By Sylvester Udemezue

(1). INTRODUCTION

This surrejoinder responds to Dr Bethel Uzoma Ihugba’s rejoinder to my earlier commentary, “The Nigerian Association of Law Teachers and the Persistent Disdain for Its Own Business, Objectives and Mandate.” While commending Dr Ihugba’s civility, good faith and desire for dialogue, this piece argues that his defence of NALT rests on a misdirected evaluative standard, substitutes activity for achievement, and sidesteps the structural deficiencies that continue to impede NALT’s relevance to legal-education reform in Nigeria.

I reaffirm that NALT’s chronic misalignment between its constitutional objectives and its conference agenda reflects a deeper institutional drift. Unless NALT realigns itself with its statutory purpose (promoting legal education, strengthening pedagogy, and improving the welfare and professional development of law teachers), its conferences risk becoming intellectually vibrant yet institutionally inconsequential.

Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder misdiagnoses the thrust of my critique. My argument was not that NALT lacks activities, but that its activities lack alignment with its core mandate. Then, by equating the mere hosting of paper presentations or inter-faculty networking with fulfilment of NALT’s objectives, Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder reduces the Association’s mandate to minimal compliance. This surrejoinder respectfully maintains that what is at stake is not whether NALT does something, but whether NALT does what it was established to do: lead, coordinate, influence and elevate legal education in Nigeria.

(2). MANDATE, MISALIGNMENT AND THE WRONG STANDARD OF EVALUATION

The rejoinder repeatedly claims that I “introduced new objectives” for NALT. With due respect, this is completely inaccurate. Every issue I identified falls squarely within the objectives set out in the Constitution of the Nigerian Association of Law Teachers: ranging from promotion of excellence in law teaching to engagement with stakeholders on the development and quality of legal education. My argument was that NALT has not been attending to these very objectives. To illustrate: (a). If NALT was founded to promote legal education, should its conferences consistently ignore issues affecting legal education? (b). If NALT exists to promote the welfare and standards of law teachers, should it remain silent on brain-drain, teacher attrition, poor working conditions, and academic excellence and ethics? (c). If NALT is constitutionally mandated to engage stakeholders, should there be no visible record of sustained engagement with the NUC, CLE, NBA, National Assembly or judiciary, the Executive on issues affecting NALT members and promotion of legal education generally? It is therefore incorrect to say I set a new examination question; I simply asked NALT to be evaluated by the same questions it set for itself. A simple search shows that the Nigerian Association of Law Teachers (NALT) is “a professional body… established in 1961 [to] represent the interests of law teachers in Nigeria, to promote excellence in research and legal academic teaching in Nigeria, [and to] aid in promoting government policies and practices related to legal education and research.”

(3). THE QUESTION OF FOCUS: CAN A HOUSE ON FIRE CHASE RATS?

My central thesis remains: a professional body must first address its own sectoral challenges before consistently dabbling in unrelated national issues. N
Unfortunately, nothing in Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder addresses this. NALT has, in successive conferences, prioritised topics such as elections, sovereignty, constitutionalism and tax reform, etc; topics undoubtedly important but not central to NALT’s raison d’être. Meanwhile, the acute problems plaguing Nigerian legal education (including curriculum stagnation, absence of teaching standards, inadequate teacher welfare, weak and absence of pragmatic research culture, poor infrastructure, declining ethics and standards of teaching and learning, neglect of law teachers and legal education, and low quality synergy with relevant regulatory bodies, among others) rarely appear on conference agendas.

Again, respectfully, Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder’s repeated insistence that “law teachers should be allowed to present papers on any topic” misses the fundamental point. Freedom of research does not eliminate institutional responsibility. A body created to promote legal education cannot substitute intellectual tourism for sectoral leadership.The argument that “at least papers are presented” confuses movement with direction, and activity with performance. A conference that avoids its own constituency’s challenges cannot claim to be fulfilling its mandate.

