- Says parents must provide haven for children in abusive marriages
- ‘Parents-in-law should know that their son’s wife is not called a “daughter in-law” as a mere formality‘
An Upper Customary of Kaduna State in Kafanchan has ruled that necessary support and guidance to a child who is married, especially when the marriage becomes toxic and life-threatening, is not an undue interference, while calling on parents not to turn a blind eye to wards facing domestic violence in their marriages.
The court, while delivering judgment in the marital dispute between Talatu Williams (Petitioner) and Williams Sunday (Respondent), commended Talatu’s mother, who eventually realised she should rather receive her daughter back than allow her to be killed in a violent marriage that had already harmed her physically and left her grandchildren emotionally battered.
Hear His Worship Emmanuel Samaila.
“We also wish to make two observations on parental responsibilities to their children. Firstly, providing necessary support and guidance to a child who has been given out in marriage, especially when the marriage becomes toxic and life-threatening, is not an undue interference. The Court notes with satisfaction that at the end of her testimony, the Petitioner’s mother (Pw1) came to the noble and humane realization that were her daughter to be killed in her marriage, the Respondent will remarry while she loses her child. As a matter of fact, after the departure of her daughter from her matrimonial home and even without divorcing her, the Respondent has remarried. It is hoped that parents will take care of their children and provide a safe haven for them at home especially when they are faced with domestic violence in their matrimonial homes.
“We would also want to state that the failure of the Respondent’s parents to take steps to act pursuant to the Petitioner’s distress call is despicable. The Petitioner narrated how she reached out to her in-laws when faced with their son’s brutality but was ignored as they never intervened to caution their son and admonish him to treat his wife with dignity and love. Parents in-law should know that their son’s wife is not called a “daughter in-law” as a mere formality but as an attestation to the fact that she has left her parents and is now directly under new parents who are expected to treat her not just as their son’s wife but also as a daughter. Would the Respondent’s parents be happy if the inhumane treatments meted on the Petitioner were done to their biological daughter? We do not think so. We also find the Respondent’s witnesses’ description of the Petitioner as having nothing when she was married as being disrespectful and distasteful. Do they know what she would have become in the society or what she would have had were her education not truncated after the Respondent impregnated her outside wedlock, especially seeing the business acumen she demonstrated?
“Secondly, we also observed from the evidence of Pw1, the Petitioner’s mother, that their non-interference in the plight of their daughter in her matrimonial home, despite the obvious and numerous acts of life threatening violence by the Respondent, appears to be borne out of a religious conviction. It is of note that even though God is said to hate divorce (Malachi 2:16), there is nowhere in the Holy Book that domestic violence is justified. Rather, the Bible requires husbands to love their wives just as Christ loves the church, an act that will naturally make their wives to submit without reservation. (Ephesians 5: 21-29)
“A deep seated conviction and belief in the God and the Bible is not a justification for turning a blind eye and burying one’s head in the sand like the proverbial ostrich. Marriage is an institution into which parents give their children out with the belief that they will build their homes with love and respect. It is also a union between two people who decided to take their affection for each other to a higher level. Would the parents of a woman allow and encourage their daughter to marry a man who will treat her with indignity and beat her as if she were a child? We do not think so. Even the Bible-inspired phrase drawn from Proverbs 13:14 says, “Spare the rod, spoil the child”, not “Spare the rod, spoil the wife.”
“If a suitor should tell a lady’s parents that after marrying their daughter he will no longer respect them and will subject their daughter to indignity and violence will they agree to give him their daughter? We do not think so. What kind of man will maltreat a woman even in the presence of her children? What manner of man will subject a woman to violence: a woman that has given birth to five children; a woman whose body handled ravaging and conflicting hormones five times during the nine months of pregnancies, each with its peculiarities; a woman who struggled to recover after each nursing and nurturing period for each of their five children; a woman who survived and recovered from a violence-induced miscarriage and most likely suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and or depression after one or all her childbirths and all these within 20 years of marriage, the same period she still managed a business successfully to contribute to making their home financially stable?
