Home Blog Page 249

Supreme Court in Thailand sends ex-Prime Minister to prison over unlawful hospital stay

Thailand’s Supreme Court has ordered former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to serve a one-year jail term after ruling that his prolonged hospital stay during his previous conviction was unlawful.

The 76-year-old political heavyweight, who led Thailand from 2001 until his ouster in a 2006 coup, returned to the country in 2023 after 15 years in self-imposed exile.

He was sentenced to eight years for corruption, abuse of power, and conflict of interest, but his jail term was later reduced to one year by royal pardon.

Instead of serving time in prison, Thaksin was admitted to Bangkok’s Police General Hospital, citing health concerns, including chest pains, high blood pressure, and low oxygen levels. He was released on parole in February 2024 after six months.

On Tuesday, however, the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital stay did not qualify as time served, insisting his medical conditions could have been managed on an outpatient basis. Thaksin has now been ordered to serve his sentence at Bangkok Remand Prison.

Video footage showed a convoy of vehicles believed to be transporting him to prison after the ruling. The court also criticized the medical reports that facilitated his prolonged stay in hospital, with two doctors already suspended earlier this year for providing false documentation.

In a statement following the verdict, Thaksin said he accepted the ruling: “Though I may lack physical freedom, I still have the freedom of thought for the benefit of the nation and people.”

His daughter, former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who was recently removed from office over an ethics breach, said the family remained in “high spirits” and pledged that their Pheu Thai Party would continue its role as opposition.

The verdict marks another setback for the once-dominant Shinawatra dynasty, which has shaped Thai politics for over two decades but continues to clash with the country’s conservative and royalist establishment.

Former Army Sergeant Major admits sexually assaulting a teenage female soldier who committed suicide after bosses ‘covered up’ the attack

Warrant Officer Michael Webber (pictured), who has since left the Army, faces sentencing at a later date after entering his plea at a pre-trial hearing on Friday September 5, 2025

A disgraced ex-Sergeant Major has pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting a teenage female soldier who took her own life – with the Army accused of a ‘cover-up’. 

Royal Artillery Gunner Jaysley Beck, 19, was found hanging in her room at Larkhill Camp, near Salisbury in Wiltshire, on December 15, 2021.

Her death came following a complaint she made against Battery Sergeant Major Michael Webber after he pinned her down and tried to kiss her, an inquest heard in February this year. 

Now Webber, who was serving at the same base, has pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault, at a pre-trial hearing.

Jaysley’s family has welcomed the guilty plea but said ‘nothing can undo the devastating loss of our beautiful daughter’.

Read Also: Activist calls for probe, denounces arrest of Nigerian female soldier who railed at sexual harassment by top military officers in viral video

And their lawyer responded to the plea by reiterating criticisms of the military chain of command, saying more should have done to investigate Jaysley’s complaints. 

February’s inquest concluded she had taken her own life after she made a complaint against Webber, who was accused of pinning her down, attempting to kiss her and placing his hand between her legs during a work social event.

Jaysley’s mother Leighann McCready later revealed how she had to plead to see her daughter’s accommodation following the death – and when finally given permission, found a heartbreaking letter tucked away in the young recruit’s room.

Read Also: HURIWA says arrest of female soldier who alleged sexual harassment by senior officers is unconstitutional and primitive

Ms McCready has accused the Army over the circumstances surrounding Jaysley’s death, saying after February’s inquest: ‘I believe it was a cover up. It was made clear at this inquest that the army knew what had taken place but did not take Jaysley’s complaint seriously and even tried to get her to change her story.’

She subsequently told the Sunday Times how the letter from Webber, then 39, confessed to an incident on July 12, 2021 and described his own behaviour as ‘absolutely unacceptable’.

He concluded by telling her, ‘My door will always open’ – a phrase which Ms McCready said her daughter found to be dismissive.

Read Also: Son of female soldier allegedly physically abused by superiors cries out, says mum was sent to psychiatric hospital

Gunner Beck had reported to military chiefs that Webber told her he had been ‘waiting for a moment for them to be alone’, engaged her in a drinking game called Last Man Standing before grabbing her leg and trying to kiss her.

February’s inquest heard she pushed him away and left the room before spending the night in her car and making a complaint to her superiors in the morning, during a stay at Thorney Island, near Emsworth, in Hampshire for an adventure training exercise.

Webber was later given a ‘minor administrative action interview’ over the work social event incident, with no further consequences.

He was later promoted to Warrant Officer 1 (WO1) rank, the highest non-commissioned rank in the Army, in May 2022.

Webber, who has since left the military, is now awaiting sentencing following his guilty plea last Friday. 

In a statement responding to his admission, Ms McCready said: ‘We are relieved that Michael Webber has admitted his guilt and not put us through the trauma of yet more legal proceedings, but nothing can undo the devastating loss of our beautiful daughter Jaysley.’

She described how her daughter had done ‘everything right’ in reporting the attack ‘immediately, not once but twice’ – but senior Army officers did not alert the police.

Ms McCready added: ‘If they had done that one simple thing, we believe with all our hearts she would still be with us today.’

The family’s lawyer Emma Norton said: ‘What an enormous difference it would have made if the Army and its chain of command had just listened to Jaysley when she first told them about the assault and reported it to the police, instead of trying to persuade her it wasn’t that serious.’

It was only after February’s inquest ruling and a request from Gunner Beck’s family to Wiltshire Police, that a file was sent to the the Service Prosecuting Authority who then charged Webber with sexual assault.

