By Dr. Tonye Clinton Jaja

In the write-up, I will do a brief summary of the crucial role and importance of the leadership of the national oil company of any country to take steps to translate the revenue it generates into positive impact upon the citizens of the said country.

The comparison is between two countries that are the highest crude oil producing countries in Africa and the middle East namely Nigeria and Saudi Arabia as at the year 2008.

“In 2008, Nigeria was indeed the largest crude oil producer in Africa, with an average daily production of 1.94 million barrels, according to the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE).”

“Yes, in 2008, Saudi Arabia was indeed the highest crude oil producer in the Gulf region, with a production capacity estimated at around 11 million barrels per day.”

However, in terms of the positive impact upon greater percentage of citizens of Nigeria and Saudi Arabia attributable to these high revenues from crude oil production, it is a tale of different strokes for different folks.

Let me illustrate this from a real life example of two PhD candidates from both countries who were at the University of London at the same time period.

In the year 2008, I witnessed first-hand the positive impact of crude oil revenues upon the lives of citizens of Saudi Arabia.

It was in April 2008 that I resumed as a PhD law student at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London.

I was a beneficiary of a fully funded government scholarship. I had a letter from the government scholarship board which I submitted to the authorities of the University of London.

At the hostel of the University of London at Russell Square, London (which was in front of Paddington Train Station), I met a fellow PhD candidate who was also a PhD law student at Queen Mary, University of London.

He too was a beneficiary of the government of Saudi Arabia’s fully funded scholarship.

But that is as far as the comparisons went!!!

Dr. Faisal Al-Fadhel, the PhD student from Saudi Arabia completed his PhD study within the prescribed period of three years!!!

However, even though I had completed writing of my own PhD thesis even before the prescribed period, the University of London could not allow me to graduate because the government of Nigeria had not paid my tuition fees!!!

Even though Dr. Faisal Al-Fadhel and myself were schoolmates, he led a more comfortable life than myself in the United Kingdom, thanks to prompt and regular payment of his scholarship bursary funds!!!

To his credit he bought me a brand new SONY, laptop computer to use in writing my PhD thesis and for editing his own thesis.

Eventually, with funds from his government scholarship, He even had the funds to bring over his wife from Saudi Arabia and they moved out of the hostel to reside in the Russell Square area of London where rent is steep.

He graduated before myself and returned home to Saudi Arabia to take up a high paying job as a lawyer and Director in one of the government agencies in Saudi Arabia.

He was able to invite me in a fully funded visit to Saudi Arabia as a resource person for a training workshop on legal drafting for some government of Saudi Arabia lawyers!!!

The foregoing shows how the proper management by the national oil company of Saudi Arabia has ensured that its citizens are able to enjoy the proceeds of crude oil revenues!!!

During my PhD study, I used litigation arising from the Nigerian oil and gas industry as a case study of the negative consequences of poor legal drafting of Nigeria’s oil and gas legislation.

I was able to identify over 500 lawsuits involving the Nigerian national oil company (NNPC) and the legislation that established it (NNPC Act, 1977) which gulped over $500,000,000 from Nigeria’s economy from 1960 to 2008. However, the same cannot be said of the national oil company of Saudi Arabia and its relevant oil (Aramco) and gas legislation!!!

In conclusion, it is for the foregoing reasons that we salute President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) for his recent changes in the appointment of the leadership of Nigeria’s national oil company.

These recent appointments are made with the understanding that the NNPC if well managed can deliver the much needed revenue for turn-around of Nigeria’s economy for the better. Which in turn would improve the quality of lives of its citizens.

Below is the news report of the said recent changes of the leadership of the NNPC by PBAT as follows:

“President Bola Tinubu has sacked the board of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) including its Group Chief Executive Officer, Mele Kyari and board chairman Pius Akinyelure.

The decision, effective April 2, 2025, was announced in a statement by presidential spokesperson Bayo Onanuga.

President Tinubu cited the need for enhanced operational efficiency, restored investor confidence, and a more commercially viable NNPC as the driving forces behind the decision.

Invoking his powers under Section 59(2) of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021, he reconstituted the board with new leadership aimed at repositioning NNPC Limited for greater productivity and alignment with global best practices.