“It is hoped that the Respondent will amend his ways and treat the women he takes as wives with dignity, love and respect. A spouse whose marriage has become toxic and life-threatening should know that it is okay to seek help and guidance because remaining in such a union, which may lead to their death, is not a virtue. They should always remember that being alive is more important than being in a toxic and life-threatening relationship where death is just a matter of time. Marriage is not a licence to treat another adult as one treats a child or a slave. The token paid by a man as bride price is not a purchase price which grants him ownership of the woman to deal with as he pleases and discard her as he wishes without consequences…”
Below is the full text of the judgment.
IN THE UPPER CUSTOMARY COURT OF KADUNA STATE
IN THE KAFANCHAN JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT KAFANCHAN
UCCK/CV/157/2023 22ND SEPTEMBER, 2024
BEFORE:
HIS WORSHIP EMMANUEL J. SAMAILA, ESQ. – JUDGE
MR JAMES K. KAJANG – MEMBER
BETWEEN
TALATU WILLIAMS – PETITIONER
AND
WILLIAMS SUNDAY – RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
The parties got married over 20 years ago and lived together. The Petitioner gave birth to five children but only four are alive today. About two years ago, she returned to her parents’ house after she decided she will no longer endure the beatings she has been receiving from the Respondent. After taking several steps to get the Petitioner to provide for their children without success, she approached the Court. When this case commenced afresh in May 2024, her claims, as stated by her Counsel, Ambisa NJ Adze, Esq., are as follows:
- The dissolution of the marriage conducted under Jaba custom and tradition.
- The sum of N5million as a result of an apartment she built together with the Respondent.
- Custody of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th children of the marriage: Rejoice Williams (16 years old), Josiah Williams (12 years old) and Gracious Williams (4 years old).
- Costs of this action.
The Respondent’s counsel, J.B. Audu, Esq., did not contest the dissolution of the marriage but denied liability for the other claims.
In proof of her claims, Tabitha Bawa, herself, Hamisu Hamani, Yem Dabo and Charles Solomon gave evidence as Pw1 – Pw5 respectively. She tendered 10 receipts of the building materials she bought. They were admitted in evidence as Exhibits P1-P10. In his defence, the Respondent testified as Rw1 and invited Sunday Bako as Rw2. The parties’ Counsel addressed the Court after the house in issue and the Petitioner’s shop were visited.
In his final address, the Respondent’s Counsel, N.R. Yem, Esq. framed a lone question for determination as follows: Whether the Petitioner is entitled to her claim of compensation or damages under customary marriage but particularly under Jaba custom. He answered it in the negative. He submitted that under Jaba custom, children inherit their parents, hence the matrimonial home, which is jointly built by the parties, is the inheritance of their children to the exclusion of any other person. He further submitted that the Petitioner had nothing when she was married and the money she claimed to have invested in the building project was obtained from the family business which she was running. He referred the Court to Adim v NBC Ltd (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1200) 543 at 549.
On the custody of the parties’ children, Counsel submitted that the Respondent has paid the Petitioner’s bride price, hence he should automatically get the custody of the parties’ children as they are already with him and he is already taking care of them. He referred the Court to Akande Karimu & Ors v Joseph Oyewole (2003) 6 WRN 36-192 and urged the Court to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim with punitive costs in favour of the Respondent.
In his brief address, the Petitioner’s counsel adopted the Respondent counsel’s lone issue for determination. He answered it in the positive. He submitted that the Respondent did not contest the dissolution of the marriage and added that the Petitioner has proved her claims for custody and damages. He urged the Court to grant their reliefs.
Considering the totality of the parties’ evidence, we distilled the following questions for resolution:
- Does a valid marriage in accordance with Jaba custom exist between the parties?
- Has the Petitioner placed credible evidence before the Court to establish her claim for the sum of N5million as compensation for her contribution in the building of their matrimonial home?
- Will the best interest of the parties’ children be guaranteed with the Petitioner who asked for it?