The coroner at the earlier hearing was told of Gunner Beck being traumatised not only by Webber’s attack but also the actions of three other officers – one of whom she had a long-distance affair, another who bombarded her with WhatsApp messages and another with whom she socialised on the night of her death.

In an Army statement following February’s inquest verdict, the head of Army Personnel Services Group, Brigadier Melissa Emmett, said: ‘On behalf of the Chief of the General Staff, I wish to extend the Army’s deepest condolences to Jaysley’s family and friends and to offer them our sincerest apologies for the failings that the Coroner has identified during this inquest.

‘We should have done so much more to support and protect her.

‘Jaysley was exactly the kind of person the Army needs, and she was excelling at her job. Her friends described her as someone who was kind, funny and always putting others before herself.

‘The three years since Jaysley’s sad death have seen significant changes in the Army, including the introduction of clear and unequivocal policies to state that there will be Zero Tolerance to unacceptable sexual behaviours.

‘These changes are being embedded throughout our culture, policies, and enduring practices across every part of the Army.

‘There is more work to do, and the evidence heard in this inquest reminds us how important it is to make lasting and effective change.

‘It is my hope that such change will give service personnel the confidence they need to report sexual offences and inappropriate behaviours, knowing that they will be listened to.

‘We are absolutely clear that everyone must play a role in building and upholding the respectful, professional environment we all need to thrive.’

The Daily Mail has asked the Army for further comment and response following Webber’s guilty plea and the grieving family’s criticisms.

Daily Mail

Resignation From the Armed Forces: It is constitutionally and statutorily imperative to obtain permission before resigning

By Obioma Ezenwobodo

Introduction:

The recent decisions of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria declaring that it is within the fundamental rights of a member of the Armed Forces to voluntarily resign his employment without the permission of his service authority has raised heated conversations bordering on compliance with fair labour practice on one hand and national security interest on the other hand. This article borders on the need to explicate and highlight different areas that cut across the issue.   

The Armed Forces is created by section 217(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) (as altered), 1999. The Armed Forces consists of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and such other branches of the armed forces as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly. By virtue of subsection 2 of the section, the Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of –

  • defending Nigeria from external aggression;

(b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders

from violation on land, sea, or air;

(c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities

to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and

(d) performance such other functions as may be prescribed by

an Act of the National Assembly

Further, section 218 (4) of the CFRN empowers the National Assembly to make laws for the regulation of – (a) the powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation; and (b) the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary control of members of the armed forces of the Federation. In strict fidelity to the provisions of the CFRN, the National Assembly enacted the Armed Forces Act (AFA), 2004, providing for operational and administrative structures of the armed forces. Thus, the Courts in Ibrahim v. Nigerian Army (2015) LPELR-24596(CA) and Chief of Naval Staff v. Okpanachi (2022) LPELR-58273(CA) have consistently held that the provisions of the AFA, which regulates persons subject to service law, are binding.

The Armed Forces, being a regimented organization, has strict regulations on enlistment, resignation, retirement, and discharge of its members. By the provisions of 25 of the AFA, a member of the Armed Forces seeking to resign must obtain permission from his service chief or service authority before resigning. By virtue of section 26 of the AFA, the President of the Federation Republic of Nigeria is empowered to make regulations for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions and mandates of the AFA relating to commissioning of officers, their terms of service, promotion, retirement, resignation, dismissal, and such other matters concerning officers of the Armed Forces as may seem to him necessary. In furtherance of this provision, the President made the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers (HTACOS), containing regulations governing the conditions of service for officers in the Armed Forces, to give effect to the provisions of the AFA. Under the HTACOS, an officer is required to have committed 15 years of service in the Armed Forces before resigning. Thus, any member of the Armed Forces who applies to resign before the mandatory years of service must first apply and get the permission of the service authority before resignation.

Flurry of Disruptive Judgments:

Recently, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has disrupted the once-entrenched means of ingress and egress in the Armed Forces by holding that a person subject to service law has the right to resign from the Armed Forces without being subjected to approval or permission from the Force. In other words, a member’s resignation is complete when his letter of resignation is received by his service authority. In the classicus case of Elkanah John Garang    v.    The Chief of Air Staff & Anor Unreported Suit NO: NICN/ABJ/117/2023 judgment given on the 29TH FEBRUARY, 2024 at Abuja division of the Court. In this case, the Claimant, a medical practitioner, was commissioned into the Nigerian Air Force vide a Direct Short Service Course on 4th July 2014. Upon his commission, he was posted to 461 NAF Hospital, Kaduna, and he served for 5 years and submitted his letter of resignation to the Defendant. The Defendant accepted the letter and still contended that the Claimant was still at their service. The Claimant sued, asking for a declaration that the submission and reception of his letter of resignation to the Defendants amounts to resignation from the Defendants. His Lordship O.Y. Anuwe, in agreeing with the Claimant that he has successfully resigned from the service of the Defendants, held thus:

