Peter Obi, former governor of Anambra state, has faulted the alleged payment of ransoms to rescue persons abducted by bandits.

Obi, who was a vice-presidential candidate in the 2019 general election, said Nigeria is not progressing because bandits are being rewarded,  while lecturers are owed salaries.

He was speaking at the launch of a book titled, ‘Communication and Media Studies: Multiple Perspectives’, written by Stella Okunna, a former commissioner in Anambra.

The recent weeks have seen a spike in the abduction of students by bandits raiding communities in the northern part of the country.

While all the students have been freed, there have been reports that ransoms were paid to rescue them, but the government has denied this.

Obi said Nigeria’s economy cannot be productive if the country continues to reward criminality while overlooking its intellectuals.

“How do we go and negotiate and pay somebody, a bandit, when we have not paid those who are working?” Obi asked following reported negotiations with bandits who abduct schoolchildren in the north.

“You can’t pay people for banditry. The only business that thrives in Nigeria is stealing the government’s money, banditry and kidnapping — and that’s why your country is not progressing.

“We are owing those who have legitimately worked. And we are negotiating and paying those who have stolen kids. It is a criminal system.

“Lecturers are owed. How do we compensate those who have not contributed anything to the economy? The economy is not productive and that’s why it is failing.

“Nigeria will not succeed if we continue asking bandits to come to a meeting, and we are not calling professors to a meeting. That is why the country is where it is today. May God help Nigeria.”

credit: TheCable

Ngozika Ihuoma, defence witness, on Thursday, indicted the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and its sacked Chairman, Ibrahim Magu, in the ongoing trial of Abdulrasheed Maina, former Chairman, defunct Pension Reformed Task Team (PRTT).

Ihuoma, a management consultant, whose firm, Crincad & Cari Nigeria Ltd, was contracted by the PRTT for consultancy service, also told Justice Okon Abang how a renowned lawyer allegedly acquired a recovered property from the EFCC even while the property was still subject of litigation.

NAN reports that Justice Abang on February 25, 2021, ordered Maina to open his defence in the charge preferred against him by the EFCC after the prosecution closed its case.

Though Maina had intended to apply for a no-case submission, the judge foreclosed his right to make the application on December 21, 2020, ruling that the pension reformed boss had adequate time and facility to make the submission but failed to do so.

The witness, while being led in evidence-in-chief by Maina’s lawyer, Adeola Olawale, said the PRTT wrote to President Muhammadu Buhari on assumption of office in 2015 of its willingness to make available intelligence that would lead to the recovery of N3 trillion hidden in some undisclosed accounts in some banks.

“By January 2016, the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and the National Security Adviser (NSA) met with Maina in Dubai, United Arab Emirate (UAE).

“After the meeting in Dubai, Maina gave the delegation intelligence report that led to the recovery of N1.3 trillion out of the N3 trillion promised to recover.

“The money was reported to the Senate Committee that investigated Maina’s reinstatement back to the civil service in 2017.

“Equally, the task team petitioned the Senate on the need to revisit the 7th Assembly Joint Committee that its report was quashed by the Federal High Court in view of the fact that the 222 choice property valued at N1.63 trillion that was handed over to the EFCC have started being mismanaged.

“One of the property in question located at No 42, Gana Street, Maitama, had been illegally acquired by a renowned lawyer while the property was still subject to litigation,” he said.

EFCC should account for 222 property

He said the EFCC should be made to account for the 222 property, “including the ones that was sold to the lawyer which was grossly under valued from N6 billion in 2011 and sold to him in 2015 at N1 billion.

“We believe that the task team stood by her integrity and accountability, not minding the persecution by the EFCC before this honourable court.”

Ihuoma said when Magu appeared before the House of Representatives Committee that investigated the reinstatement of Maina, the ex-EFCC chair denied that the anti-graft agency was a member of PRTT and that the pension reformed team did not handover any property to the commission.

‘Magu lied on oath’

He said through his company, he petitioned Malami, telling him that Magu lied on oath before the House by denying that the EFCC was not a member of the task team contrary to the instrument establishing the PRTT through a letter from the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation detailing membership of the task team and their terms of reference.

“That led to Malami petitioning Mr President and demanding that EFCC should account for the 222 property valued at 1.63 trillion which eventually led to the setting up of Justice Ayo Salami-led Judicial Commissuon of Inquiry.