By virtue of Section 24 of the Customary Courts Law 2001, Customary Courts in Kaduna State are to apply customary laws, the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience in the determination of civil disputes. The Courts are also empowered to use common sense and simplicity devoid of technicalities to do substantial justice. See Section 59 of the Customary Courts Law 2001 and Agbasi v. Obi (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 1 at 14, paras. A-B. It is also permissible for Customary Courts to consider the totality of the evidence of the parties, irrespective of their claims, to deduce and justly resolve the actual issues in dispute. See Ibrahim v. Abashe & Ors (2014) KCCLR-24 (CCA). It is noteworthy that the appearance of legal practitioners in the Customary Courts does not affect the principles of adjudication in the Court. See the admonition of Idigbe, JSC in Chief Karimu Ajagunjeun v Sobo Osho of Yeku Village & Ors (1977) LLJR-SC. These authorities will be operational in the mind of the Court as we resolved the questions raised.
Question 1
Does a valid marriage in accordance with jaba custom exist between the parties?
Pw1’s testimony that the parties are married is materially corroborated by the evidence of Pw2, Pw3 and Pw5. It is also materially supported by the evidence of Rw1 and Rw2. Even though the Petitioner was impregnated outside wedlock by the Respondent according to Pw1, Rw2 averred that they subsequently paid her bride price. Under Jaba custom, as can be deduced from the parties’ evidence, the payment of bride price is an essential requirement in the process of creating a valid marriage. In the instant case, it is not in doubt that the Respondent has performed the customary rite for his union with the Petitioner after impregnating her outside wedlock.
Considering the evidence of the parties alongside the Jaba marriage custom, we resolve Question 1 in the affirmative. We find that a valid marriage in accordance with Jaba custom exists between the parties. We so hold. Consequently, this marriage is hereby dissolved with effect from today, 22nd September, 2025.
Question 2
Has the Petitioner placed credible evidence before the Court to establish her claim for the sum of N5million as compensation for her contribution in the building of their matrimonial home?
Pw1 testified that the parties jointly built their matrimonial home and the Petitioner’s contribution in the project was even higher. Under cross-examination, the witness said she does not know how much the Petitioner has put in the building but insisted that the house belongs to both of them.
The testimony of Pw2 materially corroborates that of Pw1 that she and the Respondent jointly built their matrimonial home. The witness filled in the details of her contributions to the project to perfection before they packed in. She narrated her financial contributions which are partly evidenced by Exhibits P1 – P10. Her evidence also shows her passion and commitment to seeing to the completion of the building. She narrated how she personally supervised the building project and how she traveled twice or thrice weekly to Kaduna and returned sometimes at night in order to restock her shop, the profit of which enabled them to begin and sustain the building project. In fact, the testimony of Rw2, the Respondent’s father, materially supports this piece of evidence when he said: “It was from the business that they were able to live well and peacefully.” That statement aligns with Pw2’s evidence under cross-examination that she can make N1million profit weekly and only two them were into the business when she started. It is apparent from Pw2’s evidence that she did not only invest her money in the building project but also her time. This is an invaluable resource when viewed alongside the Respondent’s admission in his evidence as Rw1 that “by the nature of my work, I am not usually at home.”
As Rw1, the Respondent asserted that he was the one who opened the shop for the Petitioner. His evidence that they jointly built the house was qualified with the assertion that he gave the Petitioner the money for the building materials and labour. However, he did not state in what form or manner he gave her the money, whether cash or by transfer. No bank statement was tendered to evidence any transfer of any money to the Petitioner to materially contradict her testimony that it was the profit from her business that she used in the building project.
Rw2 stated that the Petitioner did not come with anything when she was married. He asserted that it was the Respondent that opened the business for her. Under cross-examination, he stated that it was the sum of N50,000 that the Respondent gave her to start the business. This piece of evidence was not corroborated as Rw1 who allegedly gave the money did not mention any such amount. Moreover, Pw2 had testified that long before the plastic business, she sold shoes and bags after her WAEC. That fact demonstrates her business acumen and a plus to her assertion that she is running a successful plastic business.