“From the foregoing, it is clear that the claimant has an unconstrained right to resign from his appointment with the 2nd defendant. No special approval is needed for the exercise of a person’s constitutional right to resign. Irrespective of the wordings of a letter of resignation, it effectively conveys the claimant’s intention to resign. Therefore, when the claimant tendered a resignation letter on 22nd July 2019, he properly exercised his right in section 306 of the CFRN 1999 to resign his appointment with the 2nd defendant. Again, the claimant’s resignation took effect from the date he indicated in the letter, being 20th September 2019. The overall implication is that after tendering the letter of resignation and it had become effective, the defendants do not have any right thereafter to say they did not accept the resignation or to still consider the claimant to still be in the service of the 2nd defendant. Let me also point out that the defendants never indicated that they were averse to the claimant’s resignation; especially in the light of Exhibits B and C, and also the fact that no communication was ever made to the Claimant rejecting his resignation. Even if the defendants did, which they did not, it is clear from the foregoing, that they had no right to do so. The claimant voluntarily joined the service and he has the right to voluntarily resign from the service. Military service is not slavery and as such the defendants cannot force the claimant to remain in the service of the 2nd defendant when it was his desire to exit the service and he had accordingly given notice of his resignation.”

Not too long thereafter, the Court held a similar decision in Tsaro Igbara Tuamene Godswill v. The Chief of Air Staff & Anor, unreported, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/364/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 March 2025 at the Abuja division of the Court. The Court equally answered the question of the right of the claimant to voluntarily resign in the affirmative.

Also, in Nnaemezie Dim v. The Chief of Army Staff & Anor, Unreported, Suit NO: NICN/ABJ/223/2024, judgment delivered on the 27TH MAY, 2025 by HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM. In this case, the Claimant, a medical doctor, was enlisted into the Nigerian Army on the 9th September, 2012 and was commissioned on the 9th March, 2013 vide Direct Short Service Course 22.. He served the defendants for six years in various capacities and tendered his letter of resignation to the Army authority. He was invited by the defendants for counselling on 28/08/2019 in respect of his resignation letter which he maintained his position on voluntary resignation. Despite his letter of resignation and the subsequent acknowledgment letter, the defendants still declared that he was still in their service. The Claimant sued, asking for a declaration that the submission of his letter of resignation amounts to automatic resignation from the Armed Forces. Subilim J, in ruling in favour of the Claimant, held thus:

“It is of interest to note that when it comes to resignation from an employment, the law is that there is absolute power to resign and an employer enjoys no discretion to accept or refuse to accept a notice of resignation. It also follows that any attempt to stop an employee from disengaging by an employer would be interpreted as force or compulsory labour. This new thinking in labour and industrial relations law is arrived at by virtue of the provisions of section 34(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution, section 73(1) of the Labour Act and the ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930 (C. 29), a Convention ratified by Nigeria on 17 October 1960. See also the cases of Ibrahim v. Abdalah [2019] 17 NWLR (pt. 1701) 293; Tadugoronno v. Gotom [2002] 4 NWLR (pt. 757) 453 CA; Adefemi v. Abegunde [2004] 15 NWLR (pt. 895) 1 CA.”

In the case of Dr. Michael Ikuesan v. The Chief of Naval Staff & Anor, Unreported, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/18/2025, the judgment was delivered on 8th May 2025 at the Abuja division of the Court. The Claimant was enlisted in the Nigerian Navy as an ordinary seaman (Rating) having gone through training at the Nigerian Navy Basic Training School (NNBS), Onne, River State. Upon graduation and qualification as an Optometrist, the Claimant, having served for eleven years, desired and attempted to be commissioned as an officer but was prevented. The Claimant thereafter submitted his letter of resignation and thereafter, sued the Defendant for a declaratory relief that his letter of resignation amounts to voluntary resignation and an order compelling the Defendant to issue him a discharge certificate by virtue of the said letter. The Court presided over by the Hon. President of the NICN, Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PHD, OFR, bpa, granted the reliefs.

The most recent of this line of cases is Flight Lieutenant J. A. Akerele v. The Chief of Air Staff and Anor, Unreported, Suit No: NICN/ABJ/25/2025, judgment delivered on 2nd September 2025 at Abuja judicial division of the Court. Here, the Claimant sought to leave the Air Force due to what he termed systematic persecution. The Air Force rejected his request based on the 15-year service rule and declared him absent without leave when he left, ordering his arrest. The Claimant challenged this in court, citing the constitutional right of public officers to resign. Hon. Justice Emmanuel D. Subilim declared that the provision in the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service (HTACOS) requiring 15 years of service before resignation was unconstitutional and violated fundamental rights. Justice Subilim described the rule as “modern-day slavery” and the Claimant’s resignation as valid from the date his letter was received and rejected the argument that using “voluntary retirement” instead of “resignation” invalidated it. A perpetual injunction was issued, preventing the defendants from arresting or compelling Akerele to continue in service.

Constitutional, Statutory, and Reasonable Justification for Persons under Service Law to First Obtain Permission before Voluntarily Resigning from the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the Federation has its peculiarity different from other civil bodies in the country. This peculiarity embodies it with a special status in its onerous task of defending the country from both internal and external aggressions and maintaining the territorial integrity of the country. To achieve this task, the Armed Forces is strictly regimented to enforce maximum discipline and order. Therefore, the fair labour principle on the right of free entry and free exit in employment law is not applicable in the Armed Forces, as both are highly regulated and structured for effective military service. Where there is a need to resign or be discharged from service, the approval of the military authority should first be sought and obtained. The argument that forcing or compelling a person under service law to remain in service against his free will is against fundamental human rights and against unfair labour practice is highly misconceived, as military law jurisprudence is different from labour law jurisprudence. This is exemplified in section 34(1)(c) of the CFRN that provides that every individual is entitled to resect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly, no person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. On the other hand, the Armed Forces is exempted from this provision in 34(2)(b)&(e)(ii), which provides that forced or compulsory labour does not include –

  • “any labour required of members of the armed forces of the Federation or the   Nigerian Police Force in pursuance of their duties as such,”

(e)(ii)   “such compulsory national service in the armed forces of the Federation as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.”

