By Sylvester Udemezue
Memory Verse:
“A law without enforcement is not worth the paper it is written on.”
~ Hon. Justice Kayode Eso
A. Introduction
Please see the article titled: “Adodo’s Alarm Over Governor Aiyedatiwa’s Alleged Disrespect For The Constitution And The Imperative Of Legal Impregnability As A Necessary Condition For Effective Governance In Nigeria” By Sylvester Udemezue (published on 19 May 2025). Nigeria is not short of laws, policies, or reform programs. The real challenge lies in their effectiveness, more precisely, their enforceability. Time and again, well-intentioned legal reforms have faltered due to a lack of embedded mechanisms that ensure compliance. As Justice Kayode Eso aptly stated, laws without enforcement are mere paper declarations. This article examines the difference between cosmetic reforms and impregnable legal transformations. It draws on two case studies to illustrate how the absence of enforcement structures renders even constitutional provisions impotent.
B. Case Study One: Ministerial Appointments and the Illusion of Reform:
In 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari appointed his cabinet more than six months after taking office. In response, the Constitution was amended through the Fifth Alteration to insert Section 147(7), mandating the President to appoint at least one Minister from each state within sixty days of taking the oath of office.² While this seemed a step forward, the provision was flawed from inception. It lacks any penalty or consequence for noncompliance. As such, it fails the test of enforceability and self-execution.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu also failed to fully comply with the timeline in 2023, without consequence, proving the provision to be effectively toothless. In Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar, the Supreme Court affirmed that constitutional obligations bind the President.³ Yet, in the absence of self-executing consequences, such provisions are mere suggestions. Contrast this with Section 285(6) of the Constitution, which mandates election tribunals to deliver judgment within 180 days of filing a petition.⁴ In ANPP v. Goni, the Supreme Court held that tribunals automatically lose jurisdiction once the deadline lapses, regardless of the stage of proceedings.⁵ That is what a self-executing, impregnable provision looks like.
C. Proposed Amendment Framework:
To transform Section 147 into an effective tool, the following hypothetical reforms are proposed:
- Failure to nominate ministers within 30 days results in automatic vacation of office by the President.
- The Vice President must then act, and similarly comply or face automatic removal.
- A cascading enforcement structure would activate the Senate President and then the Speaker to act, with strict timelines and consequences.
- Any refusal to vacate upon breach should be deemed treasonable felony.
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D. AN ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT:
Section 147A: Mandatory Timelines and Consequences for Ministerial Appointments and Succession:
(1). The President shall, within thirty (30) days of taking the oath of office, nominate at least one (1) person from each of the thirty-six (36) States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) for appointment as Minister.
Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the President from subsequently replacing or appointing additional Ministers.
(2) Where the President fails to comply with subsection (1) of this section within the stipulated thirty (30) days, the President shall:
(a) Automatically forfeit the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and
(b) Be deemed to have committed a treasonable felony if he fails to vacate office forthwith; and
(c) Be immediately liable to arrest and prosecution, such immunity as may have applied to the office having ceased to exist.
(3). Upon the occurrence of a vacancy under subsection (2), the Vice President shall:
(a) Be sworn in immediately as President;
(b) Within seven (7) days, nominate a person for appointment as Vice President in accordance with the law; and
(c) Within twenty (20) days of assuming office, comply fully with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section:
Provided that failure to comply with the provisions of paragraph (c) above shall result in the automatic forfeiture of the office of the President, and such person shall be deemed guilty of treasonable felony and liable to immediate arrest and prosecution.
(4). Where both the President and Vice President fail to comply with the provisions of subsections (1) and (3) of this section, the President of the Senate shall assume office as Acting President and shall conduct fresh presidential elections within five (5) months of assuming office.
(5). Where the Senate President fails to act as required under subsection (4), the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall assume office as Acting President and shall conduct fresh presidential elections within four (4) months of assuming office.
(6). Any President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives who fails to comply with subsections (4) or (5) of this section, respectively, shall automatically forfeit his seat in the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be.
Provided that failure to vacate such office shall constitute a treasonable felony.
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Though harsh, these measures and draft provisions match the harsh realities of governance in Nigeria. Only strict, self-enforcing laws can survive the nation’s political culture.
E. Case Study Two: Legal Practitioners’ Remuneration Order, 2023:
The Legal Practitioners (Remuneration for Business, Legal Services and Representation) Order, 2023, issued under Section 15(3) of the Legal Practitioners Act⁶, was designed to standardize lawyers’ fees. However, like Section 147(7), it suffers from a fatal defect: lack of enforcement. Although noncompliance constitutes professional misconduct, enforcement is almost non-existent. The NBA has attempted decentralised enforcement through its branches, but without statutory backing, such efforts lack traction. In NBA v. Kehinde, the LPDC process highlighted the ineffectiveness and sluggishness of disciplinary mechanisms.⁷ A more viable solution would have been to impose enforceable consequences such as barring the acceptance of legal work by courts, ministries, or regulatory agencies without proof of compliance; e.g., a bank certificate confirming adherence to fee standards. But this was ignored. Why? As Prof. Yemi Osinbajo observed, Nigerian lawmakers often legislate without regard to behavioural realism or enforcement.⁸ The result: legal mockery.
F. Why Self-Executing Laws Matter
Political scientist Richard Joseph describes Nigeria’s governance as “prebendal politics”: where patronage trumps rules.⁹ In such a system, only rules with automatic triggers and rigid enforcement mechanisms can work. The legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, “where there is a right, there must be a remedy”, captures this philosophy. A right without a means of enforcement is no right at all.¹⁰ Lord Denning famously held that “you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand”.¹¹ Likewise, you cannot build reforms on weak or unenforceable laws and expect societal transformation. Prof. Ben Nwabueze concludes this line of thought succinctly: “Constitutionalism means limited government under a supreme law, and this is meaningful only if there are legal means of securing compliance with constitutional limits”.¹²
G. Conclusion
Laws and reforms are not ends in themselves. Their value lies in their enforceability. Nigeria must stop enacting aspirational or idealistic provisions devoid of self-executing force. The nation needs legal instruments that compel obedience and punish breach, in real time. Weak laws are as good as no laws. Nigeria’s legal reform efforts must begin and end with this understanding: Only impregnable, self-enforcing reforms will deliver real system change.
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To be continued.
Respectfully,
§¢µð𝓮̂𝓶𝓮̂𝔃µ𝓮̂
Sylvester Udemezue (udems),
Legal Practitioner, Law Teacher, and the Proctor of The Reality Ministry of Truth, Law and Justice [A Public Interest Law Advocacy Group]
08021365545.
[email protected]
(18 May 2025)
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Endnotes :
- Hon. Justice Kayode Eso, cited in multiple Nigerian jurisprudential essays.
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 147(7).
- Attorney-General of the Federation v Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt 1041) 1.
- CFRN 1999, s 285(6).
- ANPP v Goni (2012) 7 NWLR (Pt 1298) 147; see also PDP v INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt 1437) 525.
- Legal Practitioners Act, Cap L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, s 15(3).
- NBA v Kehinde (2022) LPELR-57124 (LPDC).
- Yemi Osinbajo, comments at legal reform fora (as Vice President of Nigeria).
- Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (Cambridge University Press 1991).
- See Akinlade v INEC (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt 1448) 373.
The views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Law & Society Magazine.
