By Emmanuel Jonathan
Introduction
In the previous limb of the article, we had considered the entrenched timelines allowed for when an aggrieved entity can bring a petition in an election matter, the length of time allowed by the constitution for the conducting and conclusion of the election petition proceedings. We had also considered the available election petition tribunals and court, the grounds for an election petition, the qualifications of candidates for the various electoral offices in the country and then a conspicuous review of the election petition procedure particularly the pre-hearing procedure and the pre-hearing sessions and scheduling.
In this concluding part of the article, we will focus on the hearing procedure, the standards of proof, a review of the US jurisdiction election petition system, pertinent suggestions and recommendations which could revolutionize our election petition system. Such in-depth discussion will feature suggestions for a review of the immutability of the 180 days’ span, the need to reconsider the heavy standard of proofing allegations of crime in an election petition beyond reasonable doubt, the need to reconsider the cost implications and other pertinent recommendations.
Hearing in the petition
As seen in the previous part of this article, once the pre-hearing session has been concluded, the parties are then free to prove their respective cases within a 14 days’ span each. The conduit through which this is achieved is the hearing session in the election petition. Due to the greater percentage of meticulously settled matters at the pre-hearing stage, hearing is often seamless with witnesses merely adopting their filed Witnesses statements on oath, tendering of documents and cross-examinations.
By virtue of Paragraph 19 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, every election petition shall be heard and determined in an open Tribunal or Court. At least 5 (five) days before the hearing commences, the notice of the time, date and place of the hearing is sent to the parties and the INEC as the case may be.
Paragraph 20 (2) mandates that the place of hearing –the Tribunal or the Court shall have due regard to the proximity to and accessibility from the place where the election was held. Going further, by virtue of Paragraph 25, hearing in election petition operate from day to day. If at the hearing date or subsequently adjourned dates, the tribunal chairman or presiding Justice of the Court does not arrive, the petition shall be adjourned to the next day and so on. Hearing may be had on a Saturday or a public holiday. During the raging days of the COVID 19 lock down, a Governorship election petition tribunal was in full gear.
Once the parties have finished leading their witnesses to adopt their witness’ statement on oath, and the other side (respectively as many as they are) have cross examined where it/they intend to, the party beginning is allowed the liberty to re-examine his witness to clarify seeming contradictions but is prohibited from introducing fresh issues during re-examination.
Once all the witnesses have been heard, the Tribunal will ask parties to file their written addresses.
It is pertinent to note that where at the hearing of the petition either parties fail to appear, the tribunal is empowered by virtue of Paragraph 46 (1) to strike out the petition and same shall not be re-listed. Where the petitioner fails to appear at the hearing, the respondent is entitled to judgment striking out the petition. On the other hand, where the Petitioner appears but the Respondent does not appear, the Petitioner is allowed to prove his petition as far as the burden lies on him after which the tribunal/court shall enter a final judgement. However, where both parties or any of the parties’ failure to appear is inadvertent or due to circumstances beyond their control, the tribunal is inclined to adjourn the petition. However, where no good reasons can be shown for absence of parties, the tribunal shall strike out the matter and such striking out is final. It has to be mentioned that any serious party to a petition who will not be able to attend the hearing can send a formal letter seeking a brief adjournment. But the key point to be bore in mind is that if the Tribunal or Court as the case may be strike out the petition for failure of parties to attend, such striking out is final and the petition cannot be relisted. See Paragraph 46 (1) – (3).
By virtue of sub paragraph 5, a party is demanded to close his case once the party has finished adducing his evidence. A very interesting provision is in sub paragraph 6 which saddles the tribunal with the power to close any party who is taking too long to conclude his case. An election petition attorney, apart from having the 180 days’ benchmark in his mind must always be conscious of the 14 days’ window in all he does.
Sub paragraph 7 provides that the secretary is to take charge of every document entered as exhibits and assign each a label. However, in practice, it is the tribunal chairman who label the exhibits more or less like the regular trial judge.
Paragraph 46 (10) states that the parties after they have closed their cases respectively shall then file written addresses.
The pattern of filing and serving written addresses is as follows: Where the respondent did not file any defence, the Petitioner shall within 10 days after the close of his evidence file a written address. Upon being served with the written address, the other party (the respondent) shall within 7 days file his own written address. By virtue of sub paragraph 11, where the other party (the Respondent) calls evidence, that party shall within 10 days of the close of evidence file a written address. Then the Petitioner shall file his own written address within 7 days of the receipt of the Respondent’s Written Address. In both scenario, the party who first filed his written address is entitled to a reply on points of law within 5 days after the service of the other party’s written address.