In essence, the National Assembly is authorized to make laws on forced and compulsory service in the Armed Forces of the Federation. By the authority of this provision, coupled with sections 217 and 218 of the CFRN, the National Assembly made the Armed Forces Act, 2004, which contains provisions dealing with forced and compulsory services/labour in the Armed Forces. Most relevant to this discussion is section 25 of the AFA, which provides that an officer can resign from the Armed Forces when permitted to do so.

The Constitution equally confers powers on the National Assembly to make regulations on how the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation, can exercise his powers in the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary control of members of the Armed Forces. Section 218(4) of the CFRN provides thus:

            “The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the regulation of –

(a) the powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation; and

(b) the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of members of the armed forces of the Federation.”

By virtue of the above constitutional provision, the National Assembly, in section 26 of the AFA, authorises the President to make regulations governing commissioning of officers, terms of service, promotion, retirement, resignation, dismissal, and such other matters concerning officers of the Armed Forces as may seem to him necessary. Based on this provision, the President enacted the HTACOS, which, amongst other provisions, provides for 15 years of compulsory service in the Armed Forces, subject to exceptions, before resigning or being discharged from service. 

Therefore, by the asymmetric combination of both the constitutional, statutory, and delegated legislation provisions, direct, specific, and far-reaching provisions are enacted bordering on the composition, regulation, administration, resignation, dismissal, and such other matters relating to the Armed Forces. Thus, despite members of the Armed Forces qualifying as public officers by virtue of section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act and section 318(1) of the CRFN, they are not regulated by the Civil Service Rules but by the Constitution, the AFA, and the HTACOS. In terms of the adjudicatory procedure of punishing offenders and enforcing discipline within the ranks, the Armed Forces rely on summary trial and court martial procedures rather than the civil courts. The summary trial and court martial proceedings are regulated by the AFA, the different Rules of Procedure for the Army and the Air Force, and the Manual of Naval Laws for the Navy.

Therefore, the application and reliance on section 306(1) of the CFRN, as the basis of determining the question of resignation of members of the Armed Forces in Garang, Godswill, Dim, Ikuesan, Akerele, and others, is most unwarranted and capable of jeopardising national security, disrupting security architecture, and plunging the whole country into chaos. Section 306(1) provides thus:

“Resignations

(1) Save as otherwise provided in this section, any person who is appointed, elected or otherwise selected to any office established by this Constitution, may resign from that office by writing under his hand addressed to the authority or person by whom he was appointed, elected or selected.”

A careful reading of the extant section indicates its application to persons appointed, elected, or otherwise selected to any office established by the Constitution. This is a general application that its application should be insulated from the Armed Forces to avoid absurdity. The reason for this is that section 306 is causing what sections 34(2)(b)&(e)(ii), 217(1), (2) and 218(4) of the CFRN are trying to prevent…that is, an unruly Armed Forces devoid of discipline, organization structure incapable of protecting national security.

The decisions in the cases of Garang, Godswill, Dim, Ikuesan, Akerele, and others were mainly arrived at by reliance on sections 34(1)(c) and 306 of the CFRN. A careful consideration of other relevant constitutional provisions in sections 34(2)(b)&(e)(ii), 217(1), (2) and 218(4) of the CFRN would render a totally different interpretation to the vexatious issue as it is trite that in the interpretation of the Constitution, no provision is superior to any other provision and all relevant provisions have to be considered. In INEC v. MUSA (2003) LPELR-24927(SC) Pp 102 – 102 Paras D – E, Niki Tobi, JSC of blessed memory, stated:

“Provisions in a Constitution are of equal strength and constitutionality. No provision is inferior to the other and a fortiori no provision is superior to the other.”

Thus, it is settled law that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, all its provisions must be read together. See Abraham Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 2 NCLR 358 at 374. It is also poignant that the provisions of the Constitution must be interpreted to avoid absurdity or inconvenient results. In the case of Saraki v. FRN (2016) LPELR-40013(SC), Pp 100 – 100 Paras A – B, per Ngwuta JSC. stated thus:

“In view of the importance of the Constitution, any of its provisions must be interpreted in such a manner to enhance its purpose. In cases of ambiguity, real or perceived, the provision in question must be construed in such a way as to avoid what is inconvenient or absurd. See Black’s Law Dictionary Special Deluxe 5th Edn p.234.”

It is humbly submitted that by the combined reading of sections 34(2)(b)&(e)(ii), 217(1), (2) and 218(4) of the CFRN, the members of the Armed Forces, though public officers, are to be governed and regulated by the provisions of the AFA and the regulations made hereunder. It is also submitted that reliance on the general provisions in sections 34(1)(c) and 306 of the CFRN to render decisions in the cases of Garang, Godswill, Dim, Ikuesan and Akerele, excluding the special provisions in section 34(2)(b)&(e)(ii), 217, and 218 of the CFRN, present an inconvenient or absurd situations antithetical to the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control required for an effective Armed Forces for the sake of national security.