(4). NALT VERSUS ITS LEADERSHIP: A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE

Dr Ihugba attempts to separate NALT from its Executive Officers, suggesting that criticisms should be limited to EXCOs, not the Association. This is, with due respect, conceptually untenable. Associations act through their leadership. Conferences are organised by leadership. Agendas are set by leadership. Engagements with stakeholders are undertaken by leadership. If EXCOs fail to act, NALT has fails to act. To argue otherwise is to deny the organisational structure of professional associations.

(5). THE “OPPORTUNITY” ARGUMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF IRRELEVANT CONFERENCES

Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder repeatedly celebrates NALT conferences as “opportunities” to: (a). present papers “irrespective of topic,” (b). collaborate, (c). network, and (d). co-author articles. These are indeed valuable, but they cannot replace NALT’s constitutional responsibilities. If conferences present no papers on legal pedagogy, curriculum reform, teaching methods, quality assurance, academic ethics, welfare of law teachers and students, or the regulation of legal education, crucial questions that immediately arise include: (i). How are we promoting excellence in teaching? (ii). How are we fostering improved standards? (iii). How are we influencing national policy? (iv). and How are we shaping the future of legal education? Unfortunately, Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder made no attempt to provide answers to these. The rejoinder’s logic is that any topic satisfies NALT’s objectives. This is, with due respect, unsustainable. Topics unrelated to legal education cannot promote the teaching of law. A conference on election petitions or tax reform cannot directly improve pedagogy or welfare. This is the very definition of loss of focus.

(6). STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: A MANDATE NEGLECTED

The NALT Constitution mandates the Association to “engage meaningfully with stakeholders on issues affecting the development, regulation and quality of legal education.” Dr Ihugba concedes that conference assessment alone is insufficient but provides no evidence of: (i). engagement with NUC/CLE/NLS/etc on curriculum review, (ii). engagement with CLE on the BML programme, (iii). engagement with NBA on CPD standards, (iv). engagement with universities on minimum teaching standards, and (v). engagement with the National Assembly, the Executive , and other stakeholders on legislative reforms to legal education, law teachers welfare, legal education standards, poor infrastructure and low funding, etc. The rejoinder does not identify a single documented stakeholder intervention by the current or recent NALT leadership. Thus, the central question persists: If not at the conference, and not outside the conference, when and where does NALT confront the challenges of legal education?

(7)  THE PROBLEM WITH THE “65 PERCENT SCORE”

Dr Ihugba’s claim that NALT deserves a “65%—a B” is unsubstantiated. A credible grade requires measurable indicators: (i). Teacher-welfare interventions, (ii). Curriculum-review outputs, (iii). Capacity-building programmes, (iv). Policy papers influencing national regulation, (v). Pnstitutional synergy with CLE/NUC/NBA, etc, (vi). Structured feedback mechanisms, (vii). Implementation of the Blue Book’s pedagogical guidelines. No metrics are provided. No evidence is offered. With due respect, Dr Ihugba’s grading is a mere unsubstantiated subjective opinion, not an objective analysis

(8). A REJOINDER THAT UNWITTINGLY CONFIRMS THE ORIGINAL THESIS

With due respect, Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder contains several internal contradictions that ironically validate my initial critique: (a). The rejoinder claims NALT conferences cannot solve sectoral problems, but admits they can “harvest ideas” to do so; (b). It claims NALT has no role where laws already exist, but concedes NALT can “help put issues on the agenda;” (c). It claims I set new objectives, yet fails to show how any issue I raised falls outside the objectives of NALT as set out in its constitution; (d). It argues NALT focuses on research, while admitting conferences do not address legal education. Accordingly, every contradiction in the rejoinder reinforces my point, namely – NALT has drifted from its mandate and needs institutional reorientation.