Kyari was first appointed NNPC chief by former President Muhammadu Buhari but was reappointed in 2023 by President Tinubu.

As part of the overhaul, Bayo Ojulari takes over from Kyari as the new group CEO, while Ahmadu Musa Kida has been appointed as NNPC’s new non-executive chairman, replacing Pius Akinyelure. Also, Adedapo Segun has been confirmed as the company’s chief financial officer (CFO).

In line with the PIA, the president also appointed six non-executive directors from each geopolitical zone.

They include Bello Rabiu representing the north-west, Yusuf Usman from the north-east, and Babs Omotowa, a former managing director of the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), for the north-central.

Others are Austin Avuru for the south-south, David Ige for the south-west, and Henry Obih for the south-east.

Meanwhile, Lydia Shehu Jafiya, the permanent secretary of the federal ministry of finance, and Aminu Said Ahmed of the ministry of petroleum resources will represent their respective ministries on the new board.

“This restructuring is aimed at repositioning NNPC Limited for greater productivity and efficiency in line with global best practices. We are taking bold steps to transform the company into a more commercially driven and transparent entity,” the statement reads.

The changes take effect immediately, and the new board has been handed a strategic action plan, which includes a “review of NNPC-operated and Joint Venture Assets to ensure alignment with value maximisation objectives”.

• Ogebe urges Gov Fintiri’s Sallah spirit clemency and SCN review of Adamawa High Court’s error that misdirected Supreme Court 

By Emmanuel Ogebe

Three weeks after his death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court, the dissenting judgment of the most senior Justice on the panel, inexplicably omitted from the released CTC, has surfaced further vindicating Jackson and millions of people mystified by the majority opinion.

Per Her Lordship Helen Ogunwumiju, JSC, “In the circumstances, I am of the view that the defense of self defense avails the Appellant and that his response was not excessive. It is my view that the judgment of the two lower Courts should be set aside as

a miscarriage of justice. I set aside the judgment of the Court below delivered on 27/6/2022 in Appeal No. CA/YL/158C/2021.

I acquit and discharge the Appellant. Since I appear to be in the minority, I recommend this Appellant as a proper candidate for the Governor of Adamawa State to exercise his prerogative of mercy. Appeal Allowed.”

What a beautiful judgment! Millions of Nigerians and others worldwide will now realize they’re not confused after all and that there are still voices of reason in our courts. This judgment will be Her Lordship’s most famous verdict and her legacy opinion. Her name will be renowned because of this. A wise Daniella has come to judgment. God bless her!

Conversely, unfortunately, in the court of public opinion, once again in a judicial poll, the “election” winners did not reflect the majority of the Nigerian population and the opinion that best embodied the will of we the people did not carry the day.

I will just highlight a few excerpts of the salient points Her Lordship brilliantly made (numbering mine):

JUDGMENT (DISSENTING)

(DELIVERED BY HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JSC)

I have read the judgment of my learned brother MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JSC and I beg to depart from his Lordship’s view and to allow the appeal.