Further, it is humbly submitted that the Armed Forces are not bound by the provisions of the Labour Law and the International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930 (No. 29), a Convention ratified by Nigeria on 17 October 1960, See https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103259 as accessed on 8 September 2025 which were also relied upon in given judgments in the cases of Dim and Ikuesan and others. Section 89(2) of the Labour Act provides thus:

“Nothing in this Act shall apply to service members of the Armed Forces of the Federation or the Nigeria Police Force.”

Article 2(2)(a) of the International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930 (No. 29) provides that:

“Nevertheless, for the purpose of this Constitution, the term forced or compulsory labour shall not include –

Any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws for work of a purely military character.”

It is based on a similar exemption to the forced or compulsory labour principle provided in section 34(2)(e)(iii) of the CFRN, that the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was created by virtue of the NYSC Act. Under section 2 of the NYSC Act, a compulsory one-year service to the Nation is provided. Juxtaposing the NYSC compulsory one year with the Armed Forces 15 years compulsory service, it would be unimaginable, inconvenient, and absurd to argue that the NYSC compulsory one-year service amounts to forced labour, against fundamental rights, and thus corps members can voluntarily resign from the service and compel the NYSC to issue them discharge certificates. This is the same absurd situation being faced by the Armed Forces under the authority of Garang, Godswill, Dim, Ikuesan, Akerele, and Others.

Inconvenient and Absurd Situations Presented by the Decisions in Garang, Godswill, Dim, Ikuesan, Akerele, and Others:

The inconvenient or absurd situations inherent in these decisions are that their eroding effects on the regimented control necessary for effective Armed Forces. The regimented control of the Armed Forces enforces standing orders that require its members to obtain permits before leaving Barracks, traveling outside their station, or even leaving their duty posts, as disobedience to these standing orders amounts to desertion (AWOL –Away Without Leave), which is a criminal offence under section 59 of the AFA. The effect of these decisions is that a member of the Armed Forces would throw in his letter of resignation rather than be charged with desertion. In effect, the necessary service discipline is completely eroded.

Another absurdity is the destruction of the ratio of officers needed to maintain optimal effectiveness during military assignments, missions, or battles. With the effects of these decisions, a soldier who is deployed to a warfront or to a risky mission might throw in his resignation rather than show brevity in undertaking the assignment. Thus, committing an offence of acts of cowardice provided in section 47 of the AFA.  

Another absurdity is the wastage of national resources on a soldier who, after receiving specialized training, voluntarily resigns without deploying his knowledge to the protection of national security.

There is also an issue of a soldier suffering from a contagious, mental, or psychological health condition applying to resign voluntarily without adequate arrangement and care from his service authority before being resettled to the resettlement to the larger society.

There could also be an absurd condition where a soldier who has acquired vital national information in the course of his training or work wants to resign voluntarily without clearance from his service authority.

A more absurd situation is the validity of the inalienable power of the Armed Forces (applicable to all military) to recall soldiers from retirement or resignation by virtue of section 25 of the AFA. Would a soldier who voluntarily resigned without permission from the military still obey his recall? Can the Armed Forces activates this power of recall against a soldier who resigned without its permission?

Conclusion:

The necessity of obtaining permission before resigning from the Armed Forces has both constitutional and statutory justification based on the peculiarities of the Armed Forces in defending the country from both internal and external threats and protecting the territorial integrity of the country.  To decide otherwise is to reduce the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces in planning and strategizing for military operations, as any of its members may throw in a letter of resignation during the heat of operations, thereby jeopardising the operation and indirectly aiding the enemy.  It is unsafe to apply reasons in cases dealing with resignation from civil organizations to cases dealing with resignations from the Armed Forces as they are not the same by virtue of the peculiarity of the Armed Forces. It is therefore safe to say that the decisions of the honourable Courts in the cases of Hon. Farouk M. Lawan v. FRN [2024] LPELR-62546(SC), Mrs Ramatu T. Shehu v. Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory & Anor, unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/24/2018, and Mr. Victor Omotosho Ekundayo v. Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) & 2 Ors, unreported, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/82/2021 cannot apply to resignation from the Armed Forces.

It needs to be noted that the combined reading of the various provisions empowering the Armed Forces with the powers to permit resignation of its members is not arbitrary. It is within the right of a member of the Armed Forces to voluntarily retire or be discharged, even before his due date. However, the retirement or discharge is subject to the approval of his service authority/service chief. This is provided under section 32 of the AFA.

Finally, the regulation on the age duration to serve in the Armed Forces is not to punish or enslave its members but to ensure the effectiveness of the Force and preservation of national security, which is the primary responsibility of the government. 

Obioma Ezenwobodo LL.M.

Partner: Resolution Attorneys (Abuja).

Author: “Law and Practice of Court Martial in Nigeria”; “Handbook on Court Martial Practice”, and “Fundamentals of Confessional Statement in Criminal Trials”

Pioneer Chairman: The Nigerian Bar Association, Garki Branch, Abuja (2022/24)

Email:   [email protected]

Judiciary makes history in Egypt with appointment of women assistant judges

For the first time in the Egyptian State Council’s history, 48 female judges were sworn in as assistant delegates on Sunday, marking a significant milestone in the country’s judicial system.

It is the first time in the Council’s 77-year history that women have been granted this entry-level judicial rank through competitive appointment.

Judge Osama Youssef Shalaby, President of the State Council – one of Egypt’s highest judicial authorities – witnessed the Sunday, 7 September 2025 swearing-in ceremony of the first batch of female judges in the Council’s history. 