“Magu admitted before Salami that he shared and allocated most of these property to most of his friends, associates, colleagues under some presidential directives but failed to make available to the commission the evidence of that presidential directives,” he said.

The witness stated that Maina gave intelligence report to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) of a plan to siphon N35 billion from the Head of Service Pension Office.

He said the commission questioned the former HoS, Mrs Winifred Oyo-Ita and five other management committee members and that the ICPC had its report and were ready to prosecute the matter.

N15 billion mopped up from Customs, Immigration, Prison

He also said that the pension reformed boss in March 2013 gave an intelligence report to the then Minister of Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and EFCC leading to the mop up of N15 billion from Customs, Immigration, Prison Pension Office (CIPO).

Ihuoma said despite that the running cost of the PRTT was not paid, Maina was the only member of the team that was sacked.

He told the court that B. G. kaigama, who served in the team, “remaines till today, a full director and second in command in Pension Transition Arrangement Department (PTAD).

“G.T Idris, who represented ICPC is now at NIPSS undergoing a one year course leading to his promotion to a rank of full commissioner of police.

“Even Winifred Oyo-Ita who managed the Head of Service Pension Office as interim management committee became the Head of Service (HoS) of Federation where she used that office to stop Maina’s reinstatement since 2017,” he said.

The witness added that Ibrahim Larmode, who was a member of the team as chairman of the EFCC, was also promoted to the rank of Assistant Inspector/General of Police (AIG).

“We stand to say that Maina deserves to be reinstated back as approved by the Federal Civil Service Commission in 2017 and if possible, in line with the recommendations of the House of Representatives to the then President Jonathan, be made to return to service and assist in cleaning up the pension matters now that the issue of pension is going haywire again.

“We believe this try is not in the interest of pension reformed task team which EFCC was a member,” he said.
Justice Abang adjourned the matter until March 5 for trial continuation.

NAN reports that Maina (1st defendant) was arraigned before Abang, on Oct. 25, 2019, by the EFCC alongside his firm, Common Input Property and Investment Ltd (2nd defendant).

He, however, pleaded not guilty to the 12-count charge bordering on money laundering to the tune of N2 billion.(NAN)

An activist, F. U. Obalim Esq, has dragged the President, Federal Republic Of Nigeria, Muhammad Buhari to Federal High Court, over lopsided appointments of Directors of the NNPC Group in breach of Federal Character Spread and unlawful arrogation to self the powers of the Minister of Petroleum.

In the summon available to TheNigerialawyer, Attorney General Of The Federation, Federal Character Commission, President Of The Senate, Speaker Of The House Of Representatives And The Clerk Of The National Assembly, are also the Respondents in the suit.

This is contained in a suit instituted vide an originating summons marked FHC/ABJ/CS/242/2021 sought for the interpretation of the following questions of law namely:

 Whether by the Combined reading of Section 147 (1), (2), (3); Section 148 (1)(a),(b),(c), Section 151(1),(2),(3); Section 14(2)(c), (3); Section 67 (1), (2) of the Constitution, Section 19 of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act and Article 13(2) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act envisioned the self- appointment and employment by 1st Defendant into a subordinate office under his control that requires an independent, separate and conflicting Constitutional roles and Personae in a manner as to convey to himself an undue advantage as a public officer and whether as the 1st Defendant acceptance of the role of subordinate position appointee reserved for other Nigerians for the President’s supervision, advise and control other Nigerians have not being deprived of the right of participation in the government of their country.

 If Question (A) above is answered in the negative: whether by the appointment and the acceptance of latter Public Office position, the 1st Defendant has not abdicated or vacated his former position as the President for a lower Ministerial role.

 Whether the combined provisions of Sections 14(3), 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 4(1)(b),(c), (f), (g) and (h) of the Federal Character Commission Act compels the compliance of the Federal Character Principle in all Public Office appointments and Confirmations including into the 2nd Defendant’s in a manner devoid of preponderance of a section of the country to the disadvantage of another section.

 Whether Sections 4(1)(a), (d)(i),(ii), 4(1)(e), 4(1)(j), 4(1)(h) of the Federal Character Commission Act that introduced executive wide discretions in the implementation of the 3rd Defendant’s positions and opinions on Federal Character provisions is not in conflict with constitutional provisions in Sections 1(3), 14(3), 42, 153(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Article 8 (1)(a),(b) and (c) of Part I of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that mandates all arms and tiers of government to enforce the Federal Character principle in all appointments.