1. “The deceased pursued him and stabbed him at the back of his neck and when he kicked the deceased to get away, the deceased stabbed him on his left leg. At the trial, the learned trial Judge confirmed that the Court, the prosecution and defence counsel saw the wounds inflicted by the deceased on the Appellant on the back of his head and on his left leg. That evidence is on page 77 of the record. That evidence was never debunked under cross examination.”
2. “There was admittedly an expansion of the details of the incident by the Appellant on oath, but there was no contradiction in respect of the specific important facts of the incident…The only difference which has been made much of and which is irrelevant in a plea of self defence is that at the Police Station the Appellant was recorded as stating that “I stabbed him in the throat thrice with intention to kill him”. My Lords, in self defence, the mens rea is the intention to kill in order to save oneself and the actus reus is the action itself. The intention to kill at that material time cannot negate the defence of self defence…The fact that he told his truth consistently of knowingly stabbing the deceased who first attacked him with a knife and had struck him twice cannot be used against him. The Court cannot believe the portion of the statement which is against a defendant and disbelieve the portion which favours him. The statement must be admitted and evaluated in toto…There seems to be a misunderstanding of the salient ingredient of the plea of self defence and it is that the Defendant intentionally killed the deceased in self defence…The conception of an intention to kill in order not to be killed cannot constitute pre-meditated murder.”
3. “It appears that both Courts below forgot the evidence of the Appellant on oath which was not contradicted successfully under cross examination that the deceased had attacked him first, when he tried to run away from the deceased, the deceased stabbed him on the back of the head with the knife and when he kicked the deceased to get away, the deceased stabbed him on the left leg. Proportionality can be difficult to measure particularly when there is no referee during the cause of the fight.                                The case being made by the prosecution that there is no doctor’s report to back up the story of the Appellant is misconceived. Suffice it to say that during the trial, the Court noted on page 77 of the record as follows:    “Court – I would like to see the wounds of the stabbing (I have seen the scare at the back of his head and the scene (sic) at the back of his left leg). Inspected it with the prosecution and Defendant counsel.”                                 We must recollect that the judgment of the trial Court which had seen the wounds inflicted on the back of the head and the left leg of the Appellant did not disclose that it disbelieved the story of the Appellant that he had already been wounded twice by the deceased”
4. “I cannot agree that a reasonable man who had been stabbed twice already and who was still being attacked with a herdsman’s stick would hesitate to fight for his life. It would have been a different thing altogether if there had been an intervening period in the fight. The Appellant took advantage of the fact that the person who had stabbed him on the back of his head, an equally dangerous place to be stabbed, had become temporarily weak and took the opportunity to save his own life. How was he to know that the deceased would not stand up and pursue him as he had done earlier? I have serious doubt that a person attacked on his own farm who tried to disengage from the fight but was pursued and stabbed had no right to self defence in the circumstances. The reasoning that he should have fled a second time from his own farm which was an open field when he was not the aggressor cannot be how a reasonable man would react, not knowing whether or not he would be further pursued by his assailant. The Appellant was entitled to defend himself from an assailant who had trespassed on his land, attacked him first after he tried to run away.”
5. “My Lords, the prosecution had to prove that the defendant did not kill the victim in self-defence. Thus, the onus to negative each defence of accident, self-defence and provocation properly raised is on the prosecution. The prosecution in this case has not been able to adduce contrary evidence. Where the deceased was the aggressor and was physically bigger than the defendant, who was after running from the initial onslaught had to engage the deceased who chased him and was able to wrest the weapon from the deceased, his use of the same weapon in order to save his life in the absence of positive proof to the contrary avails the defendant with the defence of self defence…In the circumstances of this case, I do not think the Appellant was in a position to determine and analyze which part of the body of the deceased to stab. He had a right to want to get away from his attacker and to ensure he was no longer pursued. As stated earlier, at that point of reaction, would a reasonable man who had already been stabbed twice by a trespasser on his land think twice about stabbing his assailant anywhere available? I think not. I do not agree that the mere fact of stabbing the deceased three times in the heat of the moment instead of once, constitutes malice aforethought…Under our legal system if a man is in danger of serious bodily harm he may use such force as he believes is necessary to prevent and resist the attack and if in using such force he kills his assailant he is not guilty of any crime even if the killing was intentional.”
6. “The deceased here was a trespasser on the land of the Appellant. I believe the misapprehension of the two lower Courts in finding the Appellant guilty because he did not run away after he gained the upper hand is from the unwarranted and unreasonable interpretation of the need for the person attacked to disengage no matter the circumstances. As stated earlier, in this instance, the Appellant had disengaged once and was pursued. Did he not have the right to stand his ground against further attack on his own farm? I am of the view that he reserved the right to stand his ground on his own land pursuant to Section 33(2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. I do appreciate the point that vengefulness or excessiveness in the defence of that right must be discouraged. Each case must be treated according to its own peculiar facts. I can find no vengefulness in the action of the Appellant. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the defence of self defence avails the Appellant and that his response was not excessive. It is my view that the judgment of the two lower Courts should be set aside as a miscarriage of justice.”

On the facts and the law, Sunday Jackson wins on the merits based on Her Lordship’s incisive and scintillating elucidation of the issues.

This is aside from the over 30 disturbing flaws we have detected in the preceding majority judgements including stupefyingly the fact that Jackson was charged, tried and convicted of only two stab wounds at the trial court but ordered to be hanged by the Supreme Court for three stabs. Respectfully, where did the apex court get the extra stab from for which he was neither charged nor convicted in the high court upon which he must now be hanged?