The new batch of assistant delegates was appointed under Presidential Decree No. 447 of 2025.

The batch includes 207 members, including 48 female judges. This historic step reflects the state’s commitment to empowering women and strengthening their representation in the judiciary, in implementation of the directives of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

The move came as part of a presidential decree ratified on August 26, which included a total of 207 appointments from the graduating class of 2021. The newly appointed female judges will take the judicial oath in the coming days before formally assuming their roles within various departments of the State Council.

Breaking Decades of Gender Barriers

Founded in 1946, the State Council has long been one of the last bastions of male-only judicial authority in Egypt. While women have served in other branches of the judiciary since 2003, the Council had resisted integrating female judges until recent years.

The 2025 appointments follow sustained advocacy by women’s rights groups and incremental reforms that paved the way for this moment. Most notably:

  • In 2021, a presidential directive mandated full access for women to all judicial positions, including the State Council and Public Prosecution.
  • In 2022, 39 women were transferred into the Council’s judicial corps via exceptional routes.
  • In 2024, for the first time, women were appointed to the Council’s General Secretariat and Technical Office.

Presidential Support and Political Will

The latest appointments reflect the broader political commitment to gender inclusion, particularly under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who declared 2017 the “Year of Egyptian Women” and has repeatedly called for greater female representation in leadership.

Egypt’s Judicial Gender Reform

The Assistant Delegates will begin their service in key legal departments, including judicial review, legislation, and administrative court systems. Their duties include preparing case files, conducting legal research, and gradually taking on judicial responsibilities under the supervision of senior judges.

Their entry through the standard judicial selection process signifies not just symbolic progress, but structural transformation—ensuring that women can now advance through the judicial hierarchy on equal footing with their male counterparts. Egypt’s move adds momentum to a broader trend of judicial gender reform in the Middle East and North Africa.

Credit: Egypt Today/Top50Women.com

Senior lawyer and top educationist, Chief Mrs Leila Fowler dies at 91

Founder of the famous Vivian Fowler Memorial College for Girls, Lagos, Chief Mrs Leila Euphemia Apinke Fowler, died on Saturday at age 91.

Her death was confirmed on Sunday in a statement by the school, which she established in 1991 in honour of her late daughter.

“It’s with a heavy heart that we announce the passing of our beloved founder, Chief (Mrs.) Leila Fowler, on Saturday, September 6, 2025.

​“Chief (Mrs.) Fowler was a true pioneer, an erudite lawyer, and a visionary educationalist who founded Vivian Fowler Memorial College for Girls in 1991.

“Her life was a testament to the power of empowering young women through education.

“Her guidance and motherly warmth built not just a school, but a community dedicated to excellence,” the statement partly read.

The distinguished Yeye Mofin of Lagos was born on March 23, 1933, in Lagos. Chief Mrs. Fowler (née Moore) lived a life defined by resilience, service, and groundbreaking achievements across multiple fields.

She received her early education at CMS Girls’ School, Lagos, before proceeding to Queen of the Rosary College, Onitsha, where she obtained her Senior Cambridge Certificate in 1951.

Her career began in teaching, but she later pursued nursing in London at the prestigious St Thomas’ Hospital. Driven by ambition and determination, she transitioned to law, studying at Middle Temple, where she was called to the Bar in 1962. She returned to Nigeria the following year and was called to the Nigerian Bar in 1963.

Long before she founded Vivian Fowler Memorial College, Leila Fowler practiced law both with established chambers and through her own firm, specialising in insurance law and consultancy. Her dedication to public service was evident in her role as a councillor in the Lagos City Council between 1978 and 1980. She was also deeply involved with the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Red Cross, and the Corona Schools Trust Council.

In 1991, she founded the Vivian Fowler Memorial College for Girls in honour of her late daughter. The institution has since grown into one of Nigeria’s foremost all-girls schools, renowned for its culture of academic excellence and commitment to raising future leaders.

In recognition of her immense contributions to education and society, she was honoured with the prestigious chieftaincy title of Yeye Mofin of Lagos by Oba Adeyinka Oyekan II.

Celebrated as a “silent achiever,” Chief Fowler left an enduring legacy that spanned nursing, law, politics, and education, inspiring generations through her work and values.

Bank fires employee, replaces her with AI she trained

The Future of AI: Transforming Humanity | guptadeepak.com

A 65-year-old former bank teller at Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Kathryn Sullivan, has been fired by the bank, only for her to discover that the chatbot she had spent weeks training was the reason she lost her job.

According to The Sun, Sullivan, who served the bank for 25 years, was made redundant in July.

Sullivan said she was completely unaware that her work was preparing a chatbot to replace her before being made redundant in July, ending a long career with the bank.“I was completely shell-shocked, alongside my colleague,” she said. “We just feel like we were nothing, we were a number.”

Ms Sullivan, who had supported technologies aimed at improving customer service, said she was blindsided by the decision.

Her final duties involved scripting and testing chatbot responses for CBA’s Bumblebee AI, and she would step in whenever the bot failed to answer customer queries.

“Inadvertently, I was training a chatbot that took my job,” she said.

She added that while she sees a purpose for AI in the workplace, safeguards are necessary, “While I embrace the use of AI and I can see a purpose for it in the workplace and outside, I believe there needs to be some sort of regulation to prevent copyright (infringements) … or replacing humans.”