 If Question (D) is answered in the affirmative: whether Sections 4(1)(a), (d)(i), (ii), 4(1)(e), 4(1)(j), 4(1)(h) of the Federal Character Commission Act can be allowed to override the provisions of the grund-norm, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and not liable to be struck down.

The Plaintiff claims against the Defendants jointly and/or severally as follows:

 DECLARATION that the President Federal Republic of Nigeria self- appointment as Minister of Petroleum and the subsequent ratification and confirmation by the 3rd Defendant is ultra vires, illegal, null and void and acceptance of subsequent public office as a Minister operates as vacation and abdication of its earlier Public office as the President of the Federation from the date of assumption of duties as a Minister.

 DECLARATION that all appointments by the 1st Defendant and subsequent confirmation by the 3rd Defendant into every office, inclusive of the 20 Principal Officers of 2nd Defendant should reflect Constitutional Federal Character Spread.

 DECLARATION of the Court that the 3rd Defendant is Constitutionally obligated to issue binding opinions to all Ministries, Department and Agencies of government including the 1st and 2nd Defendants on all issues of appointments and employments.

 DECLARATION that the provisions of Sections 4(1)(a), (d)(i),(ii), 4(1)(e), 4(1)(j), 4(1)(h) of the Federal Character Commission Act which sought to limit the powers of the 4th Defendant under the Constitution, vide Sections 14(3), 153(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Article 8 (1)(a),(b) and (c) of Part I of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is inconsistent, null and void and liable to be struck down.

 ORDER OF THE HONORABLE COURT striking down the portions of the provisions of Sections 4(1)(a), (d)(i),(ii), 4(1)(e), 4(1)(j), 4(1)(h) of the Federal Character Commission Act that introduced delimiting discretion of the 1st Defendant in the exercise and execution of the Constitutional duties of the 4th Defendant.

 ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE COURT setting aside the 1st Defendant’s Appointment of 20 Principal Officers for failure of the appointments to cumulatively reflect the Federal Character Principle and Ordering an immediate re-shuffle in accordance with the Federal Character requirement forthwith.

 AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION mandating the 1st and 2nd Defendants to always request and be bound by the opinion of the 3rd Defendant on the Federal Character requirements for all appointments and employments for the Federation.

 AN ORDER OF the court mandating the office of the 2nd Defendant to enforce the judgment of the court forthwith upon delivery of the judgment.

In the affidavit he deposed to, the Plaintiff himself alleged that the President has continued to act in disregard for the laws of the country since his assumption of office in ensuring an inbalanced favored appointment of the Northerners over the Southerners especially in the National Oil Company and after the unfair distribution, retains the remaining appointment to himself, also a Northerner. He said the court has a duty to call the Defendants to order in order not to allow a Precedent of Presidents flouting their oaths of office to obey the constitution. He asserted that powers of the Federal Character Commission under the Constitution to serve as appointment and employment spread watch- dog was intentionally and unlawfully purportedly whittled down by the National Assembly and reduced to an appendage of the executive taking orders and directives from the President without no true independence for that institution.

The Suit filed on the 3rd of March, 2021 is yet to be assigned to any court.

Credit:thenigerialawyer

His Lordship, Hon. Justice Elizabeth Oji of the National Industrial Court Lagos Judicial division has dismissed the case filed by Mr. Oyegbanren Ete and 2 others on behalf of Petroleum And Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria Chevron Branch against Chevron Nigeria Limited over alleged redundancy for being pre-mature.

Justice Oji held that Chevron needs no approval from the Minister of Petroleum Resources before embarking on staff reduction or redundancy.

The Court further held that Oyegbanren Ete and others have not established that the Oil firm has breached the provisions of the Petroleum Minister Guidelines and have not tendered any document indicating that the firm has identified or communicated names of persons to be declared redundant to crystallize the application of the Guidelines.

From facts, the claimant- Oyegbanren Ete and others had submitted that sometime in October 2020 the firm decided to sack 25% of staff from the workforce without compliance with the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and Guideline issued by the minister of petroleum that based on the industrial action embarked upon, the firm was compelled to suspend the implementation of the decision to reduce the workforce; and also that the company has to ensure that the written approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources is first obtained before embarking on any staff reduction exercise as required by law.