By virtue of paragraph 47 (2) Motions are allowed in a petition. A combined reading of 47 (3), (4) and (5) show that a party may make any application and that such application has to be via the mechanism of a motion. The motion must be supported by a written address and an affidavit. The receiving party is entitled to file and serve a counter affidavit and a written address within 7 days of the receipt of the motion where he intends to oppose the application. The Applicant is then allowed a 3 days’ window wherein he may introduce a further affidavit and a reply on points of law. However, it will be recalled that in the previous limb of this article it had been categorically stated that all motions in a petition can only be taken at the pre-trial and scheduling stage (refer to Paragraph 47 (1)).
However, the drafters of the Act in their wisdom, foreseeing instances where there may be need for further applications down the lane when the hearing may have commenced, inserted a saving provision. By virtue of Paragraph 47 (1) any other motion coming up after the pre-hearing stage must be preceded by an independent application for leave to the tribunal or court for that application. However, this application must be urgent and in “extreme circumstances.” Therefore, it is important for an election petition attorney to foresee and as much as possible settle all applications and interlocutory matters during the pre-hearing stage so as not to leave the fate of his application in the hands of the tribunal or the court.
When the parties have filed all their written addresses and corresponding reply and closed their cases completely, the platform will then be set for judgement.
It is important to note that all in all, the parties are delimited to specific timelines in proving their respective cases. By virtue of paragraph 41 (10), the Petitioner is allowed only 14 (fourteen) days at most to prove his case while the Respondent is allowed not more than 10 days. Recall that the tribunal is by virtue of Paragraph 46 (6) empowered to close any party whose case is taking too long to close. However, it will seem that this power of the tribunal cannot be exercised where a party has not exhausted his apportioned timespan.
Judgement in Election Petition
Section 285 (6) CFRN provides that an election petition tribunal/court shall (mandatorily) deliver its judgement in writing within 180 days from the filing of the petition.
The question then arises: what happens where the tribunal fails to deliver judgement within the 180 days’ timespan? Does the petition become void and nonexistent? Is there no hope for the petitioner? does he become a double loser?
The sacrosanct provision of section 285 (6) CFRN is couched in mandatory terms and admits of neither variance nor interpretation. This automatically means that where the petition tribunal is out of time, the whole petition, steps and procedures taken in the proceedings would have been a total waste of time. The CFRN did not provide for any saving grace by way of extension, equitable remediation or sanction on the tribunal panelists as way of incentive to deter any laxity.
Before the present researcher make his pertinent recommendations, it is necessary to briefly analyze the judicial body language of the highest court of the land and the Court of Appeal in this regard. Perhaps therein may be distilled a glimmer of hope or otherwise from judicial interpretations of that section 285 (6) CFRN.
The Court of Appeal in the case of Labour Party v. INEC & Ors (2012) LPELR-7901 (CA) held per John Inyang Okoro JCA that, “…the above constitutional provision, in my opinion is very clear and unambiguous. It is to the effect that from the date an election petition is filed, the tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days, no more, no less. This means that after 180 days, the said Tribunal no longer has jurisdiction to do anything in the petition.” (pp. 13 -14 Paras A – B).
In that same case of Labour Party v. INEC & Ors (which the present researcher highly recommends for further reading), the court went further to place reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision of ANPP v. Goni & 4 Ors (Unreported) Suit Nos: SC. 1/2021 and SC. 2/2012 delivered on February 17, 2012 where the Supreme Court had held that,
“…the above provision is very clear and unambiguous and therefore needs no construction or interpretation. The law is settled that in a situation such as this, the duty of the court is to apply the provision as it exists, that is, to give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. The above being the law, it follows that an election tribunal in an election petition matter must deliver its decision/judgement/ruling/order in writing within one hundred and eighty (180) days from the date the petition was filed. It means the judgement cannot be given a day or more, even an hour after the one hundred and eighty (180) days from the date the petition was filed. Until the National Assembly amends Section 285 (6) of the CFRN any petition which is not determined within the 180 days from the date of filing lapses and so is this one.”