Following the redundancies, CBA – which reported a $10.25 billion profit in the past financial year – initially failed to respond to Ms Sullivan for more than a week.

“They ghosted me for eight business days before they answered any of my questions,” she said.

The bank later admitted the AI rollout had been a mistake after customer calls surged, showing the technology could not fully replace staff.

Doctor kills 12 patients to show off his resuscitation skills

Frederic Pechier, 53, goes on trial on September 8, 2025, accused of intentionally poisoning 30 patients, 12 of whom died, in an alleged attempt to show off his resuscitation skills and discredit co-workers

A French doctor accused of intentionally poisoning 30 child and adult patients, 12 of whom died, went on trial Monday, saying before the hearing he was not responsible for the ‘distress’ of his alleged victims and their families.

Frederic Pechier, 53, worked as an anaesthetist at two clinics in the eastern city of Besancon when patients went into cardiac arrest in suspicious circumstances between 2008 to 2017. Twelve could not be resuscitated.

He is accused of triggering heart attacks in patients so he could show off his resuscitation skills and discredit co-workers.

Click here to continue reading.

Manhattan Appeals Court insists Trump must pay $83.3 million in damages over sexual assault claims against him

A federal court in Manhattan declined to throw out a case that found President Donald Trump owes $83.3 million over comments he made disputing the veracity of sexual assault claims by writer E. Jean Carroll.

The Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, which generally looks at technical issues in a case instead of the underlying merits, said in the decision issued on Sept. 8 that presidential immunity does not protect Trump, and a lower court did not err in how it handled the case.

The decision is the latest in a years-long legal battle after Carroll said in 2019 that Trump sexually assaulted her at a New York City department store in 1996, and Trump fired back with allegations that she was making up the story to sell her book.  

The ruling means Trump remains on the hook for nearly $90 million in damages against Caroll – $83.3 million for damaging Caroll’s reputation when he denied her claim, and $5 million for defamation and sexual abuse. His appeals of both sums of money failed this year.

Lawyers for Carroll and Trump did not immediately provide comment for this story.

In his appeal of the $83.3 million sum that the court shot down on Sept. 8, Trump argued that a 2024 Supreme Court decision granting presidents broad immunity from criminal prosecution also applied in this case.

The court said the argument did not apply because Trump failed to bring up the issue earlier in the court process. Trump also challenged procedural issues with the trial, but the appeals court was unpersuaded.

Trump first denied Carroll’s accusation in June 2019, during his first term as president, telling a reporter in a lengthy exchange on the White House lawn that Carroll was “not my type” and that she concocted the story to sell her memoir “What Do We Need Men For?” Caroll sued him months later, winning the $83.3 million judgment.

Trump repeated the denial in a 2022 social media post, when he was not president and the first case was ongoing. Caroll then sued Trump again under a special window of time that New York granted to sexual abuse survivors, and in 2023, a jury found Trump liable for sexual abuse against Carroll. This resulted in the $5 million verdict.

USAToday

NBA sues police, seeks to stop delay in conversion and promotion of lawyers in the force

The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) has instituted a legal action at the National Industrial Court, Abuja, to challenge what it describes as the “unjust and undue delay” in the conversion and promotion of legal practitioners serving in the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) to the specialist cadre, as mandated by law.

The suit, filed on Thursday, September 3, 2025, through the NBA Section on Public Interest and Development Law (SPIDEL), seeks to enforce compliance with Section 18 (9) and (11) of the Nigeria Police Force Establishment Act 2020 and Force Order 137 of the Ratified Force Order 2013.

For years, lawyers enlisted in the Police Force — whether called to the Bar before enlistment or while in service with the permission of the Police — have remained in general duty roles and denied conversion to the specialist cadre in law. This denial has also deprived them of the accelerated promotion due under the law, particularly the automatic upgrade from junior ranks such as Corporal, Sergeant, or Inspector to the substantive rank of Superintendent of Police (SP).

SPIDEL noted that, this practice stands in sharp contrast to the treatment of other professionals within the Force, such as doctors, engineers, accountants, and aviation experts, who enjoy seamless conversion and promotion into specialist cadres.

“Lawyers in the Police Force continue to suffer the indignity of wearing very junior ranks while appearing in all strata of courts, prosecuting and defending cases for the Police, and performing other legal duties,” the Association said, describing the practice as discriminatory, demeaning, and an affront to the dignity of the legal profession.

The NBA noted that past administrations of the Association had made efforts to resolve the issue amicably, but with no progress achieved. “Having exhausted administrative remedies, we can no longer in good conscience condone this injustice,” it declared.

In the suit, filed as NICN/ABJ/264/2025: Incorporated Trustees of the Nigerian Bar Association v. Police Service Commission & 5 Ors, the NBA is seeking several reliefs, including:

“An order of court compelling the Defendants to forthwith upgrade all junior police officers who are lawyers to the substantive rank of Superintendent of Police and who before now were used/deployed as legal officers for the Defendants.”

Prof. Paul Ananaba, SAN, Chairman of SPIDEL, commended the Section’s Public Interest Litigation Committee led by Mr. Olukunle Ogheneovo Edun, SAN, for spearheading the action.

As the matter awaits assignment to a judge, the NBA has urged all parties to respect the judicial process, desist from harassing lawyers in the Police Force, and allow the courts to determine the dispute.