In defence, the firm asserted that it is not bound by the Guidelines for the Release of Staff in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry that it informed the DPR of its intention to commence a reorganization that the approval of the Minister under the Guidelines is only to be sought when the workers to be made redundant have been identified; and that the workers to be declared redundant had and have not yet been identified urged the Court to dismiss the case for lacking merit.

Delivering the Judgment, the presiding Judge, Justice Elizabeth Oji held that in a contract of employment, parties are bound by the agreement and the Court may not introduce any term or condition not agreed by the parties.

“In this case where parties have agreed on contractual terms, I have not found the legal justification to allow the Minister or his designate, to modify the terms by means of Directives, Circulars, Guidelines, and similar instruments.

“From the reproduced section 9 of the Substantive Act, the Petroleum Act, there is no provision enabling the Minister, or the Director on his behalf to make the provisions stated in these Guidelines.

“Based on all the reasons given above, I resolve the question submitted by the Claimant against the Claimant and hold that by virtue of the Guidelines for the Release of the Staff in the Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry 2019, the Defendant OUGHT NOT to obtain the written approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources before embarking on any staff reduction and or redundancy.

Credit:thenigerialawyer

February was a bad day. The Supreme Court threw a spanner in the works.

Rachel Rothwell

The court was ruling in a long-running legal battle between cab-hailing app Uber and two test claimants, with more claims waiting in the wings. Uber had asserted that its drivers, who could log on to the app as much or as little as they liked, were independent contractors working for themselves. The contracts carefully drawn up by Uber were between the drivers and the passengers, with Uber acting as booking agent.

But the Supreme Court was not having it. In a unanimous decision, it concluded that in real terms, factors such as the degree of control that Uber exercised over drivers, price-setting by Uber, and the way the firm used customer ratings to manage drivers’ performance, amounted to the drivers being afforded worker status. That meant they were entitled to rights such as the minimum wage and holiday pay.

For a while now, the courts have been edging towards an approach that pays more attention to what is happening on the ground than what the contract says, most notably in the 2011 decision in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41. But now the Supreme Court has gone much further.

Giving the sole judgment in this unanimous decision of seven justices, Lord Leggatt spelt out a position that will have made employment contract lawyers’ eyes pop. In cases such as this, involving employment legislation designed to protect vulnerable workers, the ‘starting point’ is not the contract itself. Instead, the courts will begin by looking at the purpose of the relevant employment law, and see if the reality of their situation means that they should be protected by that legislation. The painstakingly crafted contract will no longer be centre stage. As Leggatt said: ‘It is the very fact that an employer is often in a position to dictate such contract terms and that the individual performing the work has little or no ability to influence those terms that gives rise to the need for statutory protection in the first place.’

Leigh Day’s Nigel Mackay, who acted for the claimants in Uber, describes the ruling as ‘hugely significant’. He explains: ‘Uber really developed that part of its argument as the case went on, that you start from the written contract; and if there’s nothing inconsistent [with the legislation] in that, then the contract is king… The real significance is that the Supreme Court has now confirmed that this black letter law approach doesn’t apply when you’re talking about statutory rights.’

Mishcon de Reya partner Will Winch says: ‘This is a huge change, and it’s opened the door to getting through a problem that people having been trying to solve for years. There have been all sorts of discussions on whether there should be a new statutory definition of worker, and whether that would work; and whether the law was sufficient to protect people in the gig economy. Now this has taken a wall off the way that people will look at the problem, and we can see it from a whole new angle. It has opened things up enormously.’

At present, gig economy contracts will often include artificial provisions specifically inserted to defeat any potential claim to worker status. A classic example is a ‘substitution clause’ to suggest that the person named in the contract is free to send someone else to do the work instead, even though in practice this would never happen. Other more imaginative options include clauses for the hire of tools from the company, to imply non-worker status. But what will the Uber ruling mean for these contracts in future?

‘There’s no point now drafting contracts that you know will have little relation to the reality of the relationship. Why bother?’ says Sean Jones QC, employment barrister at 11KBW. ‘If someone comes to you and says, please tinker with this contract to make sure there is no worker status; as a lawyer, you would now have to ask, is it worth it?’ He adds: ‘Tribunals will likely find it freeing… Uber does not give a bright line rule, but it tells you the tone and the approach that you should take, starting with “reality first”.’

The ruling could have a sweeping effect across the wider gig economy, particularly for businesses using the increasingly popular ‘platform’ model. Mackay says: ‘Any kind of business that is providing a platform that people are working through will be looking at this to see if they are an employer. You see this model in all kinds of sectors now – handymen, childcare, rubbish collection, cleaning.’