(9). REFORM, NOT RITUALS: WHAT NALT MUST DO

Process-level improvements (such as newsletters, better Blue Book compliance, and AGM reports) are constructive but insufficient. What NALT needs is structural reform: (i). Reorient conference themes around legal education, pedagogy, teacher welfare and academic standards, ethics, etc; (ii). Institutionalise stakeholder engagement with CLE, NUC, NBA, the judiciary, the federal government and other critical stakeholders; (iii). Strengthen EXCO tenure to ensure continuity of reforms; (iv). Introduce annual policy (assessment/evaluation) statements on the state of legal education; (v). Establish a Research Committee on legal pedagogy and curriculum innovation; (vi). Ensure as a rule that at least 70%–80% of the papers presented at NALT conferences relate directly to NALT’s objectives and efforts towards resolving the challenges facing legal education in Nigeria. Without such changes, NALT will continue to operate as an intellectually stimulating but institutionally ineffective association.

(10). CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR AN ANNUAL GENERAL CONSCIENCE

My thesis remains intact. With due respect, Dr Ihugba’s rejoinder has not dislodged it. The REALITY is that NALT cannot continue to ignore its core mandate, celebrate irrelevant achievements, and still claim institutional success. Until NALT transforms its Annual General Conference into an Annual General Conscience (a forum for reflecting, evaluating and driving reform), the Association risks becoming a body with eloquence but no influence, activity but no achievement, conferences without positive consequence. Ayn Rand’s observation that “We can ignore reality, but we cannot ignore the consequences of ignoring reality” reminds us that avoiding the truth does not shield us from its effects. Growth and sound judgment require that we confront reality rather than deny it, because denial only postpones inevitable repercussions. Arthur Schopenhauer also noted that every truth passes through three stages: first, it is ridiculed; second, it is fiercely opposed; and finally, it is accepted as self-evident. In any case, I believe I have made my point. As Anne Tyler wisely remarked, “It is very difficult to live among people you love and hold back from offering them advice.”
Respectfully,
Sylvester Udemezue (udems),
Legal Practitioner, Law Teacher, and Proctor of The Reality Ministry of Truth and Justice (TRM).
Tel: 08021365545.
Email: [email protected].
Web: www.therealityministry.ngo.
(13 November 2025)

REFERENCES

1. Constitution of the Nigerian Association of Law Teachers (2018 rev)
2. ibid.
3. NALT, Manual on Legal Research and Writing (Blue Book, 2022).
4. GJ Warnock, The Object of Morality (Methuen & Co Ltd, 1971) ch 5.
5. R Yin, Case Study Research and Applications (Sage 2018) 82–84.
6. S Udemezue, ‘NALT and the Persistent Disdain for Its Own Mandate’ (2025) The Reality Ministry.

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

By J.S. Okutepa, SAN

The majority of Nigerian politicians are not democrats. They are majorly democratic despots and terrorists. They have destroyed every institution of democracy, including the rule of law and the judicial institution. The destruction of these vital democratic institutions is worrying me as a lawyer. I am worried that we are watching the reckless use of judicial institutions to kill democracy in the exercise of rights that are not recognised by law.

There is no dispute that the Nigerian Constitution, 1999, as amended, and the Electoral Act, 2022, have set out the types of political disputes that are justiciable in the Nigerian Courts. Nigerian courts of first instance must wake up and not be used to destroy democracy, no matter the level of temptation. The Nigerian Electoral Act 2022 has several sections that deal with pre-election matters. Specifically, Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022, provides that an aspirant who complains that any provisions of the Act or guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate may apply to the Federal High Court for redress. Those who purchased forms to contest political posts are not aspirants within the meaning of the law. Nigerian lawyers and judges know this, and nobody should claim ignorance of this.

Section 29(5) of the Electoral Act, 2022, also addresses pre-election matters, stating that any aspirant who participated in the primaries of their political party and has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by their party’s candidate is false may seek relief. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, also provides for the provisions for pre-election matters under Section 285(14) thereof. Section 285(14) of the said constitution recognizes three types of pre-election matters.