From the foregoing pronouncement of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, though sad in reality, the law is trite that upon the lapse of the 180 (One hundred and eighty) days from the date of the filing of the petition, the tribunal/Court will become like the Biblical Pontus Pilate whose jurisdiction terminated when he washed his hands.
This provision which quite interestingly is novel should be immediately reviewed and amended at the next possible date. The present researcher is of the suggestion that the National Assembly in amending this rather draconian and common law like provision should borrow a leaf from Section 293 (5) CFRN. That section provides as follows:
“The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
Subsection 1, referred to above provides: “all judgement in a suit (for the purpose of the above section) must be delivered within 90 days of the conclusion of evidence and final addresses.”
The two points extractable and highly recommended from the above section 293 (5) CFRN which is hereby recommended for adoption to substitute Section 285 (6) CFRN above are:
First, while it should be clearly stated that an election petition tribunal/court must deliver judgement within the 180 days’ span, however, the failure to deliver within the 180 days’ span should not be a ground to vitiate the entire proceedings.
Secondly, the provision should be allowed for an appeal process to consider the rightness or wrongness or justice or otherwise of allowing an election petition tribunal to exceed the 180 days’ span especially where the complainant suffered some form of miscarriage of justice.
Where the present section 285 (6) CFRN is amended to intertwine the above mentioned recommendations, it will help greatly in not just giving the petitioner a salient peace of mind but will also give the tribunal the needed latitude of time to consider all the usually voluminous bundle of evidence without the trepidation of being helpless at the expiration of the 180 days’ mark.
Having mentioned the above with the intent that someday, the above recommendation will become a reality, the article will turn to the next thorny issue of standard of proof in an election petition.
Before discussing the various standards of proof in an election petition, it is important to mention that judgment in an election petition does not end the procedure. Usually, immediately after the ruling or judgement, the Tribunal or Court must certify the result to the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) or the INEC. Paragraph 28 (2) further states that if the Tribunal or court has determined that the election is invalid, then subject to section 140 of the Act, where there is an appeal and the appeal fails, a new election must be held by the commission (INEC) and such election must be conducted within three months of the date of the determination of the petition.
Therefore, it can be validly stated that an election petition tribunal’s task per se comes to an end either at the determination of the appeal at the Supreme Court (as is usually the case) or the ruling for fresh elections to be conducted and within three months there is no appeal of such ruling. Whichever way it goes, usually there is always a winner at the tribunal/court and a loser. However once the Supreme Court has pronounced on the decision of the tribunal/Court, the petition becomes a matter per rem judicata estoppel. It will be recalled that recently an attempt to resuscitate a settled petition at the Supreme Court was met with intense reproofs and costs.
Standards of proof in election petition
Ordinarily, an election petition is a predominantly civil suit. This means that the standard of proof, by virtue of Section 134 of the Evidence Act is proof on balance of probabilities. However, in an election petition, any ground of the petition alleging a criminal offence shall be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act provides: “If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceedings civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
The courts at various instances have given life to this provision. In Ikpeazu v. Otti & Ors (2016) LPELR-40055 (SC), the Honourable Justice Suleiman Galadima (JSC) at pp. 16 – 17 Paras A-B held,
“…the law has not changed. Where in an election petition, the petitioner makes an allegation of a crime against the Respondent, and he makes the commission of the crime the basis of his petition, Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 imposes strict burden on the said petitioner to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. If he fails to discharge the burden, his petition fails.”
The Supreme Court in that case placed reliance, in arriving at the above principle on the cases of Okechukwo v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (pt. 1436) 255; Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCN at P. 29, 1984 1 SC Reprint.
Similarly, in the case of Abubakar & Ors v. Yar’Adua & Ors (2008) LPELR-51 (SC), the Honourable Justice Niki Tobi JSC (pp. 174 – 174 Pars. A –B) held that
“…the law I know is that where a crime is alleged in an election petition, the petitioner must prove it beyond reasonable doubt.”
In Buhari & Anor v. Obasanjo & Ors (2005) LPELR -815 (SC), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the same principle and again in the 2016 petition of Emmanuel v. Umana & Ors (2016) LPELR -40037 (SC) as well as Nyesom v. Peterside & Ors (2016) LPELR -40036 (SC).
From the above, it is crystal clear that for all times material and going forward, unless a critical review of section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act is embarked upon by the National Assembly, the Supreme Court will always pursue the rock of Gibraltar approach in the interpretation of Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
Having established the above requirement of standard in proofing allegations of crime in an election petition beyond reasonable doubt, the question then arises, is it really possible to proof allegations of crime in election petitions beyond reasonable doubt?