As Her Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JSC rightly pointed out, facts are within the realm of the trial court and can’t be substituted by the appellate court.

It would appear to me that the High Court Judge Fatima Tafida may have misdirected the appellate courts into this grievous error by injecting her own opinion or misconception of three stabs into a case where the defendant was clearly only charged with two stabs.

In the light of this fatal factual flaw and the gross perversion of justice it has occasioned on the right to life of citizen Sunday Jackson, to be unjustly taken, I humbly recommend that:

1. Governor Adamu Fintiri accede to the plea of the most senior Justice on the panel Ogunwumiju, JSC to grant Sunday Jackson clemency post-haste especially in the spirit of the ongoing Sallah Eid Mubarak 
2. The Supreme Court should urgently undertake a review of the judgment in Sunday Jackson v the State given the error by the trial court on Jackson’s two stab charge which misdirected the Supreme Court’s decision.

“One of the successful reviews was in the case of BAR ORIKER JEV & ORS. V. IYORTOM & ORS. [2015] NWLR (PT. 1483) 484.

The Supreme Court had in an earlier judgment in the matter ordered that INEC conduct a run-off election. 

During the review, the court discovered that it made the said order based on a wrong interpretation of Section 133(2) in conjunction with Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). 

On a post-judgment application by one of the parties, the Court set aside the earlier order. It instead ordered the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to issue the applicant a certificate of return.

The Court further held:

(1) That there is no constitutional provision for the Supreme Court to review its judgment as section 235 of the Constitution gives a stamp of finality to any decision of the Supreme Court.

(2) That there is, however, as the Supreme Court has decided in several cases, an inherent power to set aside its judgment in appropriate or deserving cases but that such inherent jurisdiction cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction as though the matter before it is another appeal intended to afford the losing litigants yet another opportunity to restate or re-argue their appeal.

(3) The Supreme Court avoided any direct holding on whether it acted per incuriam (without regard to existing law or precedent) in making the former consequential order, which it was called upon in the application to set aside. Rather, the Court said that it had inherent power to set aside the consequential order, which it had made on the basis of a wrong interpretation of Sections 141 and 133 of the Electoral Act.

Perusing the black inks of that ratio, it is clear that the Supreme Court can set aside its judgment in special and rare circumstances and this can only be done by the court not by an appeal.

It is therefore evidently clear that where the ground exists, Supreme Courts of basically all jurisdictions will not shy away from setting aside their judgements or orders and substituting them with others. The ultimate end is justice, not the prestige of the court.

APPLICATION OF THE SLIP RULE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The United States Supreme Court has in a few instances set aside its own decisions or judgments. In JONES V. CITY OF OPELIKA (II), 319 U.S. 103 (1943) the Court vacated certain orders made in its judgement in JONES V. CITY OF OPELIKA 316 U.S. 584 (1942), having found on the application and proper examination of the law, that it arrived at the earlier decision wrongly. This later decision was based on its decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) which had been brought to its notice.” https://lawpavilion.com/blog/reviewing-supreme-court-judgments-in-nigeria-is-it-possible-an-introspection-of-the-slip-rule-principle/

In the instant case, the court will discover that it upheld the death sentence order based on a wrong, mistaken or erroneous assumption by the trial judge that Jackson was liable for three stabs when in fact he was only charged with and convicted  of two stabs which the Supreme Court has already stated would not be excessive in this very case to deny him a successful selfdefense claim.

Click here to download Ogunwumiju JSC’s dissenting judgment.

Emmanuel Ogebe, ESQ 

US NIGERIA LAW GROUP

By Onikepo Braithwaite

Introduction
Recently the story of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC/CR/1026/2022 delivered on March 7, 2025 Sunday Jackson v The State per Mohammed Baba Idris, JSC made the rounds. As usual, it elicited comments vilifying the whole Nigerian judicial system and the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon. Justice Kudirat Kekere-Ekun, GCON, who didn’t even sit on the Appeal Panel in that case, alleging injustice and accusing her of sentencing the Appellant, Mr Jackson to death out of evil!