The three pre-election matters recognized by law in Nigeria are: Non-compliance with the Electoral Act or party guidelines in the conduct of party primaries. Improper nomination of a candidate by a party and disputes over the eligibility of a candidate. These are the matters that can be addressed under Section 285(14) of the Nigerian Constitution and Sections 29(5) and 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022. In Nigeria, selections of candidates for party posts outside pre-election matters are generally considered non-justiciable, meaning courts should not and must not interfere with internal party affairs. The Constitution of Nigeria 1999, as amended, and the Electoral Act 2022 limit judicial intervention to specific pre-election matters. See Section 285(14) of the Constitution and Sections 29(5) and 84(14) of the Electoral Act.

The Supreme Court has, on many occasions, warned Nigerian Courts not to entertain disputes on internal party elections or selections for party posts, considering them non-justiciable. There are many judicial decisions. The Supreme Court has, on many occasions, deprecated the lower courts from following its decisions on this point. The case of Dalhatu vs Turaki is in point here. In that case, the Supreme Court was very hard on the trial court. Because of the significance of that decision, let me quote the views of their lordships of the Supreme Court then.

These are what their lordships said: “This court is the highest and final court of appeal in Nigeria. Its decisions bind every court, authority or person in Nigeria. By the doctrine of stare decisis, the courts below are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. The doctrine is a sine qua non for certainty in the practice and application of law. A refusal, therefore, by a Judge of the court below to be bound by this court’s decision, is gross insubordination (and I dare say such a judicial officer is a misfit in the Judiciary”…I entirely agree with my learned brother Katsina-Alu that Onuoha V. Okafor and others (1983) 14 NSCC 494 was rightly applied to the facts of the case on hand by the Court of Appeal. This case was cited to the trial judge. He failed, rather, he refused, to apply it. He thought the Supreme Court was wrong in its decision in that case and arrogantly closed his judgment in these words “I also with great respect call on the Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties.”

This, to my mind, is the height of judicial impertinence ever exhibited by a judge of a Court lower than the Supreme Court. The doctrine of stare decisis is fully entrenched in our jurisprudence to ensure certainty of the law. Had the learned trial judge in this case cared to read that case and the various dicta of their Lordships of this Court, he would not have exhibited such crass ignorance that ran through his judgment. I think enough said on this the better.”…”My general comment on the last sentence in the judgment of the learned trial judge which says-“I also with great respect call on Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties.” is that it is rather daring and unfortunate. In my view it is a clear misconception of the well established principle of stare decisis in our judicial system. There is no doubt that the learned judge had at the back of his mind the decision of this court in Onuoha’s case (supra) and he did not realize that his duty like all other judges of the lower courts was to apply its ratio decidendi whether he agreed with it or not. See A.G. Ogun State V. Egenti (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 28) 265; Emerah & Sons Ltd V. A. G. Plateau State (1990) 4 NWLR (pt. 147) 788. He could only avoid it where it was possible to distinguish the case he was dealing with from that of Onuoha. In this case, he could not do so and so it was not open to him to avoid applying it to the case before him nor could he “advise” the Supreme Court to change its position on it. It is well settled that the Supreme Court can only change its position in a case decided earlier by it where it considers, for good and substantial reasons, to overrule itself on an application where the need arises. Williams V. Daily Times (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 124) 1; Rossek V. ACB Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (pt. 312) 382; Johnson V. Lawanson (1971) All NLR 58. Judges of the lower court have no right under any circumstances to ask or advise this court to change its decision in any case.”….”The learned trial Judge refused to follow Onuoha. That was not all. He asked this court to re-amend its position in Onuoha. In his words: “I also with the great respect call on the Supreme Court to re-amend its position on the internal affairs of political parties”.

The word “re-amend” gives the impression that this court had earlier amended its position in Onuoha, whatever that means. I cannot remember the case in which this court amended its position in Onuoha. But that is not very important. The important thing is that a trial Judge would have the courage and the strength not to follow a decision of the Supreme Court merely because he feels that the decision is wrong. As if that is not bad enough, the Judge has called upon this court to “re-amend its position” to fall in line with his. This is an extremely unfortunate situation. Apart from the fact that it attempts to destroy the well settled principles of stare decisis, this court is invited to abandon its own correct decision to follow a wrong decision of a trial Judge. This is very serous.