Pw3 – Pw5 are some of the workers engaged by the Petitioner who testified about who contracted them, the work they did and how much they were paid. They all admitted under cross examination that they would not know whether it was the Respondent that gave the Petitioner the money for the building materials and labour.
From the evidence of the parties, certain facts indisputable:
- The parties jointly built their matrimonial home, that is, the 3-bedroom flat in issue.
- The Petitioner is a successful businesswoman who invested the profits from her business in the building project.
- The Petitioner also devoted her time to buying some of the building materials, paying the workers and supervising the work.
- The Respondent was also personally involved in the work such as supplying sand and bringing block makers.
- The Petitioner was actively involved in the building project while running her business and taking care of their children as the Respondent is not usually at home.
We pause here to ask: Are these facts sufficient to establish the Petitioner’s claim for N5million as compensation for her contribution to the building of their matrimonial home? Should her contribution to the building project be limited to provable financial contributions only? Should her care for the parties’ children and other matrimonial duties be considered in determining the quantum of her share in their matrimonial home? Is the fact that she began the plastic business, which indisputably became successful, be watered down because she started it after marrying the Respondent? These questions are all subsets of Question 1. In resolving them, we shall draw inspiration from Jaba custom, equity, common sense, natural Justice and good conscience which we earlier stated as being operational in the mind of the Court in resolving the disputes between the parties.
There is no credible evidence to the contrary that the Petitioner cannot claim her share of their matrimonial home. In fact, it is the quantum of her contribution that was contested by the Respondent who admitted that they jointly built the property. Apparently, the Petitioner is aware of the limits of her right to their matrimonial properties when she stated that the land upon which they built their matrimonial home was a gift from the Respondent’s grandmother. She also did not include the 3-rooms they built on the land and the new three rooms which have reached lintel level. Her exclusion of these buildings is a concession on her part to the more significant roles played by the Respondent in their construction. Without further ado, we hold that the Petitioner has a right under Jaba custom, as a divorcee, especially one who has been and is still taking care of the parties’ children, to share in their matrimonial home otherwise, the custom would have been declared repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. Such a custom would have been unenforceable being unconstitutional as it will discriminate against the right of a woman to share in a matrimonial property she has, indisputably, invested in multi-dimensionally. We so hold.
We also ask: Is it equitable for the Petitioner to take a share of their matrimonial home? We draw inspiration for our answer to this question from the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya in JOO v MBO & Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA Kenya) & Anor [2023] KESC 4 (KLR). Even though the parties in the case were married under the Act, the Court based its decision on the settlement of properties not just on statutory laws but also on the principles of equity. The Court held that:
To our minds, equity is an important principle when it comes to matrimonial property since what is fair as it relates to equity is not a question of the quantitative contribution by each party but rather the contribution by any party in any form, whether direct or indirect. Any substantial contribution by a party to a marriage that led to acquisition of matrimonial property, even though such contribution is indirect, but nevertheless has in one way or another, enabled the acquisition of such property amounts to significant contribution. Such direct or indirect acts as was discussed by Lord Justice Fox in Burns v Burns [1984] 1 All ER 244 may include:
i. Paying part of the purchase price of the matrimonial property.
ii. Contributing regularly to the monthly payments in the acquisition of such property.
iii. Making a substantial financial contribution to the family expenses so as to enable the mortgage instalments to be paid.
iv. Contributing to the running of and welfare of the home and easing the burden of the spouse paying for the property.
v. Caring for children and the family at large as the other spouse works to earn money to pay for the property.
The principle in this persuasive decision applies to the facts in the instant case, particularly to the multi-dimensional contributions made by the Petitioner in the building of their matrimonial home.