Five other Supreme Court Justices, decided this appeal. While the majority (four Justices) affirmed the decisions of lower courts convicting Jackson for culpable homicide punishable by death contrary to Section 221(a) of the Penal Code Law of Adamawa State 1997 (PCLA), the Head of the Panel, Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JSC dissented. In her minority dissenting judgement, Ogunwumiju, JSC set aside the judgements of the trial court and Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal, acquitted and discharged Jackson, and recommended him to the Governor of Adamawa State as a proper candidate for him to exercise his prerogative of mercy in favour of.

None of the reasons for the majority and minority decisions, had to do with wickedness, evil, ethnicity or religious sentiments; but, rather, the interpretation of the law, exercising their judicial discretion judiciously and judicially. The Supreme Court Appeal Panel consisted of three Christian Justices and two Muslims, while I don’t think any of the Justices is of the Fulani extraction as stated by some, alleging ‘they had it in’ for Jackson for killing a Fulani Herdsman.

Elements of a Good Judgement
It is sad that these days, once judgements are handed down, people do not take the time to read them and understand the reasoning behind them, before automatically, and regularly, erroneously, concluding that they are perverse.

Once a decision bears the elements of a good judgement, that is, one that is based on law and facts – issues distilled; evidence adduced properly evaluated; clear findings of fact made; the law properly applied to arrive at the correct conclusion; clear and coherent reasoning behind the judgement, this is all that is required. See Mbani v Bosi & Ors (2006) LPELR-1853(SC). Though the principle of ‘Stare Decisis’ must be adhered to, it comes with the caveat of avoiding bad precedent.

Deciding cases based on public policy, which is seen as being synonymous with public good, is only permissible when the decision aligns with the rules, law and procedure that govern the matter. See Sonnar (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor v Partenreedri M.S. Nordwind Owners of the Ship M.V. Nordwind & Anor (1987) LPELR- 3494(SC) per Kayode Eso, JSC. Doing substantial justice between the parties in a case and avoiding being bugged down with technicalities, is also important. See Akpan v Bob (2010) LPELR-376(SC) per Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen, JSC (later CJN). It is only when these elements are absent from a judgement that we can begin to criticise it as wanting, and not just because it doesn’t favour us or it offends our sentiments.

Background
Sunday Jackson, a farmer, had been found guilty of culpable homicide punishable by death by a High Court of Adamawa State, for killing one Buba Bawuro, a Herdsman, who had trespassed on Jackson’s land with his cattle in January 2015.

The summarised facts of the case related in the extra-judicial statement made at the Police Station by Jackson who was the sole witness of the incident, was that Bawuro allegedly pursuing some people who killed his cattle, trespassed onto his farm, attacked Jackson out of frustration and tried to stab him; they struggled and Jackson wrestled the knife from him, and then stabbed Bawuro in the neck three times. Jackson then fled the scene, leaving Bawuro in a pool of blood. Jackson had stated that he knew that he could kill Bawuro by stabbing him, and he meant to kill him. Jackson reported himself to his Mother, who reported to her brother, and Jackson ended up being arrested. Of course, there is scepticism about confessional statements taken by the Police.

Jackson’s testimony in court, however, differed in some respects from his extra-judicial statement. Jackson testified that Bawuro, a Fulani Herdsman, had asked him if he had seen the people he was pursuing, to which he replied in the negative. Bawuro brought his cattle onto his land, and when he tried to drive away Bawuro’s cattle, Bawuro brought out a knife to attack him, and being unarmed he fled with Bawuro in hot pursuit. He testified that Bawuro was able to stab him in the back of the head and left leg. The trial Judge confirmed seeing the scars of the injuries (evidence of the scars sighted by the Judge, prosecution and defence Counsel was stated in the record of proceedings). Bawuro caught up with him, and then tried to stab Jackson again, they struggled and Jackson wrestled the knife from him. Bawuro picked up a stick and started beating Jackson, who then stabbed Bawuro in the neck three times, until he was weak and unable to continue beating him. Jackson also testified in court, that he believed that Bawuro would kill him.