What factors will point towards worker status? ‘It’s about whether everything is closely controlled by the platform; if it controls how you contact the customers and how you do the work, and sets the price,’ explains Mackay. ‘Subordination is another big issue. If you’re effectively being managed in how you do the work, for example in Uber’s case through a ratings system, that’s one of the key things in a subordinate relationship.’

These factors are part of a fiendishly difficult balancing act that lies at the very heart of the gig economy. As Jones puts it: ‘The brand is everything. To preserve it, you need control. The more control you have, the more likely it is that people will be found to be workers. That is the central problem for the gig economy.

‘Companies have never been able to find that sweet spot with enough control, but without conferring worker status. It may just be that there isn’t a sweet spot; you can’t run a business like that without engaging workers. That might be a conclusion that many such companies may now be facing.’

As for Uber, it insists that the ruling will affect only a ‘small’ number of drivers and says it has made ‘significant’ changes to its business, meaning that ‘many of the examples called out in the judgment are no longer relevant’.

Rachel Rothwell is editor of Gazette sister magazine Litigation Funding magazine, providing in-depth coverage on costs and the financing of litigation.

Credit:Lawgazette

The government’s chief legal adviser has made history by becoming the UK’s first cabinet minister to take maternity leave whilst in office.

Attorney general Suella Braverman MP announced on Twitter that she was starting her maternity leave and will become the first ‘minister on leave’. The government quickly rushed through the Ministerial and other Maternity Allowances Act 2021 to allow Braverman to take maternity leave, otherwise she would likely have had to resign.

Braverman said: ‘This is a landmark moment for the UK government and I hope it sends the message to young women who are interested in pursuing a career in politics that having a young family isn’t out of bounds to them if they wish to work in senior roles. ‘

Braverman said she looked forward to returning in the autumn.

Solicitor general Michael Ellis QC MP will take over as attorney general while Braverman is on leave. He said: ‘I look forward to working with the many excellent lawyers and officials to play my part in making law and politics work together at the heart of the UK constitution. I wish Suella well on her maternity leave.’

Justice minister Lucy Frazer QC MP has been appointed solicitor general – a role she served in 2019, from 9 May to 25 July. Frazer’s photo no longer appears in the ministerial line-up on the Ministry of Justice’s website. The MoJ said there was no update on who will take over her prisons brief.(Law Gazette)

By Chizurum Emmanuel

The jurisprudential discussion surrounding the provisions of Section 34 (6) of the newly amended Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as AMCON) (Amendment No 2) Act, 2019 and its interpretation when juxtaposed withSection 6 (a) (b) and 1 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as CFRN) is causing a legal dilemma to practicing lawyers and legal scholars alike.

In a bid to better understand thisconstitutional conundrum, a look at the conflicting provisionsis necessary.

Section 34 (6) of the AMCON Act provides that;

“No injunction, preservative or restorative order, interim, interlocutory, perpetual or like order described shall be granted against the Corporation or its Director or officers in any action, suit or proceedings in relation to the exercise or intended exercise of power by the Corporation under this Act to recover debt owed to the Corporation or otherwise realize an eligible ban asset or any asset or property by which such eligible bank asset is

securedand in particular under subsection 1 (a) and Section 39 of this Act and the remedy  

of any claimant against the Corporation in any such action, suit or proceeding is limited to monetary compensation”.

Section 6 of the CFRN provides;

(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section-

• Shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law;
• Shall extend, to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any persons in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.

While Section 1 (3) of the CFRN provides that;

“if any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of its inconsistency be void”.

AMCON as a statutory corporation established to resolve non-performing loan assets of banks in Nigeria ideally requires an enormous amount of statutory help if they are to successfully perform the duties for which they were established. This does not however accord AMCON the luxury of granting themselves special privileges, especially one that offends the supreme law of the land. In AMADI V NNPC^[1], KARIBIWHYTE, J.S.C held that;

“In my opinion, a legitimate regulation of access to Courts should not be directed at impeding ready access to Courts. There is no provision in the Constitution for special privileges to any class or category of persons. Any Statutory provision aimed at the protection of any class of persons from the exercise of the Court or its constitutional jurisdiction to determine the right of another citizen seems to me inconsistent with the provision of Section 6(a) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”

Deducing from Section 34 (6), AMCON aims to grant its officer’s and agents acting on its behalf immunity from injunctions of the court in the course of the performance of their duties, while this may seem harmless considering the overall duties of AMCON and the obstacles encountered recovering debts, the dangerous undertones are limitless.