Granted that section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act contemplated civil suits generally, however, as shown earlier, while an election petition belongs to the limb of civil suits, election petitions are a special type of action, a sui generis class of litigation. Therefore, it naturally behooves a special different set of principles whose aim should be to do justice and nothing but justice. In a majority of election petitions in Nigeria, the allegations of crime are always mostly a recurring decimal. The present researcher from research and personal participation discovered that it is often difficult for the petitioner, where he alleges crime in election petition to be able to proof same beyond reasonable doubt.
The reason is rather simple. First, a keen observer of the Nigerian electoral process will note that most Nigerian elections are often allegedly marred by rigging and much violence, gunshots, thuggery and general bedlam. In these circumstances, it is natural for potential witnesses to be scared and scamper away for dear life. Then in the petition halls or court, it becomes difficult for these witnesses who saw such acts of violence to testify mostly out of fear. In a petition where the researcher participated in, a witness was kidnapped right in the premises of the petition hall. Therefore, when the petitioner under the Nigerian electoral petition system is required to proof his case of criminal allegation beyond reasonable doubt, the Petitioner will become hard-pressed to have witnesses who would be daredevils to hang around during the often dangerous acts of violence. In these instance, it becomes extremely difficult to prove before the court the alleged acts of violence and other criminal allegations. To compound issues for the petitioner, there are often no corroborative systems like the closed circuit televisions (CCTV) and law enforcement personnel. A comprehensive review of the petitioner’s position in proofing allegations of crime in an election petition beyond reasonable doubt will almost be similar to that of erecting the pyramids of Giza, at Egypt in a day.
The truth of the matter is that from a practical angle, proving most allegations of crime (except perhaps fraud on paper and forgery), especially in instances and occasions replete with violence and voter intimidation by kidnapping and shooting of guns at the voting arena, beyond reasonable doubt is an almost impossible herculean task.
The present researcher understands the tribunal/court’s need to be objective, and to be able to assess all facts with dispassionate eyes, yet if the facts do not even scale the premium bar of being admissible due to a rather stiff and onerous standard, how then can such fact find themselves in the much coveted golden scales of Lady Justitia?
The present researcher is therefore of the view that an exemption should be made or a special provision should be imported into the Evidence Act by amending section 135 (1) for the purpose of proofing allegations of crime in a civil suit with particular reference to an election petition. The bar is too high for the petitioner who is often in most instances not in control of the state apparatus. The present researcher actively advocates for a reduction of the standard of proof in proving a criminal allegation in election petition to be on preponderance of evidence.
A practical review of factual situations and the strict interpretation of section 135 (1) of the Act will mostly always leave the petitioner unable to proof the allegations of crime in his petition. The array of cases cited above and many others were lost by the petitioners because they could not prove the criminal allegations beyond reasonable doubt. This definitely raises the concern that this standard is not apt for a complex procedure like an election petition.
Therefore, it is highly recommended that either judicial activism or legislative review should be embarked on for the purpose of interpreting or amending section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act by making special recognition and provisions for election petitions.
Foreign jurisdiction election petition system: The United States as a case study
In the United States of America, their electoral system as a whole is slightly different from the Nigerian direct votes electoral system. In the United States, the president of the country is elected on a double platform of electoral college votes (which in recent times has been canvased to be abolished) and direct popular votes. The electoral college is more or less a committee of states’ delegates who meet to elect the president of the country established by virtue of Article II, section 1 of the United States’ Constitution. There are 538 electors (members of the electoral college) of whom at least 270 must vote to elect a person and his/her running mate as president and vice president respectively. While the electoral college elect the president, the American public also have a shot at casting their votes. However, the deciding voice in who goes or returns to the White House in the case of an incumbent is dependent, not on the vote of the American public but on the votes of the 538 persons selected from the 50 States of the United States.
Sometimes it has so happened that while the electoral college will elect a particular candidate, the popular votes will elect a different candidate. This happened during the candidacy of John Quincy Adams (1824 elections), Rutherford B. Hayes (1876 election), Benjamin Harrison (1888 election), George W. Bush (2000) and quite recently in 2016, when Hillary Clinton defeated Donald Trump in the popular election with over 2.8 million votes but the electoral college in a surprising move elected Donald Trump. The United States system provides that the winner of the presidential office is the person so certified by the Electoral College and not the popular votes.