Plea of Self Defence
Jackson pleaded that he killed Bawuro in self defence; the courts didn’t accept this plea. The majority believed that the varied version of events that Jackson testified to in court, was an afterthought (obviously to lay the foundation for the plea of self defence). To buttress this view, in his lead judgement Baba Idris, JSC, referred to Jackson’s oral testimony in court as an attempt to perform an “11th hour miracle”, and held that where an accused does not challenge the making of his confessional statement, but merely gives oral evidence that is inconsistent with or contradicts the contents of the statement, the oral evidence should be treated as unreliable and liable to be rejected, and the contents of the confessional statement upheld, unless a satisfactory explanation of the inconsistency is proffered.

In support this position, Aliyu v State (2021) LPELR-55002 (SC) was cited. The purport of this is that, Jackson didn’t give a cogent reason for the inconsistency between his extra-judicial statement and oral testimony in court, and that where Jackson didn’t challenge his extra-judicial statement, and gave oral testimony that is different from it, the latter would be treated as unreliable and was liable to be rejected. And, this was what the Apex Court did – rejected his oral testimony. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that there was no medical report presented to the court, to confirm that Jackson’s scars that were seen by the trial court, were as a result of injuries sustained from Jackson’s encounter with Bawuro, since there was no other witness to the encounter.

A successful plea of self defence, is a complete defence for a case of murder, and will result in the discharge and acquittal of the Defendant. See Okorodudu v State (2024) LPELR-62191(SC) per Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JSC, where the Apex Court held that the defence of self defence is based on the facts of each case; that it is a total defence which the prosecution has the burden of disproving, failing which the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt will not be discharged. In State v Shonto (2019) LPELR-47431 (SC) per Amina Adamu Augie, JSC, the Supreme Court held inter alia that killing in self defence is a total exoneration of the Accused Person, resulting in their discharge and acquittal.

For the plea of self defence to be successful, the Supreme Court cited the case of Ochani v State (2017) LPELR-42352 (SC) in which it had listed what must be proved 1) that the Deceased was the aggressor – the accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter; 2) there must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm, either real or apparent as to create the honest belief of an existing necessity; 3) there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat; and 4) there must have been a necessity for taking life. The Supreme Court also cited Afosi v State (2013) LPELR -20751 (SC), where it had held that all the above ingredients must be established conjunctively. In State v Shonto (Supra) the Supreme Court also held that the force used in self defence must be reasonable in the circumstances, to repel the attack.

The Majority Decision and Her Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JSC’s Dissenting Judgement
Both the majority and dissenting decisions agreed that the deceased, Bawuro, was the aggressor, and Jackson wasn’t the cause of the unfortunate encounter. It was on the other three elements that there was a disagreement.

In both his extra-judicial statement, which the Baba Idris, JSC held was a valid confessional statement made voluntarily (since the objection on its admission into evidence necessitating a trial-within-trial was withdrawn) and oral testimony, Jackson stated that he was able to wrestle the knife from Bawuro. As far as the majority was concerned, by seizing the knife, the impending danger to Jackson’s life had been averted, and he had a means of escape since they were in an open bush. Since Jackson’s oral testimony had been discountenanced in favour of the extra-judicial statement, so was his story therein, that Bawuro picked up a stick after the knife was seized and was beating him with it, that he feared for his life and had to defend himself by stabbing him. Instead, the majority accepted Jackson’s extra-judicial/confessional statement that he stabbed Bawuro thrice in the throat with the intention of killing him; that any reasonable person would know that stabbing in the throat would cause grievous bodily harm or death, and the medical report admitted into evidence supporting the fact that Bawuro was stabbed multiple times was countenanced.

Her Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JSC, on the other hand, was of the view that both courts should have countenanced Jackson’s testimony on oath which was not contradicted successfully under cross-examination (see Okorodudu v State (Supra)); that Bawuro had attacked Jackson first when he tried to run away from Bawuro; that Bawuro stabbed Jackson on the back of the head with the knife and when he kicked Bawuro to get away, he stabbed Jackson on the left leg. Her Lordship was of the opinion that, the trial Judge’s confirmation of them seeing the scars was sufficient, and that proportionality can be difficult to measure, particularly when there was no eyewitness to the incident. Her Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JSC, also believed that from the account of events, where such a fight with a knife was ongoing, there couldn’t have been enough time or the circumstances for Jackson to properly, intentionally and purposely form an intention to kill Bawuro.