In the more recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Aguolu v Aguolu (2025) LPELR-80269 (CA), the Court reiterated the positions of the law on the settlement of properties which echoes the conclusion reached by the Kenyan Supreme Court. The Court held that a mere marriage, without more, does not entitle a spouse to an equal share of a matrimonial property. The marriage in issue in Aguolu’s case is also a statutory marriage. The Court noted that the settlement of properties in matrimonial causes is subject to the discretion of the Court which is to be exercised based on the evidence of the parties, not in isolation. It is noteworthy that Section 72 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1970 which was referenced by the Court requires that in the settlement of properties, the Court should consider what is “just and equitable in the circumstance of the case.” The Court also referenced Fribance v Fribance (1957) 1 All ER 357 at 360 CA where Denning L.J. (as he then was) held that:
In the present case, it so happened that the wife went out to work and used her earnings to help run the household and buy the children’s clothes whilst the husband saved. It might very well have been the other way around. The title of the family asset does not depend on the mere chance of which way around it was. It does not depend on how they happen to allocate their expenditure. The whole of the resources were expended on their joined benefit … and the product should belong to them jointly. It belongs to them in equal shares.
In the instant case, the Petitioner has demonstrated beyond persuasion that she has committed not just her resources but also her time in the building of their matrimonial home.
Considering the evidence of the parties alongside the applicable laws, we answer Question 2 in their affirmative. We find that the Petitioner has presented a credible and cogent evidence to establish her claim for N5million as compensation for her contributions to the building of their matrimonial home. We so hold.
But should we award this sum without knowing the actual value of the property? Our answer is in the negative as doing so might occasion injustice to the Respondent. Therefore, we reason that it will be fairer to both parties if we make an alternative but equitable order in the circumstance. Consequently, the Court hereby orders that the parties’ matrimonial home, particularly the 3-bedroom flat, be valued and sold and the proceeds shared between them in the ratio of 40:60, as the justice of this case demands. The property shall be valued by a qualified and independent private estate valuer. The Registrar of this Court shall supervise the execution of this judgment.
Question 3
Will the best interest of the parties’ children be better guaranteed with the Petitioner who claims it?
Pw1 testified that the parties lived together with their children and were firsthand witnesses of the numerous acts of violence their father inflicted on their mother. The witness narrated four incidents of such violence against the Petitioner one of which led to the breaking of her hand. She also narrated how the parties’ children were the ones sent by the Petitioner to inform her of some of the beatings. The witness further averred that the parties’ children are presently living with their mother at her (witness’) house where the Petitioner has been solely responsible for their upkeep for the past two years since they all left the parties’ matrimonial home. These pieces of evidence were not challenged by the Respondent.
The evidence of Pw2 is materially corroborative of the testimony of Pw1. The witness stated that the Respondent stopped providing for their children even before they followed her when she left their matrimonial home. She also narrated how she struggled to source for the fees for their older children who got admission into tertiary institutions to the extent of reporting the Respondent to Human Rights and Civil Defence. Human Rights is an expression used by some litigants to refer to the Sexual Assault Referral Centre – SARC (Salama Centre), Kafanchan where cases of gender-based violence are being reported. The witness also stated the limited role her father in-law (Rw2) played in the education of their children. Pw2 also testified that the Respondent has given out their children’s room to tenants while he occupies the remaining room with his new wife. These pieces of evidence were not impeached under cross examination. Rather, the aim of the Respondent during the cross examination was to try to blackmail the Petitioner into agreeing that their matrimonial home is their children’s inheritance and should not be sold.
In his evidence, Rw1’s attempt to contradict the testimonies of Pw1 and Pw2 on his lack of care for their children was not persuasive. The witness made general assertions without any concrete material or credible corroboratory evidence to buttress it. Rw2’s attempt to corroborate Rw1’s testimony is also not persuasive as he also made general assertions about the Respondent’s care for their children. However, the witness’ testimony materially supports the evidence of Pw1 and Pw2 that the parties’ children are presently with the Petitioner.
From the evidence of the parties’ witnesses, it is apparent that their children have been with the Petitioner since she left her matrimonial home. It is also established that the Respondent does not care for their children, at least prior to their departure with their mother from their house to her parents’ house two years ago. In fact, the unchallenged evidence of Pw2 that the Respondent has rented their children’s room showed the extent of the Respondent’s lack of care and concern for their children’s future as he has no intention to keep them. Interestingly, these are the same children he is naming as the heirs of the parties’ matrimonial home, a ploy obviously aimed at blackmailing the Petitioner into agreeing that the house should not be sold.