On my part, I will not obey him. He is wrong in his judgment and this court is correct in Onuoha.” The doctrine of judicial precedent otherwise known as stare decsis is not alien to our jurisprudence. It is a well settled principle of judicial policy which must be strictly adhered to by all lower courts. While such lower courts may depart from their own decisions reached per incuriam, they cannot refuse to be bound by decisions of higher courts even if those decisions were reached per incuriam. The implication is that a lower court is bound by the decision of a higher court even where that decision was given erroneously: see Emerah & Sons Ltd V. Attorney-General Plateau State and ors (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 147) 788, Global Trans Oceanico S.A. V. Free Ent. (Nig) Ltd (2001) 5 NWLR. (Pt. 706) 426 at p.441; (2001) 3 SCM 35″

Nigerian Courts generally consider internal party matters, like selections for party posts, as non-justiciable, unless they directly impact electoral processes or violate the Constitution/Electoral Act in the party’s primary elections. And it is only aspirants who participated in the primary elections of the political parties that have locus standi and who can sue in the court and before the appropriate court with jurisdiction. One is completely at a loss at the kind of orders flying left and right centre by Nigerian Courts in sabotage of democracy and the rule of law, when, from the facts, there are no party primaries in all these cases.

The judiciary must not be ridiculed further. The sanctity of the judiciary must be preserved. The Nigerian judiciary must not be completely destroyed. Once it is destroyed, the hopes of Nigerians are destroyed forever. Democracy is heading to a calamitous end, given the despotic and thuggish approach to democracy by the majority of Nigerian politicians.

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

An unlikely coincidence of ballots in a forty-five day period from the middle of September to the end of October 2025 has cast a new light on the state of democratic governance in Africa and now threatens to unscramble the ritual hollowness that has become the fate of elections on the continent under the indifferent watch of the African Union and other regional institutions in Africa. How the continent’s leaders and institutions handle the aftermath could have serious implications for the stability of the continent.

On 16 September, Malawi went to the polls to elect their president. The last time the country did that in 2019, it produced results that were so transparently rigged that five judges of the Constitutional Court of Malawi wearing bullet-proof vests were needed to set aside the result declared by the electoral commission. That was only the second time in Africa’s history that a court would nullify the declared outcome in a presidential election.

The annulled result had favoured then incumbent and fifth president of the Republic, Peter Mutharika (a long-serving law professor and brother of Malawi’s third president, Bingu wa Mutharika), in a contest against Lazarus Chakwera, a theologian and pastor with the Assemblies of God Church in Malawi. In the re-run that followed the judicial nullification in 2020, Chakwera prevailed and the people ousted Peter Mutharika from the presidency.

The contest in September 2025 pitted 85 year-old Peter Mutharika in a sequel against his nemesis, Lazarus Chakwera. In the preceding five years, President Chakwera had managed to implausibly squander the considerable civic goodwill that powered him into office. Despite being 15 years younger than President Mutharika, President Chakwera lost resoundingly to his older opponent who secured 56.8% of the vote.

Malawi may have vindicated the trust of both the voters and of the candidates in a test of the will of the people but it is an outlier in a continent that has grown used to seeing elections as charades. This reluctance for credible ballots was evident when the central African country of Cameroon went to the polls nearly one month later on 12 October 2025, to elect their president. The incumbent, Paul Biya, was a 92 year-old whose sojourn in Cameroon’s government dates back to his appointment as Chief of Staff in the cabinet of the Minister of Education in 1964. In 1975, President Ahmadou Ahidjo made him Prime Minister. On 6 November 1982, two days after the resignation of President Ahidjo on grounds of ill-health, Biya ascended to the presidency and has ruled the country for 43 years since.

At 92, Paul Biya is the oldest serving president in the world, only outlasted in office by Teodoro Obiang, president of the neighbouring Equatorial Guinea, who has been in office since he toppled his uncle, Macias Nguema, in August 1979 before executing him. In the election this year, his main opponent was Issa Tchiroma, a 35-year veteran in the cabinet of President Biya, who stepped down from the ruling Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM) and from the Cabinet in order to run against his former boss.