Forming an intention to kill presupposes premeditation, and premeditation would be having a guilty mind even before the act, that is, forming a plan to kill someone beforehand, and this couldn’t have been done during a sudden fight between strangers, as in the case of Jackson and Bawuro. See Ibrahim v State (2018) LPELR-45967(CA). In using the plea of self defence, the Defendant doesn’t deny killing the deceased, but, maintains that the killing was done only to save their own life; so, even if Jackson admitted to wanting to kill Bawuro, it was probably on the spur of the moment to save his own life. Her Lordship was also of the view that, the doubts raised should have been resolved in favour of Jackson.

In trying to save Jackson, the defence of self defence having failed, though it wasn’t raised by him, Baba Idris, JSC also examined the defence of provocation, though it is trite that self defence and provocation cannot co-exist on the same evidence – they are mutually exclusive. Unlike self defence, provocation is a mitigating defence, not absolute, and would have the effect of reducing the offence to culpable homicide not punishable with death, that is, from murder to manslaughter. The Apex Court cited the case of Mohammed v State (2017) LPELR-42098 (SC) which held the three elements that must co-exist for the defence of provocation to succeed: 1) In the heat of passion; 2) grave and sudden provocation as to deprive the accused of self-control and 3) before there is time for passion to cool. The Supreme Court found that while the first element was proved, and in the second element, Jackson lost his self control while wrestling for the knife with Bawuro, the third element, the mode of resentment bore no reasonable relationship with the provocation. It appears that the majority were of the view that Jackson had time to cool having wrestled the knife from Bawuro; they may have been able to live with Jackson stabbing Bawuro once, but, thrice? They believed it was excessive.

Conclusion
I respectfully disagree with the majority judgement and I tend to align myself more with the dissenting judgement of Her Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JSC. I’m of view that, even if the plea of self defence didn’t avail him, Jackson’s actions still do not appear to me to fall within the definition of premeditation/malice aforethought/guilty mind, but more like Voluntary Manslaughter at worst – intentional killing without premeditation (which could bag up to life imprisonment upon conviction).

Being suddenly attacked with a dagger by a trespasser, isn’t a normal daily occurrence that everyone is prepared for. And, not everyone can remain cool, calm, collected and rational in such circumstances. Section 33(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution also permits a person to use reasonable force to defend their life and property. Since there was no eye witness, who is to say that the force Jackson used on Bawuro was excessive, given the circumstances? In my humble opinion, Jackson should have been given the benefit of the doubt, and in the worst case scenario, convicted for the lesser of offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death, if not a discharge and acquittal on the basis of self defence. But, the majority were obviously of the opinion that the fact that Jackson was able to wrestle the knife from Bawuro gave him an upper hand, time to cool down and an escape route that no longer necessitated the stabbing of Bawuro to death. Their position negates the defence of self defence.

And, while we may not align with the majority judgement of the Supreme Court in this matter, it is obvious that coming to the decision had nothing to do with bizarre non-legal reasons given by some.

This habit of criticising every judgement without the facts of the case, and based on everything else but established legal principles and procedure, is a matter of grave concern. It only ignites the polity, and erodes public confidence in the Judiciary unnecessarily and unfairly. It is our hope that the Governor of Adamawa State will, however, exercise the prerogative of mercy in favour of Jackson, and pardon him.

Part of what the author wrote was that:

“For nearly three years until 2018, Numan was the site of a murderous war between sedentary farmers and armed pastoralists. No one knows the number who lost their lives in this conflict… In suggesting that Sunday Jackson had a reasonable means of escape, the Supreme Court showed almost blissful lack of awareness of the nature of the conflict on the floodplains of the Benue River (and its tributaries)… The standard of evidentiary assessment deployed by the Supreme Court required Sunday Jackson to possess almost divine knowledge of the surrounding circumstances. Asking him to run in the middle of this required him to be certain that there was no other danger around him. There was no way that he or anyone could in the middle of an active conflict zone have attained that degree of knowledge or awareness…”

What did the High Court (HC) find as fact on this point?

Did defence counsel raise the circumstance of war as a peculiar defining consideration for the HC in the evaluation of the evidence?

If so, what did the HC say after considering the point? If not, did counsel concede that the present facts were not conditioned by the farmer – herder war? In the event, would it be right for the HC judge to ignore the facts as presented by the parties through their counsel and instead to conjure his own facts and thereupon to rule according to imagination?