Read the full statement below 

UNJUST AND UNDUE DELAY IN THE CONVERSION AND PROMOTION OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS IN THE EMPLOY OF THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE TO SPECIALIST CADRE: THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTES ACTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 18 (9) AND (11) OF THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE ESTABLISHMENT ACT 2020 AND FORCE ORDER 137 OF THE RATIFIED FORCE ORDER 2013.

A core mandate of the Nigerian Bar Association is the promotion of the welfare of its members, the imperative to ensure that the welfare and interest of members is adequately catered for necessitated the establishment of several fora under the NBA including the Police Lawyers Forum which comprises all persons called to the Nigerian Bar enlisted as officers and men of the Nigeria Police Force.

While some persons joined the Nigerian Police Force as qualified lawyers, some became lawyers with the permission of the Nigeria Police Force while they were already enlisted into and serving in the Nigeria Police Force, in which case upon being called to the Nigerian Bar, the law requires that they ought to have been automatically converted from general duty services to specialist cadre in the field of law in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 (9) and (11) of the Nigeria Police Force (Establishment) Act 2020 and the Force Order 137 of the Ratified Force Order 2013 issued under the hand of the Inspector General of Police.

With conversion to specialist duty, the officers would be entitled to promotion from the junior ranks of Inspector, Sergeant, Corporal, etc, to Superintendent of Police (SP).

However, despite the subsistence of the relevant legislation and Force Order, legal practitioners enlisted into the Nigeria Police Force have been, for many years, unjustly denied conversion from general duty services to specialist cadre and consequently, lawyers in the Police Force continued to wear junior ranks for many years even while appearing in all strata of courts of law prosecuting and defending cases for the Nigeria Police Force and performing other legal functions.

The situation is more concerning because professionals in other disciplines such as medicine, engineering, accountancy, aviation and others enjoy accelerated and regular conversion from general duty services to the specialist cadre. The rationale for the discrimination against lawyers in the police remains unfathomable.

Despite efforts made by past NBA administrations to resolve this issue using amicable means, no progress has been achieved. Yet, members of the legal profession in the Nigeria Police Force continue to bear the shame of wearing very junior and demeaning ranks and being subjected to general and common duties while at the same time being used by the same Police authorities to perform legal duties contrary to the provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, having not been employed from the onset as legal officers. This to say the least, is an assault on the dignity and nobility of the legal profession, reeks of double standards and can no longer in good conscience be condoned, moving forward.

Having exhausted available means to ensure an administrative reversal of this injustice against lawyers in the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigerian Bar Association through its Section on Public Interest and Development Law (SPIDEL) on Thursday the 3rd day of September 2025 instituted an action before the National Industrial Court, Abuja in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/264/2025 between: The Incorporated Trustees of the Nigerian Bar Association v. Police Service Commission & 5 Ors praying the court for several crucial reliefs including:

“An order of court compelling the Defendants to forthwith upgrade all junior police officers who are lawyers to the substantive rank of (Superintendent of Police) and who before now were used/deployed as legal officers for the Defendants.”

We wish to specially acknowledge the Section’s Public Interest Litigation Committee chaired by Mr. Olukunle Ogheneovo Edun, SAN whose proactive efforts were responsible for the accomplishment of this task.

As we await the assignment of the suit to a Judge, we urge all parties to the suit to respect the judicial process, stop the harrassment of lawyers in the Police Force and await the decision of the court in good faith.

Prof Paul Ananaba, SAN

Chairman,

NBA Section on Public Interest and Development Law

Meet Rear Admiral Jamila Malafa, first Nigerian woman ICC judge evaluator

Rear Admiral Jamila Abubakar Sadiq-Malafa, Nigeria’s trailblazing female naval officer, has been appointed as a Judge Evaluator and African Liaison at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Malafa had made history in 2017 as the first woman from Northern Nigeria to be promoted to Commodore, equivalent to Brigadier General in the Army.

Her current ICC position, which is on a part-time basis, highlights her transition from a celebrated military career into international justice, where she represents Africa’s voice at one of the world’s most respected judicial institutions.

A judge evaluator at the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a role within the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM), which is a subsidiary body of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, focused on providing oversight of the Court. 

A judge evaluator evaluates the performance of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) or other departments/functions of the Court through a comprehensive process that involves data collection, analysis, and reporting. The ultimate goal is to foster a culture of continuous improvement within the ICC

Alongside this role, she also doubles as the Director of Legal Services at the Nigerian Legion Headquarters in Abuja, where she is expected to introduce reforms to reposition the organization for greater relevance.

A Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Malafa served in the Nigerian Navy’s legal department throughout her career and rose to become Director of Legal Services before her retirement.

Her legal expertise became the backbone of her naval career, combining professional excellence in law with the discipline and structure of military service.

Her rise in the Nigerian Navy broke long-standing gender and regional barriers, inspiring women across the country to aspire to higher leadership positions in the military.

In 2023, she retired from the Navy after attaining the rank of Rear Admiral, making her the first Northern woman ever to achieve that milestone.

Her elevation at retirement sealed a career defined by resilience, professionalism, and determination in a system historically dominated by men.

Malafa’s combined responsibilities at the ICC and the Nigerian Legion underscore her versatility, showing how she continues to shape justice and veterans’ affairs even after leaving uniformed service.

Jamila Abubakar Sadiq-Malafa’s story remains a powerful testament to courage, empowerment, and the breaking of barriers, both within Nigeria and abroad.

1...248249250...1,457Page 249 of 1,457

TIPS

Load more