It took the Constitutional Council 15 days to tabulate the figures in an election which had 8.1 million registered voters with an average turnout of about 68.5%. When it eventually declared that outcome on 27 October, the Constitutional Council announced Biya as winner with 53.66% of the votes in disputed results and in an election in which he was unable to campaign because of infirmity. Independent analysts who have examined the official numbers insist he “couldn’t have won.”

With the result, Biya – who was born one month after Adolf Hitler assumed office as German Chancellor and in the month preceding the inauguration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the president of the United States of America – entered upon his seventh presidential term in a country in which the median age belongs to children who were born in 2006. By the time of the next election, he will be nearly one century old. In the wake of the announcement, United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, pointedly declined to extend congratulations to President Biya, instead focusing his attention on the need for a “thorough and impartial investigation” of the “post-electoral violence and…. reports of excessive use of force.”

Paul Biya can at least claim that he had a genuine contest against a genuine opponent. In Côte d’Ivoire, West Africa, the contest two weeks later on 25 October 2025 pitted incumbent president, Alassane Ouattara – whose ambitions drove the country to the brink of fragmentation at the beginning of the millennium – against no one.

When the result was announced, President Ouattara, a child of the Second World War, having been born on New Year’s Day in 1942, contrived at 83 years to award himself nearly 90% of the vote and a fourth term in office in an election from which he barred every credible competition. That was indeed a generous four percentage points lower than the 94% of the votes that he awarded himself in 2020. In power since 2010, Ouattara was supposed to be term-limited after two terms of ten years in office. At 83, he expects to rule until at least he is 88, which would still be five years younger than President Biya’s current age.

The election in Tanzania four days after Côte d’Ivoire’s took place in a graveyard. The incumbent and candidate of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) was Samia Suluhu Hassan, who inherited the office when her principal, John Pombe Magufuli, died in March 2021.

Ahead of the contest, however, it became evident that Samia would not tolerate a contest. Under her leadership, the government unleashed what Amnesty International described as a “wave of terror” designed to make her candidacy unopposed and the ruling party unchecked in its march to a pre-determined seventh decade in power. On the day of the contest on 29 October, protests unexpectedly erupted in key cities, such as Dar-Es-Salaam, Arusha, Mbeya, and Mwanza. Under cover of a media blackout complemented by an internet shutdown imposed on the day of the ballot, Samia’s government orchestrated a campaign of targeted mass murder in population centres suspected to be opposition strongholds.

President Samia’s electoral commission declared her winner with 87% voter turnout and nearly 98% of the vote. As Tanzanians in different parts of the country woke up to find bodies on their courtyards with fatal injuries from unknown persons and morgues overflowing with fresh cadavers reportedly being disappeared under instructions of the government, President Samia turned up at a military base in new capital city, Dodoma, where on the fourth night following the vote, she was stealthily inaugurated for a new term.

Initial estimates putting the casualty count in the hundreds were quickly eclipsed by more updated tallies of over 3,000 killed in under 72 hours. Fresh reporting by the New Humanitarian put the number over 5,000 and suggests that the casualty count may indeed be over 10,000. Around the country, initial trepidation gave way to alarm at the scale of the massacre. That alarm has now been ousted by outrage.

Meanwhile, for the first time in their histories, official election observer missions deployed by the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) both concluded separately that the election in Tanzania “did not comply with AU principles.” This caught many people unprepared. Now both institutions are scrambling to figure out what to do. There is an emerging consensus that President Samia is illegitimate. The leaders of both institutions must articulate consequences and citizens have a right to expect them to do so clearly.

Consensus is also growing around the urgent need for an independent, international investigation and accountability. Meanwhile, Tanzania’s young people prepare for nation-wide protests on 9 December 2025. The symbolism is significant: it is World Anti-Corruption Day; it is the anniversary of the adoption of the Genocide Convention; and it is Tanzania’s Independence Day.

A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at [email protected]

The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.