The law is settled that the payment of fees is not the only thing that the welfare of a child entails. Among other equal components of a child’s welfare is the provision of a safe and healthy environment to enable the child to be nurtured into a responsible adult. In view of the Respondent’s numerous maltreatment and beatings of the parties’ mother in the presence of their children, is there any justification to allow him near them? What kind of adults will they grow up to be if they are continually exposed to such unwholesome behaviours? Wouldn’t their sons grow up believing that wives are to be treated with indignity? Wouldn’t they grow up believing that wives deserve to be beaten at will and abandoned without any consequences? Wouldn’t their daughters grow up with the perverted mindset that women deserve to be beaten rather than treated with dignity? Given what the parties’ children have experienced in their developing and pre-adult years, we are of the view that it is necessary that they are kept in the custody a person who will give them a healthy environment to grow and hopefully imbibe a positive view of the family and marriage relationship.
In Odogwu v Odogwu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt 215) 2, the Court held that:
The welfare of child is not the material provision in the house – good clothes, food, air conditioners, television, all gadgets normally associated with the middle class, – it is more of the happiness of the child and his psychological development.
This principle aptly aligns with the circumstance of this case.
Ordinarily, the wishes of the parties’ children would have been sought but for the fact that the Court does not wish to disturb their recovery period after their unpleasant experiences while living with both parents. The Court also notes the Respondent’ lack of concern and care for the parties’ children, especially after they followed their mother. He placed no credible and persuasive evidence before the Court to show that he has been providing for their children since they left the house. We see the Respondent’s act of demarcating their children’s rooms from the rest of the flat and letting it out as the absence of an intention to have them back and keep them. It is no wonder that he did not even counterclaim their custody.
Considering the evidence of the parties alongside the applicable laws, we answer Question 3 in the affirmative. We find that the Petitioner has placed credible and persuasive evidence before the Court to establish her claim to the custody of their children. We so hold. Therefore, the custody of the parties’ children is hereby granted to the Petitioner. In order to give the Respondent the opportunity to make things right with his children, he is hereby granted visitation rights to see them, an act he should do with utmost respect for his ex-wife and former in-laws. In addition, the Court hereby orders the Respondent to send the sum of N100,000 monthly to the Petitioner for the upkeep of their four children. These orders are not absolute as they can be varied pursuant to an application by either party or the Court in accordance with Section 27(2) of the Customary Courts Law 2001.
Before concluding this judgment, we wish to state that the inhumane treatment the Respondent subjected the Petitioner to while they were living together is condemnable and a criminal act. No spouse has the right to be violent towards the other as there are civilized, dignified, responsible and matured ways of handling matrimonial disputes without resorting to violence. The fact that the Respondent had beaten and injured the Petitioner numerously was unchallenged. So also is the evidence that he abandoned her, and by extension their children, for one week without care or concern after one of such beatings. There was also no disputation by the Respondent of the averment that he has not made any provision for the upkeep of his wife and children after they followed their mother to his in-law’s house. It is also not disputed that it was after the Petitioner began mounting pressure on the Respondent to provide for their children that he decided to tell her he no longer desires her as a wife, an act which led her to institute this case so that their rights and obligations can be judicially determined. In Pius Abur v. Alphosus Igbudu & Anor (2007) KCCLR-180 (CCA), the Customary Court of Appeal, Kaduna held that general damages need not be claimed or proved but may be granted by the Court if the circumstance of a case warrants it.
Considering the foregoing, we reason that the circumstance of this case, particularly the physical abuse, abandonment, emotional and psychological traumas inflicted on the Petitioner by the Respondent, warrants the award of general damages to her. Therefore, damages in the sum of N2million is hereby awarded in favour of the Petitioner against the Respondent.