More importantly, did the appellant raise these extenuating circumstances on intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeal (CA)?

What did the CA decide about the credibility and validity or not of the point?

If the three justices of appeal upheld the findings of the HC judge on this question of fact, shall we say that the four adjudicators were incompetent or biased against this particular accused person? Why?

It is only after the answers to the foregoing questions that, on this matter of pure facts (there’s no shred of disputation on law here) that we can meaningfully question what the additional five justices of the Supreme Court (SC) did or did not do in reviewing the judgments of lower courts through the judgment and record of appeal at the intermediate appellate court.

This would be a minimum of nine experienced lawyers who became judges and who have intimately listened directly to the witnesses (whom we have not seen or listened to) and or have directly had access to and studied all the relevant documents admitted into evidence where the parties and witnesses had mostly contemporaneously stated what had or had not transpired; and, even read and seen material that although produced in evidence had eventually not been admitted as exhibits for use in the evaluation and judgment (much of which merely reading the judgment we have had no access to).

It is possible that nine judges in three tiers of our superior courts and with the assistance of competent counsel (some with Nigerian and international legal certifications) had nevertheless concurrently but wrongly ruled one way on the facts. But if this is the case, any neutral lawyer is entitled to require evidence of error or misconduct much higher than just a speculative criticism about an ongoing herder-farmer war. Otherwise, we might as well submit that in any site of bloody conflict, regardless of evidence in particular cases, cold-blooded murder is permissible and requirements that trigger our laws on self-defence are suspended!

Surely that cannot be the case because even in the field of declared international war, a soldier who shoots a surrendering soldier is treated no better than any other villainous murderer!

By Dr. Tonye Clinton Jaja

Louis Armstrong is one of the greatest jazz musicians of all time.

He popularised a song that goes by the title: “Oh! When The Saints Go Marching In”.

Some of the lyrics are as follows:

“Oh, when the saints (when the saints)
Go marching in (marching in)
Now, when the saints go marching in (marching in)
Yes, I want to be in that number
When the saints go marching in.”

The song is based on the religious belief that one day, there will be a roll call and entrance granted to either heaven or paradise for the “saints” that is: those whom are declared righteous by Almighty God because of the good deeds that they did during their lifetime.

Using the lyrics of this song as a metaphor, when the history of the heroes of democracy and adherence to the rule of law in Rivers State is written, some names will be on that roll call and others would not!!!

Governor Fubara has written his name in gold and he would definitely be one of those who would be marching in, when the saints go marching in!!!

For his refusal to voluntarily hand over ₦ 6 billion per month out of the commonwealth of Rivers State as a bribe to Wike!!!

Edison O. Ehie, Chief of Staff to Governor Fubara would also be marching in when the saints go marching in.

For his refusal to accept a bribe of ₦ 5 billion for the impeachment of Governor Fubara in October 2023!!!!

Hon. Justice Simeon Amadi, Chief Judge of Rivers State would also be marching in when the saints go marching in for his refusal to support the second attempt at impeachment of Governor Fubara during the month of March 2025.

Rt. Hon. Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi (RCA) for speaking out publicly to condemn President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s declaration of a State of Emergency in Rivers State, he too will go marching in when the saints go marching in!!!

In response to one of my previous articles, a lawyer had tried to praise Wike as one of the “saints that would be marching in” when the roll call of Rivers State is made.

Unfortunately, the only criterion that the said lawyer applied was that Wike had empowered a list of about 50 Rivers State indigenes via appointments into different federal government agencies!!!

In response, I wrote to the said lawyer:

“..you are entitled to your views about Wike and you have expressed your opinion… however, there is a question that a wife asked her husband in the 1995 movie named “Heat” starring Al Pacino, Robert DeNiro etc…” so because he saved your limb, you have to repay him with your life”?

Whatever good Wike appears to be doing for a few Rivers State men and women (I listed about 50 not adding the 27 law-makers of the Rivers State House of Assembly and the 23 LGA Chairmen), is nullified by the evil that Wike has inflicted upon the remaining over five million INDIGENES of Rivers State, whom are forced to live under the State of Emergency declared by PBAT since 19th March 2025!!!”