The question then arises, what happens when a person loses an election in the United States? How relevant is their own system and why should the comparative analysis be drawn?
Usually after the United States elections (which usually occurs in November of the election year), the Legislative branch of government (called Congress) in a joint session meet on the next January 6th at exactly 1 p.m. where the votes of the electoral college are ratified. It will be recalled that it was in the last similar votes ratification session that an invasion of the United States Capitol by hoodlums allegedly inspired to act at the behest of former president Donald Trump occurred.
Once the Congress in a joint session give a go ahead of satisfaction with the votes, the elected person is sworn on January 20th at noon and thereafter no challenge whatsoever shall lie to such election. So, for the American presidential election system, their electoral petition system is a bit less hostile because of the entrenched constitutional safeguards. However, this is not to suggest that there have been no instances of discontent with election outcomes.
Usually, if the discontent pertains to state governorship or legislative post, the State’s highest court are empowered to hear and determine such controverted elections/ election results as an ordinary civil suit. Each state of the United State has its own supreme Court. It is when the Supreme Court of a particular state has adjudicated over a particular election result within that state’s jurisdiction that an aggrieved candidate can proceed to the final and last court of the country, the federal Supreme Court.
So, basically, in the United States, states laws and the Constitution detect how electoral results are contested whether for federal or state offices in so far as those elections were contested in the state. Regular civil courts handle election petition matters applying states laws. Basically, all election petitions start at the State Courts via regular civil proceedings. By US electoral laws, all decisions from the states’ supreme courts are final except, as previously mentioned, where an aggrieved candidate decides to pursue his case at the Federal Supreme Court or where there is a violation of federal constitutional rights or federal electoral laws.
To get a clearer idea of how the US election petition system works, we shall briefly examine the highly contentious case of George W. Bush & Anor v. Albert Gore Jnr & Anor (531 U.S. 98 2000).
In 2000, after a fiercely contested presidential election in the United States, all the states except Florida released their results for each candidate. Florida which had conducted its own election on November 7, 2000 had a challengeable issue with some ballot sheets. About 61,000 voters had submitted irregular sheets. Bush was set to win the state (incidentally, his brother Jeb Bush was the governor of the state) however in a ferocious legal move, the Gore team applied to the Florida Court to order an immediate recount of the 61,000 irregular sheets. The Florida Supreme Court after hearing arguments ruled in favour of Gore and ordered a recount of the 61,000 votes. The George Bush team, sensing a potential turn of the tide headed to the Federal Supreme Court where arguments were heard on December 11, 2000 and by December 12, 2000, the Court gave its ruling staying and overruling the Florida Supreme Court. With the stay and overruling decision, Florida gave the state to George Bush who together with votes obtained in other states crossed the 270 electoral college votes threshold by 1 extra vote to win the United States Presidency by 271 votes.
To fully appreciate the above suit, the legal arguments and wisdom canvassed therein as well as to understand the US system, kindly visit law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/531/98.
The whole point from the Bush v. Gore case is the rapidity with which the suit was heard both at the Florida supreme court and the Federal Supreme Court. The parties went home satisfied (both the winner and loser) that justice had been done. For a full study and review of the suit at the Florida Supreme Court kindly visit floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/242155/file/GoreResponseMotionTostay.pdf.
The point therefore is that there should be a modification of our election petition system to resemble that of the United States where election related matters are instituted, heard and determined in regular courts in the country. However, since the United States’ have a specialized court hierarchy system (for example in the State of Florida, like other states, they have a Supreme Court of Florida, Five District Courts of Appeal, 20 circuit courts (More like our own High Courts) and 67 county courts (more like Magistrate Courts). Since the states’ Supreme Court have territorial jurisdiction and finality in matters related to states’ law, that will place the hierarchical angle of the Supreme Court of a state at par with a State High Court in Nigeria.
In the suggestion that High courts should be saddled with the jurisdiction to hear and entertain election petition matters, the challenge that readily comes to mind is the possibility of bias and compromise on the part of the judge. Therefore, the Federal High Court superintending that state jurisdiction can be saddled with the judicial authority to hear and determine the election petition matters like every other ordinary civil suit. Appeals can rise therefrom to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.
