Adodo’s alarm over Governor Aiyedatiwa’s alleged disrespect for the constitution and the imperative of legal impregnability as a necessary condition for effective governance in Nigeria

By Sylvester Udemezue

1. The Fifth Alteration (No. 23) Act, 2023 to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 introduced a notable reform to Section 192. A new Section 192(6) now provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, the nomination of any person to the office of a Commissioner for confirmation by the House of Assembly shall be done within sixty days after the date the Governor has taken the oath of office: Provided that the Governor may appoint a Commissioner at any other time during his tenure, and such appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the House of Assembly.”
2. A similar provision, designed to ensure timely formation of the Federal Executive Council and enhance effective governance, is seen in Section 147 (7), which provides: _”Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, the nomination of any person to the office of a Minister for confirmation by the Senate shall be done within sixty days after the date the President has taken the oath of office: Provided that the President may appoint a Minister at any other time during his tenure, and such appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate.”
3. Although these amendments, as beautiful as they appear, were ostensibly designed to promote the timely constitution of Federal and State Executive Councils, and thereby enhance good governance by imposing clear deadlines for the nomination of ministers and commissioners, it is unfortunate that they provide no sanctions for non-compliance. Besides, the provisions are neither self-enforcing, self-executing, nor legally impregnable. As a result, the provisions are easy manipulate, and there are virtually no real consequences for a breach, except perhaps the theoretical option of impeachment by the legislature. Sadly, in a country like Nigeria, where the legislative arm at all levels often functions more as an appendage of the executive than as an independent check, it is almost laughable to expect the legislature to pursue such accountability measures. Consequently, there is no genuine compulsion on the President or any Governor to comply with these provisions.
4. In a recent article titled “Inchoate Constitution Of The Ondo State Executive Council More Than Sixty Days After Governor Lucky Orimisan Aiyedatiwa’s Inauguration: Implications For Constitutional Compliance And Inclusive Governance”, published on 19 May 2025, my learned friend and respected public-interest advocate, Vincent Adodo, Esq., raises concern over the Governor’s failure to fully constitute the Ondo State Executive Council more than 60 days after assuming office, contrary to the constitutional requirement. According to Learned Adodo, only two commissioners have been appointed, leaving the majority of ministries without leadership. He argues that this delay undermines the inclusive governance envisaged under Sections 192(2) and 14(4) of the Constitution, both of which emphasize equitable representation and broad-based participation in governance. He therefore calls for urgent compliance through the nomination of commissioners from all nine federal constituencies in the state.
5. With utmost respect to the learned author, I offer a cautionary reflection; while the Governor’s inaction is politically and morally troubling, the legal consequences may not be as far-reaching as presumed. In reality, provisions such as Sections 192(6) and 147(3) of the Constitution, though seemingly progressive, are ultimately pregnable, they allow for manipulation and lack the force needed to ensure compliance. These provisions reflect a wider pattern of poorly conceived and weakly enforced legal reforms, symptomatic of a system where institutions are fragile and individuals often exercise authority above the law.
6. In a polity such as ours, where the rule of law is frequently subordinated to political expediency, any legal reform that permits discretionary delay or uneven enforcement is, in practical terms, ineffective. A law that cannot compel obedience or ensure accountability is, for all intents and purposes, useless.
7. Our lived experience has consistently shown that the average Nigerian, when intent on evading the law, will exploit every loophole and discretionary window. Thus, the focus should shift from making more laws to making better laws, laws that are stiff, self-enforcing, and legally impregnable. For any law to be truly effective, it must be constructed in a way that compels automatic compliance and eliminates opportunities for delay or abuse.
8. In a country where adherence to legal norms is often the exception rather than the rule, we need laws that reflect the difficult terrain they are meant to regulate. We must stop assuming that citizens and officials will naturally act in good faith. Instead, we must design laws that leave no room for manipulation. Cosmetic amendments like Section 192(6), without mechanisms for immediate enforcement or sanctions, fail to meet this standard.
9. Indeed, the most effective guard against fraud and executive inertia is the elimination of discretion in enforcement. Our laws must foreclose the possibility of subjective interpretation or selective application by any stakeholder, especially those with vested interests in the system. Where discretion exists, abuse follows. Where enforcement is negotiable, compliance becomes optional.
10. The hard truth, the REALITY, is that our Legislature has not yet demonstrated the will to drive real, transformative reform. Instead, it continues to offer superficial or even mischievous distractions, such as the constitutionally dubious proposal to impose compulsory voting, while ignoring the deeper structural problems that plague our governance system. In a forthcoming paper, I intend to further interrogate the concept of legal impregnability as a necessary condition for achieving meaningful effectiveness in governance, law enforcement, and public accountability. For those who have requested an example of an impregnable system change or legal reform, I have attempted to provide one in my paper titled “How Nigeria’s National Assembly Can Make the Electoral Act/System Impregnable on Electronic Transmission to Prevent Fraud During Election Result Collation.” [See: Udemezue, Sylvester, “How Nigeria’s National Assembly Can Make the Electoral Act/System Impregnable on Electronic Transmission to Prevent Fraud During Election Result Collation” (August 13, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4929155 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4929155].
    Respectfully,
    §¢µð𝓮̂𝓶𝓮̂𝔃µ𝓮̂
    Sylvester Udemezue (udems)
    Legal Practitioner, Law Teacher, and Proctor of The Reality Ministry of Truth, Law and Justice (A Public Interest Law Advocacy Group)
    08021365545 | 08109024556
    TheRealityMinister@gmail.com
    19 May 2025