The CFRN has via Section 6(6) empowered the Courts with the power to grant injunctions where a reasonable case for them is made. Interpreting the provisions of this section, ADEKEYE J.S.C in the case of SHAABAN & ANOR V. SAMBO & ORS^[2] opined thus;

“In describing the scope and extent of jurisdiction of court under section 6 (6) a – b of the 1999 Constitution, it has to be explained that the judicial powers vested in the courts in accordance with this section shall extend not withstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law. In effect, the inherent powers extend to and can be expressed over all matters between government, or authority and citizens of Nigeria in all actions and proceedings relating to the determination of any questions as to the civil rights and obligations of anyone.” 

Any Statute (AMCON Act) attempting to regulate, obliterate, undermine or limit the judicial authority of the Court and by extension the Constitution is of itself a violation of S.1 (3) of the CFRN.

Section 1(1) of the CFRN emphasizing the supremacy of the constitution needs not be expounded on as it has already received judicial blessing in ABACHA & ORS V. FAWEHINMI^[3] where the court unequivocally affirmed that the supremacy of the Constitution has never been called to question under ordinary circumstances.

Delving deeper, in providing a pre-emptive solution for an envisaged problem, Section 1(3) of the CFRN has been crystal clear about any dispute arising between the CFRN and any other form of Legislation. In SARAKI V. FRN^[4] the Supreme Court held that;

“The time honored principle of law is that wherever and whenever the Constitution             speaks any provision of an Act/Statute on the same subject matter, must remain silent”  

See also CHEVRON (NIG) LTD V. IMO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS^[5][6] where AGUBE, J.C.A held that;

“…Section 1(3) provides in absolute and express terms that if any other law is       inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail          and that other law shall to the extent of its inconsistency, be void”

Of utmost importance is the fact that the AMCON Act is a subsidiary legislationderiving its legitimacy from the constitution and as such cannot supersede any of the provision(s) contained in its originating document, See the case of FAMFA OIL LIMITED V. A.G FEDERATION & ANOR⁶where Abdullahi JCA held that;

“It is the law that subsidiary legislations must conform with the principal law        which provided the source of their existence”

The Court of Appeal in putting to bed this debate in the very recent case of; AMCON V. MR. ADEBAYO MUMINI SHITTU &ORS^[7], MONICA B. DONGBAN-MENSEM JCA, upholding the judgment of the lower court held that;

“The provision of Section 34(6) of the AMCON Act seeks to curtail the discretion                  of the court and also seeks to curtail the rights of citizens to seek redress or       help from the Court. This is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution           and is therefore declared null and void to the extent of its inconsistency”

In addressing the obnoxious provisions of Section 34(6) of the Amcon Act, the Court of Appeal found credence in the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, per Karibi Whyte JSC (OBM) in the case of AMADI v. NNPC (2000) LPELR-445 (SC) where the Apex Court held as follows:

“  In my opinion a legitimate regulation of access to courts should not be directed at impeding ready access to the Courts.  There is no provision in

the constitution for special privileges to any class or category of persons. Any statutory provision aimed at the protection of any class of persons from the exercise of the court of its constitutional jurisdiction to determine the right of another citizen seems to me inconsistent with the provision of Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution.”

Underlining mine for Emphasis

While AMCON may have enacted such provision without prejudice to the Constitution, the abuse of same would be inevitable and would occasion harm on the common man that damages would not remedy. The Supremacy of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria must be upheld across the board, and if AMCON were allowed to circumvent said supremacy with an obnoxious section in their incorporation Act, nothing precludes other statutory corporations from attaining demigod status, above reproach from the law and beyond the reach of the arm of justice. Drastic consequences abound if this section receives judicial blessing.

Chizurum Emmanuel is a 200 Level Student of the University of Calabar and is currently an intern with Pistis Partners LLP

[1] (2000)LPELR-445 (SC)

[2] (2010)LPELR-3032 (SC)

[3] (2000) LPELR-14(SC)

[4] (2016)LPELR-40013(SC)

[5] (2016)LPELR-41563(CA)

[6] LPELR-9023(CA)

[7] CA/L/1266/2019