The essence of this system will be to ensure a smooth, seamless and cost effective procedure as well as a linear litigation pattern for all election related matters. To ensure an objective evaluation of evidence and minimize the possibility of bias, the number of judges siting on such election matters can be increased to 3 (three) judges or more as obtainable in the United States jurisdiction.
Conclusion and recommendation
This article has attempted to review the election petition system in Nigeria. The article succeeded in analyzing the different election petition tribunals and Court obtainable under the election petition system, the grounds upon which election petitions are brought, the various qualifications required to contest an election, a critical review of the election petition tribunal/court proceedings from filing to pre-hearing, hearing and judgment and post judgement steps to enforce the tribunal/Court’s judgment. The article considered the 180 days’ timeline required for the dissipation and determination of all issues filed in the election petition for determination. The article also reviewed the foreign jurisdiction system with particular reference to the United States of American system with focus on the Bush v. Gore suit.
Having underscored all issues and matters arising from our discussion so far, this 2-part article will conclude with the following pertinent recommendations which have already been extensively canvassed in the body of the article.
First, as recommended in the foregoing paragraphs, our election petition system should be amended to allow election petition suits to be filed and heard in the regular courts like every other civil suit. In the case of presidential election matters, the Court of Appeal is apt as is currently obtainable, while for Governorship and Legislative election petitions, the Federal High Court should be vested with an exclusive original jurisdiction to hear, entertain and determine such petition matters. The court when sitting in its capacity as an election petition tribunal should be constituted of at least 3 (three) Judges. For the local government and area council election petitions, the states’ High Courts should have unfettered jurisdiction to hear and determine their election petition matters. Appeals from the High Court for the Local Government and Area Council election petition may then arise to the Court of Appeal where they shall be determined without further recourse to the Supreme Court.
Secondly as was suggested in the body of the article, with respects to costs and other financial implications, the normal financial requirements obtainable in ordinary civil suits should apply to the election petition matters instead of the burgeoning half a million cost required of the petitioner by way of security. It is understandable that the presence of this costs may act as some sort of barricade to sieve out the unserious litigants, to address the fear that many interlopers will abuse the cheap process, it should be bore in mind that the locus standi hallmark entrenched by way of those who are qualified to bring the petition and the defined grounds thereof will ensure that the seemingly cheap process is not abused. Besides, even in its presently costly state, an abuse can still occur. Hence, the argument cannot be sustained that when election petition fees are reduced that it will lead to abuse of the process.
Thirdly, as canvased in the body of the article, the 180 days’ timeline and the provisions of the CFRN and the obtainable judicial attitude, that once the 180 days are up, that no force on earth or above can resuscitate the petitioner’s suit (even where the petitioner is not to blame) should be holistically reviewed. As mentioned in the article, while the 180 days will serve as a safe harbor timeline to finalize and ensure a smooth transmission and continuity of government, yet like Section 293(5) CFRN, where a judgment is obtained in excess of that timeline, such judgment ought not to be void ab initio but rather should be voidable subject to a party’s application or after review by an appellate court.
Fourthly, this article also considered and reviewed the obtainable standard of proof in election petitions. It showed that the requirement of proving criminal allegations beyond reasonable doubt is too onerous and herculean a task for the petitioner. It was suggested that special provisions be made for the election petition as it was shown that under Nigerian circumstances that it is often very difficult if not impossible to prove most criminal allegations in election petitions beyond reasonable doubt. Hence an extensive review of the present obtainable standard was called for and it was suggested that the obtainable standard of proving all allegations in an election petition, whether civil or criminal, should be on balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence.
Finally, the aim of this article as a whole is to critically underscore and consider the question whether the election petition system in Nigeria is not rigged against the petitioner? After salient discussions and review, in some quarters, it was shown and seen that the election petition system is currently rigged against the petitioner. Albeit it must be mentioned that this is not intentional on the part of the court or drafters of the relevant laws and constitution. However, overtime and in practice, the sheer enforcement and literal interpretation of some of the provisions of the various obtainable laws and judicial principles have worked to rig the system against the petitioner.
Those critical sectors and points needing urgent reforms have been canvased in this article. It is therefore the aim of this article and the prayer of the present researcher that these suggestions and recommendations highlighted above and extensively discussed in the body of the article be implemented to ensure that all parties in an election petition are given a fair and level playing ground to ventilate their grievances and go home at the end of the day with verdicts served on golden scales of equity, justice and fairness.
