo. Who were the victims of the war? The countercoup was a cleansing of the Igbo officers in the Nigerian Army. He couldn’t say the people killed in the countercoup that were his own people. So, it was a reprisal coup against the Igbo, and the Igbo were not only killed as military officers, their businesses were destroyed across Nigeria.”

Nigeria lies comatose today because it refuses to confront its realities. Only the truth will reverse its ultimate collapse. That is why everyone with a conscience, not just South East legislators, must readily challenge falsehoods and self-serving narratives that harm rather than help the country.

As for General Gowon, it may well be that his media effluvia are a prelude to his much-anticipated but never-seen autobiography.

He must bear one thing in mind. The verdict on his time and actions will be passed by the inexorable and inevitable letters of history. Not by his deodorised and fanciful utterances. History invariably consigns political apostasy to the cesspit of infamy.

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.