We also wish to make two observations on parental responsibilities to their children. Firstly, providing necessary support and guidance to a child who has been given out in marriage, especially when the marriage becomes toxic and life-threatening, is not an undue interference. The Court notes with satisfaction that at the end of her testimony, the Petitioner’s mother (Pw1) came to the noble and humane realization that were her daughter to be killed in her marriage, the Respondent will remarry while she loses her child. As a matter of fact, after the departure of her daughter from her matrimonial home and even without divorcing her, the Respondent has remarried. It is hoped that parents will take care of their children and provide a safe haven for them at home especially when they are faced with domestic violence in their matrimonial homes.
We would also want to state that the failure of the Respondent’s parents to take steps to act pursuant to the Petitioner’s distress call is despicable. The Petitioner narrated how she reached out to her in-laws when faced with their son’s brutality but was ignored as they never intervened to caution their son and admonish him to treat his wife with dignity and love. Parents in-law should know that their son’s wife is not called a “daughter in-law” as a mere formality but as an attestation to the fact that she has left her parents and is now directly under new parents who are expected to treat her not just as their son’s wife but also as a daughter. Would the Respondent’s parents be happy if the inhumane treatments meted on the Petitioner were done to their biological daughter? We do not think so. We also find the Respondent’s witnesses’ description of the Petitioner as having nothing when she was married as being disrespectful and distasteful. Do they know what she would have become in the society or what she would have had were her education not truncated after the Respondent impregnated her outside wedlock, especially seeing the business acumen she demonstrated?
Secondly, we also observed from the evidence of Pw1, the Petitioner’s mother, that their non-interference in the plight of their daughter in her matrimonial home, despite the obvious and numerous acts of life threatening violence by the Respondent, appears to be borne out of a religious conviction. It is of note that even though God is said to hate divorce (Malachi 2:16), there is nowhere in the Holy Book that domestic violence is justified. Rather, the Bible requires husbands to love their wives just as Christ loves the church, an act that will naturally make their wives to submit without reservation. (Ephesians 5: 21-29)
A deep seated conviction and belief in the God and the Bible is not a justification for turning a blind eye and burying one’s head in the sand like the proverbial ostrich. Marriage is an institution into which parents give their children out with the belief that they will build their homes with love and respect. It is also a union between two people who decided to take their affection for each other to a higher level. Would the parents of a woman allow and encourage their daughter to marry a man who will treat her with indignity and beat her as if she were a child? We do not think so. Even the Bible-inspired phrase drawn from Proverbs 13:14 says, “Spare the rod, spoil the child”, not “Spare the rod, spoil the wife.”
If a suitor should tell a lady’s parents that after marrying their daughter he will no longer respect them and will subject their daughter to indignity and violence will they agree to give him their daughter? We do not think so. What kind of man will maltreat a woman even in the presence of her children? What manner of man will subject a woman to violence: a woman that has given birth to five children; a woman whose body handled ravaging and conflicting hormones five times during the nine months of pregnancies, each with its peculiarities; a woman who struggled to recover after each nursing and nurturing period for each of their five children; a woman who survived and recovered from a violence-induced miscarriage and most likely suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and or depression after one or all her childbirths and all these within 20 years of marriage, the same period she still managed a business successfully to contribute to making their home financially stable? It is hoped that the Respondent will amend his ways and treat the women he takes as wives with dignity, love and respect. A spouse whose marriage has become toxic and life-threatening should know that it is okay to seek help and guidance because remaining in such a union, which may lead to their death, is not a virtue. They should always remember that being alive is more important than being in a toxic and life-threatening relationship where death is just a matter of time. Marriage is not a licence to treat another adult as one treats a child or a slave. The token paid by a man as bride price is not a purchase price which grants him ownership of the woman to deal with as he pleases and discard her as he wishes without consequences.
The costs of this action in the sum of N300,000 is hereby about awarded in favour of the Petitioner against the Respondent. The total judgment sum, N2.3million, shall be paid within 30 days from today. Interest at the rate of 10% shall accrue annually on the judgment sum until it is finally and fully paid.
Any party that is dissatisfied with this decision may appeal to the Customary Court of Appeal, Kaduna within 30 days from today, 22nd September 2025.
Signed 22.09.2025
